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EVIDENCE OF LIES AND RULES OF EVIDENCE:
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF FMRI-BASED EXPERT OPINION OF
WITNESS TRUTHFULNESS

William A. Woodruff
Neuroscientists are exploring intriguing technology that some
claim will revolutionize the jury's search for truth. Functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging ("MRI") seeks to correlate brain
activity with cognitivefunction. Current research with regardto lie
detection indicates that laboratorystudies have achieved accuracy
rates in excess of 90% in identifying deception and verifying truth
in study participants.But how likely will this new technology be
useful in the context of the rules governing the impeachment and
rehabilitationof witnesses at trial? Does the new technology meet
the reliability standards demanded of expert scientific opinion?
Has the neuroscience community generally accepted the reliability
of JMRI as a lie detector? Will professional opinions on witness
truthfulness actually help the jury in its fact-finding role? Or, will
it confuse and confound the jury in its essential task of reaching a
verdict?
Judicial scrutiny and scholarly commentary to date has
focused on the reliability of expert opinion and whether the
neuroscience community has generally accepted this new
application of fMRI with little consideration of other evidentiary
requirements that may limit expert opinion testimony of witness
truthfulness. This Article identifies thirteen impediments to
admissibilityandpresents them underfive major categories: (1) the
regulation of impeachment and rehabilitationof witnesses; (2) the
requirement that expert testimony help the jury to understand the
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evidence or decide a fact in issue; (3) the rule requiring expert
testimony to be based upon reliable principles and methods; (4)
the requirement in some jurisdictions that novel scientific
principles be generally accepted by the relevant scientific
community; and (5) the balancing of unfair prejudice and
probative value of the opinion testimony.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Despite media hype' and at least one company still offering
scientific expert testimony on whether a witness is telling the
truth,2 proponents of functional magnetic resonance imaging
("fMRI") as a lie detector have failed in three attempts to admit the
new technology as evidence of witness truthfulness 3 at trial. A
federal district judge in Tennessee,' a New York state trial judge,'

See Brains on Trial (PBS television broadcast Sept. 11 & 18, 2013),

available at http://brainsontrial.com/; Your Cheating Brain, BBC NEWS (Nov.
12, 2001), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1651974.stm; Lie Detection:
Making Windows in Men's Souls, THE ECONOMIST (July 8, 2004), http://www.
economist.com/node/2897134/print?StoryID=2897134; Steve Silberman, Don't
Even Think About Lying, WIRED (Jan. 2006), http://www.wired.com/wired/
archive/14.01/ lying.html; Why do People Cheat? Dateline Explores (Part 5),
NBC NEWS (Dateline NBC television broadcast, May 8, 2009), http://www.
msnbc.msn.com/ id/30645239/ns/datelinenbc-healthstories/; Mind Reading,
CBS NEWS (June 28, 2009), http://www.cbsnews.com/videos/mind-reading50073711; Adi Narayan, The fMRI Brain Scan: A Better Lie Detector?, TIME
(July 20, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1911546-1,00.html;
Virginia Hughes, Science in Court: A Head Case, NATURE (Mar. 17, 2010),
http://www.nature.com/ news/2010/100317/full/464340a.html.
2 No

LIE MRI, INC., http://noliemri.com (last visited Mar. 13, 2014). Until

early in 2013, a second company, Cephos Corp., http://www.cephoscorp.com
(last visited Mar. 7, 2014), also offered truth verification services using fMRI.
3 With the exception of the emerging theory that fMRI can "decode" memory
and reveal something that is in the subject's memory but is either beyond the
conscious recall of the subject or the subject denies having the memory,
proponents of fMRI do not claim to be able to address witness credibility in its
larger sense. See infra notes 594-95 and accompanying text. There are,
however, other potential forensic applications of fMRI technology. Professor
Hank Greely identifies five areas where fMRI may be relevant in legal
proceedings: (1) detecting lies; (2) detecting memory or recognition; (3) detecting
pain; (4) detecting bias; and (4) detecting consciousness. Henry T. Greely, Mind
Reading, Neuroscience, and the Law in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND
NEUROSCIENCE 120-49 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina Roskie, eds., 2013). While

bias may relate directly to witness credibility, the research into this area is just
beginning. No one has suggested that fMRI is scientifically reliable or valid in
detecting bias.
4 United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092 (W.D. Tenn.
June 1, 2010). The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation to exclude

108

OCT. 2014]

Evidence of Lies and Rules of Evidence

109

and a Maryland state trial judge6 all rejected fMRI-based expert
testimony on witness truthfulness.
The hypothesis underlying fMRI as a lie detector is that telling
the truth is the natural or normal response of the brain and one
would not expect to see increased activity over and above the
normal background level of brain activity. Lying, however,
requires the person to first recall the truth, then suppress the truth
while creating a lie that might plausibly fit the objective facts, and
finally, verbalize the -falsehood. This increased neural activity
demands more energy. To supply the energy demand, more
oxygenated blood is directed to those regions of the brain
processing the lie. This relative difference in energy demand,
called the blood oxygenation level-dependent ("BOLD")
differential by neuroscientists, is detectable by an fMRI scan.
Comparing the BOLD differential between subjects known to be
telling the truth with those deliberately lying allows researchers to
hypothesize that an increased BOLD response in certain regions of
the brain when the subject is answering questions is an indication
of deception.
Three recent cases have dealt with the admissibility of expert
opinion of truthfulness based on fMRI testing.' The defendant in a
federal prosecution in Tennessee for Medicaid and Medicare
billing fraud, Dr. Lorne Semrau, underwent fMRI scanning by Dr.
Stephen Laken, an fMRI researcher and president of a company
that provided forensic fMRI lie detection services.! Dr. Laken
conducted scans that addressed whether Dr. Semrau intended to
defraud the government when he "upcoded" Medicare and
Medicaid reimbursement claims by filing claims under a procedure
code that reimbursed at a higher rate than the code for the

the fMRI-based expert testimony was adopted by the district judge and affirmed
on appeal. United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012).
5 Wilson v. Corestaff Servs., L.P., 28 Misc. 3d 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
6 Memorandum Opinion and Order, Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C
(Montgomery Cty., Cir. Ct., M.D. Oct. 3, 2012).
See infra notes 8-30 and accompanying text.
8 Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092,
at *14.
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procedure actually performed.' Dr. Laken also attempted to
determine whether he knew it was improper to seek separate
reimbursement for an included procedure that was not to be billed
separately.'o Dr. Laken concluded that Dr. Semrau was truthful
during his fMRI scan when he denied the intent to defraud and
when he claimed he did not know that billing separately for the
included procedure was impermissible." Dr. Semrau's counsel
then notified the government of his intent to introduce fMRI-based
expert opinion testimony to support Dr. Semrau's truthfulness as a
witness. 2 The government moved to exclude the proffered expert
testimony." The magistrate judge, after hearing testimony from Dr.
Laken, two government experts, and reviewing scientific and legal
literature on the subject, found that expert opinion testimony of
truthfulness based on fMRI was not sufficiently reliable and was
too prejudicial to put before the jury. 4 Based on the magistrate
judge's recommendation, the district judge excluded Dr. Laken's
opinion testimony. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district Court's
ruling. "

The second court to consider the admissibility of fMRI-based
expert testimony on truthfulness was a New York state trial court
hearing a case involving a plaintiff-employee alleging employer
retaliation for reporting an incident of sexual harassment in the
workplace.'" The plaintiff, who worked for a company that
supplied temporary office workers, complained to her employer
that a fellow employee sent her sexually explicit photos over an
office fax machine." After she reported the sexual harassment by
9

Id

'10 Id

" Id. at 5-6.
12Id. at 1.
13 id.

14 See infra notes 185-255 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
magistrate judge's ruling on the admissibility of the fMRI evidence offered by
Dr. Semrau.
1 United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012).
1 Wilson v. Corestaff Servs., L.P., 28 Misc. 3d 425, 426 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
7 Id.
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her co-worker, she was not assigned out for other temporary
work." She sued for retaliation.19 In support of her claim of
retaliation, plaintiff offered the testimony of another employee,
who reportedly heard plaintiffs supervisor say that plaintiff would
not be assigned other temp work because she complained of sexual
harassment.20 To bolster the credibility of the supporting witness,
the witness underwent fMRI scanning by Dr. Laken.2 1 As in
Semrau, the plaintiff notified the defendant that she was prepared
to offer fMRI-based expert testimony that the witness was being
truthful when he reported hearing the supervisor disclose his plan
to retaliate against plaintiff.22
Because this was in New York state court, the trial judge
applied the Frye" general acceptance standard and excluded the
testimony without an evidentiary hearing.24 In granting the
defendant's motion to exclude the expert's opinion, the court noted
that "even a cursory review of the scientific literature demonstrates
that the plaintiff is unable to establish that the use of the fMRI test
to determine truthfulness or deceit is accepted as reliable in the
relevant scientific community."25
The third case in which fMRI based expert testimony on
witness truthfulness was offered was the re-trial of Gary James
Smith, a former Army Ranger who was convicted of killing his
roommate, Michael McQueen, Jr.26 After the conviction at his first
18 Id.
19 Id.
20

Id.

21 Id.
22 id.

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Frye, the defendant
offered evidence that he had taken and passed the "lie detector" test that was the
predecessor to the modem polygraph. In excluding the examiner's testimony
that the defendant was telling the truth, the court held that novel scientific
evidence was not admissible until it had achieved general acceptance by the
relevant scientific community. Id.
24 Corestaff Servs., L.P., 28 Misc.
3d at 426-28.
25 Id. at 428.
26 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 5-6, Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C,
(Montgomery Cty, MD, Oct. 3, 2012). The conviction in the first trial was
23
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trial was reversed, Smith again claimed that McQueen committed
suicide.2 7 To support this argument he underwent fMRI scanning
by Frank Haist, a consultant for No Lie fMRI.28 Haist was prepared
to testify that Smith was being truthful when recounting the fact
that McQueen died of a self-inflicted wound and that Smith did not
shoot him. 29 The trial judge, after considering testimony by experts
from both sides, reviewing scientific literature submitted by the
parties, and hearing from each side's expert, excluded the
fMRI-based expert opinion on witness truthfulness because "it is
clear ... that the use of fMRI to detect deception and verify truth
in an individual's brain has not achieved general acceptance in the
scientific community."30
Much of the legal literature on fMRI as a lie detector has dealt
primarily with the reliability of the underlying scientific theory and
whether expert testimony based on fMRI is admissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 ("Rule 702") or the Frye general
acceptance standard.31 Little has been written on how this novel
reversed because the trial judge excluded defense evidence on the victim's state
of mind. Smith v. State, 423 Md. 573 (Md. Ct. App. 2011).
27 Memorandum Opinion and Order at
6, Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C,
(Montgomery Cty, MD, Oct. 3, 2012).
28 Michael Laris, Debate on Brain Scans as Lie DetectorsHighlighted
in Maryland
Murder Trial, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/
crime/debate-on-brain-scans-as-lie-detectors-highlighted-in-maryland-murder-trial/
2012/ 08/26/aba3d7d8-ed84- lel-9ddc-34Od5efble9cprint.html.
29 Id.
30 Memorandum Opinion and Order at 5-6, Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C,
(Montgomery Cty, MD, Oct. 3, 2012) (copy on file with the author). Smith was
convicted at the second trial but has not raised the exclusion of the fMRI evidence
on appeal. Brief of the Appellant at 1-3, Smith v. Maryland, (No. 1832) 2013
WL 6004017 (June 27, 2013).
31 See, e.g., Daniel D. Langleben, Detection of Deception with jMRI: Are We
There Yet?, 13 LEGAL AND CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 1 (2008); Elena
Rusconi & Timothy Mitchener-Nissen, ProspectsofFunctionalMagnetic Resonance
Imaging as a Lie Detector, 7 FRONTIERS INHUMAN NEUROSCIENCE 1, 3-4 (2013);
Charles Adelsheim, Functional Magnetic Resonance Detection of Deception:
Great as FundamentalResearch, Inadequateas Substantive Evidence, 62 MERCER
L. REV. 885, 905-08 (2011); Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science be Good
Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191,
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scientific technique fits within the larger context of the regulation
of evidence of witness credibility.3 2 This Article seeks to fill that
gap in the literature and considers the admissibility of fMRI based
expert opinion on witness truthfulness within the framework of the
rules governing the impeachment and rehabilitation of witnesses,
the admissibility of expert opinion testimony, as well as the
criminal defendant's constitutional right to offer evidence that may
otherwise be excluded by a rule of evidence.
Part II briefly explains MRI technology as it pertains to lie
detection. Part III provides context for the debate over
admissibility of fMRI opinion on truthfulness by reviewing the
American tradition of assigning credibility decision to the jury.
Part IV analyzes the rules governing the admissibility of expert
opinion testimony on truthfulness and how they apply to
fMRI-based opinion testimony that a witness lied or told the truth
during an fMRI scan. Part V addresses the application of the rules
regulating expert opinion testimony and considers whether the
current state of the scientific research can satisfy either the relevant
and reliable standard of Rule 702 or the Frye general acceptance
standard followed by several state jurisdictions. Part VI explores
whether fMRI-based expert opinion on witness truthfulness that
clears the hurdles imposed by the impeachment and rehabilitation
rules and the rules governing expert opinion can satisfy the
probative value versus prejudicial effect balancing test of Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 and state analogs. Part VII considers
whether the Constitution provides the criminal defendant a right to
offer fMRI-based opinion testimony on witness truthfulness even if
one or more of the other rules of evidence excludes the testimony.
1192 (2010); Joseph R. Simpson, FunctionalMRI Lie Detection: Too Good to be
True?, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 491, 491 (2008); Laurence R. Tancredi &
Jonathan D. Brodie, The Brain and Behavior: Limitations in the Legal use of
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 271, 280-86
(2007); F. Andrew Kozel et al., DetectingDeception Using FunctionalMagnetic
Resonance Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605, 605 (2005).
32 See, e.g., Charles N.W. Keckler, Cross-examining the Brain: A Legal

Analysis ofNeural Imagingfor CredibilityImpeachment, 57 HASTINGS L. J. 509,
545-51(2006).
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Part VIII concludes that fMRI as a lie detector cannot yet satisfy
the reliable and relevant standards of Rule 702 and it has not yet
reached the level of general acceptance in the relevant scientific
community to earn admission under Frye. It also concludes that the
American tradition of assigning credibility determinations to the
jury imposes additional burdens on proponents of fMRI lie
detection that will further delay the day in which this technology is
admitted in a jury trial. The obstacles imposed by the rules of
evidence will, in turn, make the economic exploitation of the
technology less likely and may hinder further research. This
Article ultimately concludes that someday fMRI testimony on
witness truthfulness may be admitted, but it will not be anytime
soon.
II. EVIDENCE OF LIES: FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE
IMAGING

Magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI") is the latest noninvasive
imaging technology currently in use in medical science." Unlike
x-ray and other forms of medical imaging, MRI does not subject
the patient to ionizing radiation. Using magnetic fields of different
strengths to influence the alignment of hydrogen atoms in the
body, the MRI scanner records the release of the energy stored by
the hydrogen atoms' single proton nucleus as it responds to the
cycling magnetic fields. Processing the captured data through

33 The first commercially available MRI scanners for medical imaging were
marketed in the early 1980s. See RICHARD B. BUXTON, INTRODUCTION TO
FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING (2d ed. 2009). For a succinct

explanation that highlights the aspects most likely to influence evidentiary
issues, see Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection:
The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 377 (2007). Other very
readable sources of information on how fMRI works are Adina L. Roskies,
Brain Imaging Techniques, in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE

37-74 (Stephen J. Morse & Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013); Tancredi & Brodie,
supra note 31, at 27; Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner
Darkly: FunctionalNeuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past
Mental States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119 (2010).
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computer algorithms creates an image of the body part under
examination.3 4
Scientists have long known that increased brain activity
demands more blood to the area of the brain engaged in the
activity." The interrelationship between brain activity, cerebral
blood flow, and the metabolism of oxygen and glucose by the brain
is the foundation of fMRI. 36 This foundation is based on two
principles: (1) regions of the brain that are more active receive
more oxygenated blood than regions of the brain that are less
active; and (2) oxygenated blood and deoxygenated blood behave
differently in a magnetic field because they have different
magnetic resonance."
The oxygen-carrying hemoglobin molecules in the blood do
not disrupt the MRI's magnetic field as the blood passes through
it." Once oxygen is taken up by the surrounding tissue as the brain
draws upon this energy source to fuel its activity, however, the
oxygen-depleted blood does disrupt the magnetic field and the
MRI scanner captures this disruption." By scanning a person's
brain while that person is performing some cognitive task and
capturing the magnetic resonance resulting from cerebral blood
flow, cerebral blood volume, and cell metabolism, the MRI
scanner can produce an image revealing which regions of the brain
are more active while the task is being performed.40 This BOLD
signal allows scientists to locate the regions of the brain where the
cognitive task under study is being performed.41 An fMRI scan
taken before and during a cognitive task detects the relative
34 See Langleben, supra note 31, at 2.
35 See BUXTON, supra note 33, at 6.
36

See id.

n See id at 7.
38 See Marcus E. Raichile, An Introduction to FunctionalBrain Imaging in the
Context of Lie Detection, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT: SCIENTIFIC
AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS, 3, 4 (Am. Acad. of Arts and Scis., 2009).
3 See id.
40 See Geoffrey K. Aguirre, FunctionalNeuroimaging: Technical, Logical, and

Social Perspectives,45 HASTINGS CTR. REP. S8, S9 (2014).
41 See id.
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difference in the oxygenated blood in a given region of the brain
and permits the construction of a graphic image of the BOLD
responses associated with the brain state under study.42 While not a
direct observation of neural activity, the BOLD signal is an
indication of neural activity.4 3
As it applies to lie detection, the theory is that when the subject
is telling the truth, he is merely recalling facts from memory, a task
that does not require particularly high levels of neural activity.44
Lying, on the other hand, does require more neural activity because
the person must suppress the truth while also constructing the lie.45
This increased neural activity demands more energy.4 6 To meet the
energy demand, more oxygenated blood is provided to that portion
of the brain engaged in the cognitive task.47 To produce an image
that represents the relative difference between the baseline or
"truth" level of brain activity and the activity level when the
subject is lying, the subject is told to respond to a series of
questions truthfully during one scan and to respond to the same
questions deceptively during a second MRI scan.4 8 The data from
the two scans is processed through a computer algorithm to
produce a graphical image of the hemodynamics associated with
the respective conditions.4 9 The resulting images display the
presence of oxygenated blood in the brain by assigning color to
regions where the computer algorithms determined that the BOLD
response was present."o The presence of more oxygenated blood in
certain regions of the brain while the subject is answering

42

See id

43 Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 31, at 3-4.
44 See Sean A. Spence, et al., A Cognitive NeurobiologicalAccount ofDeception:
Evidencefrom FunctionalNeuroimaging,359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL
SOC'Y OF LONDON

1755, 1757 (2004).

45

See id.

46

See Sean A. Spence, Playing Devil's Advocate: The Case AgainstjMRI Lie

Detection, 13 LEGAL & CRIM. PSYCHOL. 11, 12 (2008).
47 See id.

See id.
See Aguirre, supra note 40, at S12-S13.
'o See id. at S11.

48
49
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questions is said to be indicative of deception." Conversely, the
absence of the BOLD response. in those brain regions associated
with lying are said to verify the truthfulness of the subject's
responses.5 2
The final images produced by the scanner's computer,
however, are not photographs or X-Rays of the brain processing a
lie. Rather, they are a complex combination of technologies from
the fields of physics, neurophysiology, cognitive neuroscience,
statistics, computer science, and software development that seek to
represent relatively small changes in blood flow and oxygen
metabolism in the part of the brain under study.53
The spatial resolution of the typical MRI scanner produces
incredibly detailed anatomical images of tissue and body
structures.5 4 These images are most useful in the medical setting
where physicians are looking for some structural abnormality, such
as a tumor. In fMRI, however, the goal is temporal resolution,
which is the change in metabolic activity over time. As temporal
resolution increases, spatial resolution decreases.5 6 Thus, the
"picture" of the BOLD response is not the clear, sharp image one
might expect from an MRI scan seeking to identify anatomical
structures or abnormalities. To be useful to the neuroscientist
trying to determine whether a certain portion of the brain was
activated while the subject was performing some cognitive task in
the scanner, the raw data is cleaned up, background "noise" and
artifacts are removed, spatial resolution is sharpened, signal data is
averaged and then enhanced by computer algorithms to highlight
the relatively slight BOLD response, and color is added to the

5' See Martha J. Farah et al., Functional MRI-based Lie Detection: Scientific
and Societal Challenges, 15 NATURE REV. 123, 123 (2014). The most common
brain regions to show activation during fMRI deception studies are the prefrontal
cortex, the anterior cortex, and the parietal cortex. Id.
52 See id. at 123-24.
53 See Brown & Murphy, supra note 33, at 1145.
54 See Aguirre, supra note 40, at S10.
s See id. at S9-S10.
5 See

id. at S8-S9.
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active voxels" to graphically display the relative strength of the
BOLD response." The resulting image is then overlaid onto an
anatomical image of the brain so the colorful highlights
representing the BOLD response are associated with a particular
region of the brain.59 Because the structural image is produced
from an MRI scanning at one cubic millimeter voxel size and the
BOLD image is produced from a three cubic millimeter voxel size,
the BOLD image overlay and the structural image can never match
exactly."o Because the different resolution of the MRI and fMRI
scans makes precise alignment impossible, the MRI image of the
brain onto which the computer enhanced image of the BOLD
response is overlaid may be a scan of a "standard" brain and not
the brain of the subject under study.6'
Proponents of fMRI lie detection maintain that the BOLD
response is a direct measurement of a completely involuntary
physiological function directly related to the cognitive task of
prevaricating.6 2 Compared to the polygraph, which measures
physiologic functions thought to be related to stress that are
5 See Aguirre, supra note 40, at S 10. Voxels are volumetric pixels; essentially,
three-dimensional pixels. These voxels typically measure 3mm x 3mm x 3mm in
fMRI compared to the Imm x 1mm x Imm voxel size in MRI. The smaller voxel
size in MRI contributes to the high quality of spatial resolution in structural
scans. But they are too small to capture the hemodynamic change over time,
hence the need for larger voxels in fMRI and the decrease in spatial resolution. Id;

see also, Giorgio Ganis, et al., Lying in the Scanner: Covert Countermeasures
Disrupt Deception Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, 55
NEUROIMAGE 312, 314 (2011); Owen Jones, et al., Brain Imaging for Legal
Thinkers, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 8, 12 (2009).
58 See Aguirre, supra note 40, at S9-S 11.
59

See id. at S12.
See Roskies, supra note 33, at 63-65.
61 See Brown & Murphy, supra note 33, at 1145. See generally Aguirre, supra
note 40, for a detailed explanation of the various steps needed to create the sort
of fMRI BOLD image frequently displayed in the scientific literature, the popular
media, and as exhibits to accompany expert testimony.
62 See Kozel et al., supra note 31, at 605; see also K. Luan Phan, et al., Neural
60

Correlates of Telling Lies: A FunctionalMagnetic Resonance Imaging Study at
4 Tesla, 12 ACADEMIC RADIOLOGY 164, 170 (2005) (discussing the various sections

of the brain associated with, and affected by lying).
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assumed to be a product of lying,63 the fMRI measures the cerebral
blood flow, volume, and metabolism of the portion of the brain
thought to be processing the lie and compares it with that same
portion of the brain when the subject is telling the truth.6 4 Thus,
proponents argue, the fMRI image of the BOLD response is a more
accurate and reliable indicator of truthfulness than the polygraph.
Irrespective of any accuracy advantage the BOLD response
may have to the physiological phenomena measured by the
polygraph, it is important to note that fMRI is not measuring actual
neural activity directly. It is not capturing deception itself. It is
merely capturing what researchers believe are the neural correlates
of deception.65 Like the polygraph, fMRI is looking at the shadow
cast by deception and is not detecting lies in any direct sense. No
current technology can directly distinguish between the neural
activity of truth and the neural activity of deception.66
The reliability of fMRI as a forensic tool to either detect
deception or verify truth is very much an open question. Whether it
is a more accurate screening device than the polygraph routinely
used in law enforcement investigations, security and counterterrorism
interrogations, or certain employment background checks, however,
is beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, the concern this Article
addresses is whether the technology is admissible to either impeach
or support the credibility of a witness at trial. In this context,
admissibility requires the evidence meet both the rules governing
expert opinion testimony and those applicable to the impeachment
and rehabilitation of witnesses.

63

See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 13

(Nat'l Acads. Press, 2003).
64 See Daniel D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated
Deception:
An Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727,
731 (2002).
65 See Spence, supra note 46, at
12.
66 See Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note
31, at 5.
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III. RULES OF EVIDENCE: THE CRUCIBLE OF THE COURTROOM

The American jury trial is the reconstruction of a past event or
incident.6 ' The jurors are the historians trying to determine what
actually happened on the day in question. Witnesses with personal
knowledge of various parts and pieces of the story tell the jury,
under oath, what they saw, heard, felt, touched, or otherwise
experienced. These percipient witnesses testify to their recollection
of the facts. The jury must decide which witnesses to believe and
what weight to give the testimony received in order to find the
facts of the case. Determining the facts is the core function of the
American jury.68
When it will assist the jury in their task of historical
reconstruction, witnesses who do not have personal knowledge of
any of the historical facts but who have opinions based on the
application of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
to the facts, information, or evidence from the event are permitted
to testify to their opinions. These expert witnesses provide
information, explanations, and opinions on matters that otherwise
would be beyond the understanding, common knowledge, and

See Hon. William G. Young, Vanishing Trials, Vanishing Juries, Vanishing
Constitution, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 67 (2006) (explaining how the jury trial is
a uniquely American phenomenon and one deeply enshrined in our history, culture,
and traditions). For a discussion of the evolution of the jury trial from colonial
days to modem times and the ongoing debate over the jury's power to decide
questions of law as well as fact see Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A
BriefHistory of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867
(1994).
68 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 56 (permitting the court to grant summary judgment
to a party and dispense with the jury trial guaranteed by the Seventh Amendment
only if there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact"); see Dimick v.
Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) ("Maintenance of the jury as a fact-finding
body is of such importance and occupies so firm a place in our history and
jurisprudence that any seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be
scrutinized with the utmost care. The controlling distinction between the power
of the court and that of the jury is that the former is the power to determine the
law and the latter to determine the facts."); see generally Alschuler & Deiss,
supra note 67, at 902-21 (discussing the long and controversial history of the
allocation of authority between judge and jury on deciding questions of law).
67
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experience of the jury. The jury considers the testimony of the
percipient witnesses and the opinions of the experts, along with the
other evidence in the case, to ultimately reconstruct the historical
event in question so they can then apply the governing legal
standards to reach a verdict in the case.
Of course, in the usual case, the percipient witnesses are not
consistent. Their versions of the event vary, sometimes wildly. The
experts are not consistent, either. Well-qualified, well-trained,
well-spoken, and well-meaning scientists, doctors, accountants,
engineers or other experts routinely reach diametrically opposed
positions on the same issue. Just as with the inconsistencies among
the percipient witnesses, the jury of laypersons is charged with
reconciling the divergent scientific or technical testimony and
deciding which is more believable.
Determining whom to believe, whom to trust, and whom to
rely upon in reconstructing the historical incident is the sole and
virtually sacred task of the American jury.6 Indeed, juries are
typically instructed by the presiding judge, "You are the sole

See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891) ("There are
many things sometimes in the conduct of a witness upon the stand, and
sometimes in the mode in which his answers are drawn from him through the
questioning of counsel, by which a jury are to be guided in determining the
weight and credibility of his testimony. That part of every case, such as the one
at bar, belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their natural
intelligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men; and, so
long as we have jury trials, they should not be disturbed in their possession of it,
except in a case of manifest and extreme abuse of their function."); see also
Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 594 (2009) ("Our legal system, however, is
built on the premise that it is the province of the jury to weigh the credibility of
competing witnesses .... ); United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998)
("A fundamental premise of our criminal trial system is that 'the jury is the lie
detector."); United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414 (1980) ("The AngloSaxon tradition of criminal justice, embodied in the United States Constitution
and in federal statutes, makes jurors the judges of the credibility of testimony
offered by witnesses."). For an historical account of the evolution of the jury as
the courtroom's lie detector see George Fisher, The Jury's Rise as Lie Detector,
107 YALE L.J. 575, 580-83 (1997).
69
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judges of the credibility or 'believability' of each witness and the
weight to be given to the witness's testimony.""
While the jury is the sole judge of the facts in a case, the rules
of evidence control what information the jury is permitted to use in
its reconstruction of the event giving rise to the litigation. The
threshold for admissibility is, of course, relevance." Evidence that
simply has no logical or legal connection to the case is not
admissible.7 2 But the rules of evidence also exclude a great deal of
otherwise relevant evidence." Indeed, the body of law called
evidence is a body of law that keeps facts from the trier of fact.7"

70 PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) § 1.08 (Comm. on Pattern
Jury Instructions Dist. Judges Ass'n Fifth Circuit 2012); see also PATTERN
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.07 (Sixth Circuit Comm. on Pattern Criminal
Jury Instructions 2014); FEDERAL CIVIL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH
CIRCUIT § 1.13 (Comm. on Pattern Civil Jury Instructions of the Seventh Circuit
2009); MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT
COURTS OF THE EIGHT CIRCUIT § 1.05 (Judicial Comm. on Model Jury Instructions
for the Eighth Circuit 2014); CRIMINAL PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1.08
(Criminal Pattern Jury Instruction Comm. of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit 2011); ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL
CASES) § 5 (Comm. on Pattern Jury Instructions of the Judicial Council of the
Eleventh Circuit 2010). For a typical state pattern jury instruction on credibility,
see N.C. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES § 101.15 (N.C.
Conference of Superior Court Judges Comm. on Pattern Jury Instructions 2011).
n FED. R. EVID. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make
a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the
fact is of consequence in determining the action.").
72 FED. R. EvID. 402 ("Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the
following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal statute;
these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Irrelevant evidence
is not admissible.").
7 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. ("The court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.").
74 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (recognizing
that judges exercising their gatekeeping function under Rule 104(a) "inevitably
on occasion will prevent the jury from learning of authentic insights and
innovations. That, nevertheless, is the balance that is struck by Rules of
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Some exclusionary rules seek to further policy goals unrelated
to accurate fact-finding in the case under consideration." Others
seek to promote accurate fact finding by excluding unreliable
information.76 Still other rules deny the jury information out of a
fear the jury may not be able to properly weigh the information in
the context of the case under consideration." Superintending the
application of these rules is the trial judge who has tremendous
discretion to admit or exclude evidence, control the mode and
order of proof to promote accurate fact finding, avoid wasting
time, and protect witnesses from harassment and undue
embarrassment."
As we genuflect before the jury's mystical powers to
distinguish between fact and fiction, social science research reports
that human beings are really not very good at separating liars and
truth-tellers.79 The recent rash of publicized post-conviction relief
cases where, typically, DNA evidence reexamined with new and

Evidence designed not for the exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but
for the particularized resolution of legal disputes.").
7 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 407 (excluding evidence of subsequent remedial
measures when offered to prove liability or culpable conduct); FED. R. EVID. 410
(excluding evidence of plea discussions under certain circumstances); FED. R.
EVID. 501 (allowing privileges).
76 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 702 (admitting only reliable expert opinion); FED. R.
EVID. 802 (excluding hearsay).
n See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 403 (excluding otherwise relevant evidence when
the "probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . .. unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence"); FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (excluding most propensity
evidence).
78 FED. R. EvID. 104; FED. R. EVID. 611.
79
See, e.g., Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and
the Jury, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2000); Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the
Hands, A Lick of the Lips: The Validity of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing
Witness Credibility,72 NEBR. L. REV. 1157, 1190-97 (1993); Olin Guy Wellborn
Ill, Demeanor,76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075, 1082-88 (1991). But see Max Minzner,

Detecting Lies Using Demeanor,Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557,
2560 (2008) (observing that when bias and context are considered along with

demeanor juries may be better at detecting lies than when relying upon
demeanor alone, but suggesting more research is needed).
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more accurate technology vindicates the defendant and thoroughly
discredits eyewitness accounts have added to the skepticism about
the jury's ability to accurately determine the historical facts."
When added to the claims of some neuroscientists that fMRI
accuracy rates for lie detection exceed 90%, the rush to provide the
jury with the opinion of the neuroscientist on whether a given
witness is telling the truth or lying is understandable."
Despite rather serious and obvious weaknesses in the technology,
some have suggested that since the neuroscience-based opinion on
credibility is better than what the jury brings to the task, the jury
should at least have the benefit of the expert's opinion.8 2
On the one hand, we tout our confidence in the jury's ability to
make credibility judgments and accurately weigh the evidence, while
on the other hand we question whether the jury can understand and
appropriately weigh complex scientific evidence." The fear is that
lay juries may give excessive weight to colorful fMRI images
showing a brain "processing a lie." This schizophrenic notion of
the competence of juries as accurate fact-finders explains why the
rules of evidence restrict what the jury hears and limits how it can

80

The Innocence Project reports 311 post-conviction DNA exonerations in the

United States since 1989. DNA Exoneree Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT,

http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2014). See, e.g., Mitch
Weiss, Judges Clear Two in 2000 Killing, THE NEWS & OBSERVER (Sept. 23,

2011), http://www.newsobserver.com/2011/09/23/1510069/judges-clear-two-in2000-killing.html.
81 See, e.g., Kozel et al., supra note 34, at 608-10 (reporting accuracy rates
between 90% and 93%); Langleben, supra note 34, at 4 (citing various studies
claiming accuracy rates above 90%); Simpson, supra note 31, at 491 (comparing
reported accuracy rate of fMRI of 90% with much lower rates for polygraph);
see also Testimony of Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, May 13, 2010,
Vol. I at 91, United States v. Semrau, No. 07CRI0074-lJPM (W.D. Tenn.)
(reporting 100% accuracy in detecting deception).
82 See Schauer, supra note 31, at 1210-19.

83 See David L. Faigman, Admissibility of Neuroscientific
Expert Testimony,

in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 89, 109 (Stephen J. Morse

& Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013).
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use what is admitted.84 Ultimately, as imperfect as it is, the jury is
the lie detector in the courtroom. The real question is whether our
system should admit fMRI-based expert testimony on a witness's
truthfulness to assist the jury in that task. The answer to this
question involves consideration of the trial context in which the
evidence is offered, the limitations imposed by evidence rules on
expert opinion testimony, including the scientific validity of the
underlying principles and methods, the balancing of the probative
value of the testimony against the risk that it will confuse rather
than enlighten the jury, and whether constitutional concerns should
permit criminal defendants to offer such testimony even if the rules
of evidence say otherwise.
IV. RULES OF EVIDENCE: ATTACKING AND SUPPORTING
CREDIBILITY

Assuming that fMRI as a lie detector could satisfy the scientific
reliability standards of Rule 702,5 expert opinion testimony based
on fMRI scanning that a witness is truthful or deceptive must meet
the admissibility principles governing the impeachment and
rehabilitation of testifying witnesses." The trial itself is about the
underlying historical facts that gave rise to the litigation, but the
See, e.g., David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing is Believing: The
Effect of Brain Images on Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION
343, 349-51 (2008) (finding scientific summaries more credible when accompanied
by neuroimages); Deena Skolnick Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of
Neuroscience Explanations,20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 470 (2008) (explaining that
laypeople are dazzled by neurobabble); David P. McCabe et al., The Influence of
JMRI Lie Detection Evidence on Juror Decision Making, 577 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
566, 572-75 (2011) (explaining that fMRI lie detection is more persuasive than
other technologies in mock trial setting). But see Adina L. Roskies et al.,
Neuroimages in Court: Less Biasing than Feared, 17 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE
Scis. 99, 101 (2013) (analyzing recent studies and finding no untoward impact of
neuroscience images on juror decision making); Robert B. Michael et al., On the
(non)PersuasivePower of a Brain Image, 20 PSYCHONOMIc BULLETIN REV. 720,
722-724 (2013) (finding brain images exerted little to no influence on whether
people agree with conclusions in an article accompanying the image).
85 See infra Sections V.A-V.C for a discussion of Rule
702 and fMRI.
86 See generally FED. R. EVID. 601-615.
84
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resolution of disputes surrounding those facts is often conditioned
upon which witnesses the jury credits and which ones they
discredit.
"Credibility" in the context of testimonial evidence is broader
than whether a witness is consciously telling a lie. Witnesses can
contradict one another on factual points without lying. One witness
could be mistaken. Another could have had a better perspective or
angle of vision. Still another might have forgotten a key point or
become confused as to what she actually saw or heard. All of these
situations can and do occur in trials every day, and juries routinely
deal with them in weighing the evidence and judging the
believability of witnesses. At this point in time, fMRI makes no
claim to be able to determine which of these divergent factual
accounts are more accurate. Thus, the admissibility of fMRI-based
opinion on truthfulness only arises when the credibility issue is
whether a witness deliberately and consciously lied during
testimony at trial."
Important as the credibility issue may be, however, it is still
one-off from the central issue at the trial, the reconstruction of the
historical event that gave rise to the litigation. Recognizing the
importance of credibility evidence, as well as its potential to
distract the jury from the merits of the case, the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and most state evidence rules, regulate the timing and
the form of admissible evidence on the issue of witness credibility.
To be admitted, an fMRI-based opinion on witness truthfulness has
to clear more than the scientific reliability hurdle; it must also

8 Defining a "lie" is not a simple matter, especially a "lie" that can
be
detected by fMRI scanning. See, e.g., Keckler, supra note 32, at 539 (explaining
that deception is a "continuous rather than discrete variable"); Jed S. Rakoff, Lie
Detection in the Courts: The Vain Search for the Magic Bullet, in USING
IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT: SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL QUESTIONs 40, 44-45
(Emilio Bizzi et al. eds., 2009) ("The law recognizes many kinds of lies, ranging
from 'white lies' and 'puffing' to affirmative misstatements, actionable halftruths, and material omissions."). For a discussion of the difficulty in defining
lies for fMRI lab studies and applying that definition to the real-world of trial
testimony see infra notes 364-99 and accompanying text.
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negotiate the labyrinth of rules that govern impeachment and
rehabilitation of witnesses.
A. Timing: Impeach First,RehabilitateSecond
Evidence to bolster or support the credibility of a witness is
generally not admissible until the witness has testified and the
opponent has attacked his credibility." Courts generally consider it
a waste of time to admit evidence of a witness's good credibility
until the opponent has attacked the witness's credibility through
cross-examination and/or extrinsic impeachment.89 Allowing
anticipatory rehabilitation of a witness's credibility runs the risk of
wasting time if no attack on credibility is forthcoming, injecting
into the case credibility evidence that does not address facts
subsequently introduced to attack credibility, and also risks
distracting the jury from the underlying factual issues it must
resolve.o Though the Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly adopted

S.

1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 33 at 60 (6th ed. 2006)
("Both at common law and under the Federal Rules, the general norm is that the
witness's proponent may not bolster the witness's credibility before any
attempted impeachment."); DAVID H. KAYE, ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A
88 KENNETH

TREATISE ON

BROUN,

EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE

§ 2.4 (2d ed. Supp. 2014)

("Testimony that merely attempts to bolster the credibility of another witness
whose character for truthfulness has not been attacked normally is inadmissible.").
See, e.g., FED. R. EvID. 608(a) ("The credibility of a witness may be attacked or
supported by evidence in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these
limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for truthfulness or
untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful character is admissible only after the
character of the witness for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or
reputation evidence or otherwise."); CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, LAIRD C.
KIRKPATRICK AND CHARLES H. ROSE III, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE

RULES § 6.18 at 488-89 (3d ed. 2009) ("At the outset it should be noted that
generally a party may not support a witness who has not yet been attacked,
which means especially that proof of good character may not be presented along
with the initial testimony of a witness, and that prior consistent statements by the
witness may not be offered along with his initial testimony.").
89 Fresh complaints in sexual assault cases and statements of prior identification
under FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C) are notable exceptions to this general rule.
BROUN, supra note 88, at 84.
90 Id.
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this common law principle only with regard to evidence of a
witness's good character for truthfulness," federal courts have
continued to apply it to other forms of bolstering credibility, or
"oath helping," through the balancing provisions of Rule 403 and
the court's broad power to control the mode and order of proof
under Rule 611(a).92 Application of this principle in the
fMRI-based expert opinion on truthfulness context precludes
admission of such evidence before the witness has testified at trial
and been impeached." Once this "timing rule" has been met, the
admissibility of the positive fMRI opinion will depend upon
whether the fMRI opinion refutes the form of the impeachment.94
B. Form: RehabilitationMust Meet the Impeachment
It is axiomatic that evidence to support credibility must
respond to that offered to impeach credibility:
The [evidence supporting credibility] must meet the impeachment with
relative directness. The wall, attacked at one point, may not be fortified
9' FED. R. EvID. 608(a).
92 See FED. R. EVID. 611(a)

("Control by the Court; Purposes. The court
should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining
witnesses and presenting evidence so as to: (1) make those procedures effective
for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from
harassment or undue embarrassment."). Id. advisory committee's note ("Item (1)
restates in broad terms the power and obligation of the judge as developed under
common law principles. It covers such concerns as whether testimony shall be in
the form of a free narrative or responses to specific questions, . . . the order of

calling witnesses and presenting evidence, the use of demonstrative
evidence, ... and the many other questions arising during the course of a trial
which can be solved only by the judge's common sense and fairness in view of
the particular circumstances. Item (2) is addressed to avoidance of needless
consumption of time, a matter of daily concern in the disposition of cases. A
companion piece is found in the discretion vested in the judge to exclude
evidence as a waste of time in Rule 403(b).")
93 BROUN, supra note 88, at 84.
94 It should also be noted that a hearsay declarant is subject to impeachment to
the same extent as a live witness. FED. R. EvID. 806 ("When a hearsay
statement-or a statement defined in Rule 801(d)(2)(C), (D), or (E)-has been
admitted in evidence, the credibility of the declarant may be attacked, and if
attacked may be supported, by any evidence which would be admissible for
those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness.").
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at another, distinct point. Credibility is a side issue, and the circle of
relevancy in this context should be drawn narrowly. When we reach the
stage of rehabilitation after impeachment, we are rather far afield from
the historical merits of the case; and the courts justifiably insist on a
stronger showing of relevance to minimize the risk that the jury will
lose sight of the merits. As a rule of thumb, the courts demand that the
rehabilitation be a response in kind to the impeachment. Precisely how
responsive is a question of degree as to which reasonable courts differ.9 5

A simple hypothetical illustrates the point. If the witness is
impeached by evidence tending to show that the noisy and
smoke-filled bar impaired his ability to see and hear the fight
between the defendant and the victim, evidence that the witness is
a truthful person is irrelevant. In the language of Rule 401, his
truthful disposition does not have any tendency to make his ability
to see and hear in the conditions of the bar any better or more
reliable.
C. Application: Impeaching andRehabilitatingwith fMRI
To appreciate how fMRI-based expert opinion on truthfulness
fits into this regulatory scheme, we must first consider the methods
of impeachment and whether the impeachment employed was an
attack on truthfulness. Assume that the witness has undergone
fMRI scanning and the expert witness is prepared to testify that the
scanning indicated the witness was being truthful when he
answered the questions pertaining to the historical facts
surrounding the issues at trial.96 Also assume the witness's trial
95 BROUN, supra note 88, at 84. The three cases in which fMRI-based expert
opinion testimony on witness truthfulness has been offered all decided the
admissibility issue in a pre-trial hearing and did not consider the limitations that
the rules governing impeachment and rehabilitation would place on otherwise
admissible expert opinion. See supra notes 8-30 and accompanying text.
96 From a practical standpoint, using fMRI as a "truth verifier" is the more
likely scenario. Litigants, both civil and criminal, are more likely to seek fMRI
opinions to support their own veracity, or the veracity of percipient witnesses
supportive of their theory of the case, than they are to seek a court order for an
opposing party or other witness to undergo fMRI scanning. The fMRI studies
thus far have all included willing volunteers and there is no data on whether the
BOLD response would be the same for a witness who was compelled to undergo
fMRI scanning. Furthermore, when the witness is the criminal defendant the
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testimony was consistent with the answers he gave during that
portion of the fMRI scan where he was instructed to answer the
examiner's questions truthfully." Understanding how the rules
governing witness impeachment and rehabilitation influences the
admissibility question raised by this straightforward hypothetical is
important in appreciating the potential uses of fMRI-based expert
opinion on witness truthfulness at trial.
Impeachment falls into one of five categories: (1) diminished
capacity of the witness to observe, remember or relate the historical
facts; (2) bad character for truth and veracity; (3) extrinsic evidence
that contradicts the witness's version of events; (4) prior statements
of the witness that are inconsistent with in-court testimony; and
(5) the presence of bias that may induce the witness to slant or
color his testimony in favor of the calling party.9 8 To this commonly
accepted list of impeachment methods, this Article would add
another: (6) deliberate deception not inferred from one of the other
impeachment modes. Due to fMRI's claim that it can detect lies
directly, a direct attack on sincerity of the in-court testimony that
does not depend upon an inference of deception from other modes
of impeachment but is the product of deliberate deception irrespective
of character, bias, inconsistency, or contradictory evidence is
conceivable.

Constitution imposes significant hurdles to any compelled fMRI scanning. See,
e.g., Sean Kevin Thompson, A Brave New World of Interrogation
Jurisprudence, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 341 (2007) (addressing self-incrimination
and due process issues). Assuming scientific reliability, and the opposing party
was aware of the result of the tests, there would appear to be no specific
impeachment limits, other than balancing probative value versus prejudicial
effect, if the opposing party offers the expert's opinion to impeach after the
witness testified. In this event, however, the likelihood of a trial is considerably
diminished. In a jurisdiction that admits such evidence it is unlikely a party
would proceed with the case if the key witness, or the party himself, has failed
the lie detector. See infra notes 55-133 and accompanying text for a more
detailed discussion.
97 See supra notes 33-66 and accompanying text.
98

CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER AND LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 3 FEDERAL EVIDENCE

§ 6.26 (3d ed. 2012).
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1. Capacity

Impeachment by showing defects in capacity questions the
witness's ability to perceive, understand, remember, or relate the
facts of which the witness purports to have personal knowledge. In
a marked departure from the common law, modem evidence codes
eschew the long list of factors that disqualified witnesses from
testifying and, instead, leave many of those considerations to the
jury in weighing the evidence.9 9
But being competent to testify is not the same as being an
infallible repository of historical facts relevant to the case. Casting
doubt on the reliability of a witness's testimony by showing
defects in his capacity to observe, understand, recall, and relate the
historical facts is regulated by the general principles of relevancy
and the balancing of probative value against the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay,
wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.co No
special rules limit the form of the evidence that may be offered to
attack the witness's ability to perceive the matter about which the
witness has testified. 0 ' Accordingly, evidence of the witness's
poor eyesight, obstructed vision, and other such matters are
routinely presented to juries so that they may evaluate the accuracy
and reliability of the witness's versions of the events.'02
However, impeachment by showing some degree of defect in
the witness's capacity does not mean the witness is a liar or that
the impeaching party is calling the witness a liar. For example,
fMRI-based expert testimony that the witness was being truthful
when asked about the events while in a scanner would not logically
rebut evidence that the witness's line of sight was obscured by
9 FED. R. EvID. 601 declares every person "competent to be a witness unless
these rules provide otherwise."
ooFED. R. EVID. 401, 402, 403, 611.
'o' CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE

(5th ed. 2012).

§ 6.21

102 ROGER PARK, ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE:
IMPEACHMENT AND REHABILITATION § 8.1 (2nd ed. Supp. 2014) ("[T]he court
will instruct the jury to draw its own conclusions about the faculties of a
particular witness.").
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trees or a road sign.o 3 While the witness may sincerely believe she
had a clear line of sight and unobstructed view of the scene and the
resulting BOLD differential confirmed the sincerity of her belief,
the issue is one of the accuracy of the witness's perception of the
historical facts, not truth-telling. fMRI-based opinion testimony
that the witness sincerely believed her version of the facts was
accurate and that she was not being deceptive in describing what
she saw, or thought she saw, does not address the underlying
question of how well the witness could observe, understand, recall,
and relate the historical facts. Because the fMRI opinion on
truthfulness does not rebut the defect in capacity impeachment, it
would not be admissible to rehabilitate the witness regardless of
the reliability of the opinion.'04
2. Character
The rules of evidence have long disfavored evidence of a
person's character or trait of character to prove conduct in
conformity with that character trait.o' With notable exceptions, the
Federal Rules of Evidence codified the common law rule.'06 Rules
By the same token, fMRI-based opinion testimony that the witness was
deceptive during a scan is not an attack on capacity.
104 See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text.
'os Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1948) ("The inquiry is
not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is said to weigh
too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge one with a
bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a particular
charge. The overriding policy of excluding such evidence, despite its admitted
probative value, is the practical experience that its disallowance tends to prevent
confusion of issues, unfair surprise and undue prejudice.").
106 FED. R. EVID. 404; FED R. EvID 405. At common law, a criminal defendant
could prove his good character through witnesses who were familiar with his
reputation in the community. The modem rule permits witnesses who have
sufficient connection to and knowledge of the person whose character is being
proved to testify as to their personal opinion of the character, as well as the
person's reputation in the community. FED. R. EvID. 405(a). If the defendant
attacks the character of the victim, the modem rule permits the prosecution to
offer reputation or opinion evidence of that same character trait in the defendant.
FED. R. EvID. 404(a)(2)(B)(ii). Additionally, the modem rules depart from the
common law in generally protecting the character of a victim of sexual assault,
FED. R. EVID. 412, and in permitting the prosecution and the plaintiff in a case of
103
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404(a)(1) and (2), 405, and 412-415 regulate the admissibility of
evidence of pertinent character traits and specific acts of
misconduct of criminal defendants, the victims of crimes, and civil
defendants in cases arising out of sexual assault or child molestation.
Rule 404(a)(3) regulates admissibility of character evidence of a
witness in either a civil or criminal case. It permits a party to offer
character evidence of a witness only if the evidence complies with
limits imposed by Federal Rules of Evidence 608 and 609.'o' Rules
608 and 609 permit impeachment by showing the witness has a
bad character for truthfulness, but they also carefully regulate the
form that the impeachment evidence can take.' 8
Under Rule 608, a party can impeach Witness 1 by calling
Witness 2 to attack Witness l's "character for truthfulness."o' This
sort of impeachment, however, is quite constrained. Under Rule
608(a), extrinsic evidence of Witness 1's bad character for
truthfulness is limited to his reputation for truthfulness within the
community"0 and/or Witness 2's opinion of his character for

sexual assault or child molestation to offer evidence in the case in chief of prior
similar acts of the defendant to prove the defendants predisposition. FED. R.
EvID. 413-415.

"Exceptions for a Witness. Evidence of a witness's character may be
admitted under Rules 607, 608, and 609." FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(3). Rule 607
permits any party to impeach any witness, including his own and does not
impose any substantive limits on the mode of impeachment or the form the
evidence may take.
1os Rule 608, for example, excludes extrinsic evidence of prior conduct
probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness. FED. R. EvID. 608(b). Rule 609
imposes limits on the type and age of prior convictions that are admissible to
prove a witness's bad character for truthfulness. FED. R. EvID. 609.
107

109 FED. R. EVID. 608(a) ("A witness's credibility

may be attacked or

supported by testimony about the witness's reputation for having a character for
truthfulness or untruthfulness, or by testimony in the form of an opinion about
that character.").
110 Reputation is, of course, what others say about the person whose character
is in question. When offered for the truth of the matter asserted, i.e., Bubba's
reputation for truthfulness in the community is terrible, reputation is hearsay.
Rule 803(21) provides the exception: "Reputation Concerning Character. A
reputation among a person's associates or in the community concerning the
person's character." FED. R. EVID. 803 (21).
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truthfulness.'" Admission of this sort of impeachment evidence
allows the jury to infer that Witness 1 is generally not a truthful
person and is probably acting consistently with that untruthful
character trait and is not telling the truth at trial. Of course, the
party who called Witness 1 can rebut this adverse character
evidence by introducing opinion and reputation evidence from
Witness 3 that Witness 1 is a generally truthful person.
Because the rules restrict the character witnesses to just their
opinion of Witness l's character for truthfulness and/or the
reputation within the community of Witness 1 for truth and
veracity, the jury never learns of the myriad of specific acts and
incidents that formed the basis of the opinion or reputation.
Furthermore, Rule 608(a) specifically conditions admission of
evidence of good character for truth and veracity to situations
where the opponent has first offered opinion or reputation evidence
of bad character for truth and veracity.1 12 In other words, absent an
attack on Witness l's character for truth and veracity, evidence to
bolster the witness's credibility by introducing reputation and
opinion testimony of good character for truth and veracity is
specifically prohibited.
Additionally, Rule 608(b) prohibits extrinsic evidence of prior
acts of the witness that either support or undermine his character

I In both instances, the character witness must have personal knowledge of
the witness's reputation or a sufficient relationship with the witness to have an
opinion as to the character trait of truthfulness. United States v. Whitmore, 359
F.3d 609, 616 (D.C. Cir. 2004); United States v. Turning Bear, 357 F.3d 730,
734 (8th Cir. 2004). See infra notes 287-311 and accompanying text for a
discussion of whether expert opinion is admissible on the issue of witness
truthfulness, generally. In the context of opinion under Rule 608, fMRI opinion
is not admissible because fMRI-based opinion on truthfulness does not address
"character for truthfulness or untruthfulness." See DAVID L. FAIGMAN, ET.AL.,
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

§ 40:8 (2012) ("Rule 608 thus does not obviously apply to the situation in which
the witness states 'X' on the witness stand and the polygrapher testifies as to
whether the witness was truthful in saying 'X' during the polygraph test.").
112 FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
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for truth and veracity."' The Rule's exclusion of extrinsic evidence
of these acts forces the impeaching party to rely upon what the
community thinks of the witness's character or to offer the
personal opinion of one who knows the witness whose character is
under attack without providing the jury the details of the basis of
either the reputation or the opinion. The lack of specificity in this
sort of impeachment makes its utility of questionable value and
may discourage its use except in limited circumstances where the
credibility of a witness is critical and the evidence of reputation
and opinion is clear and consistent. Excluding specifics instances
of conduct also avoids time-consuming and distracting mini-trials
over the details of acts probative of character for truthfulness that
accumulate over a person's lifetime. Permitting extrinsic evidence
of this sort could easily bog the trial down in collateral matters far
removed from the historical events giving rise to the litigation.1 14
Similarly, Rule 609 permits the use of certain prior convictions
as evidence of a witness's bad character for truthfulness.' 15 At
common law, felons were deemed not competent to testify at
trial."' The underlying felony conviction was evidence of a
disregard of or failure to comply with the law and was evidence
that the felon would not comply with the oath to testify
truthfully."' Modern rules removed the disqualification and admit

"Specific Instances of Conduct. Except for a criminal conviction under
Rule 609, extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a
witness's conduct in order to attack or support the witness's character for
truthfulness. But the court may, on cross-examination, allow them to be inquired
into if they are probative of the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of:
(1) the witness; or (2) another witness whose character the witness being cross113

examined has testified about." FED. R. EVID. 608(b); see also FAIGMAN, ET AL.,
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY

§ 40:8 (2012) ("But subsection (b) [of Rule 608] specifically provides that 'specific
instances of conduct' cannot be introduced to support or attack credibility.")
(emphasis added).
114 See BROUN, supra note 88, at 73.
" FED. R. EVID. 609.
116 BROUN, supra note 88, at 74.
117

See id.
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certain prior convictions as evidence of the witness's bad character
for truth and veracity."'
If, for example, the defendant testified on direct examination
that he did not rob the convenience store and the prosecution
brought out on cross examination or offered extrinsic evidence that
the defendant was convicted of filing a false income tax return five
years earlier, the defendant's character for truthfulness would have
been attacked." 9 The fact of the conviction for filing a false income
tax return is evidence from which the jury may infer the defendant
has an untruthful character and that his in-court testimony in the
current trial may be consistent with that untruthful character. In
other words, the bad character for truthfulness impeachment
through a prior conviction allows the jury to conclude, "He lied on
his income tax return five years ago so he's probably lying today."
In responding to impeachment for bad character for
truthfulness, Rule 608(a) specifically limits the rehabilitation
evidence to opinion and reputation testimony about the witness's
good character for truthfulness.'2 0 Opinion testimony by the fMRI
expert, however, that on a specific day at a specific place and in
response to specific questions the defendant was telling the truth is
not an opinion as to the defendant's character for truthfulness.
Rather, it asks the jury to believe the witness today because, in the
opinion of the expert, he told the truth about the incident on a past
occasion. In this regard, the testimony is more akin to extrinsic
evidence of specific acts of truthfulness, something the Rules

forbid.121

The fMRI expert, assuming he has sufficient knowledge and
familiarity with the defendant so that he can form an opinion as the
FED. R. EVID. 609.
"9 See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
120 FED. R. EVID. 608(a). For example, in response to an impeachment by bad
reputation for truthfulness or by a prior conviction admissible under Rule 609,
rehabilitation is limited to opinion or reputation evidence of good character for
truthfulness.
12 FED. R. EVID. 608(b) ("Except for a criminal conviction under Rule 609,
extrinsic evidence is not admissible to prove specific instances of a witness's
conduct in order to attack or support the witness's character for truthfulness.").
118
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defendant's character for truthfulness, can only testify on direct
examination that, in his opinion, the defendant is a generally
truthful person. He cannot, on direct examination and in response
to an attack on the witness's character for truthfulness, go into the
underlying events, interactions, or specific events that allowed him
to reach the opinion that defendant is a person who has a truthful
character.12 2 In reality, an fMRI expert hired to conduct an fMRI
scan while questioning the defendant about the details of the
charged offense is hardly going to possess the sort of relationship
with the defendant that courts require in order to testify to general
character for truthfulness.123 It is similarly unlikely that the retained
expert would be sufficiently familiar with the community in which
the defendant lives and works to testify to the defendant's
reputation for truth and veracity within that community.
No proponent of fMRI as a truth verifier or lie detector has
claimed that fMRI can reveal a person's general character for
truthfulness. To date, the claim has only been that the fMRI scan
can reveal deception and verify truth solely when the person is
undergoing the scan and being questioned about a past event.12 4
Taken as a whole, the impeachment and rehabilitation rules
concerning a witness's character for truthfulness only admit opinion
and reputation evidence of the witness's character trait of
122

FED. R. EVID. 608.

123 Rule 608 does not specify the extent, length, or nature of the relationship

between the character witness and the witness whose character is in question.
Courts do, however, require a showing that the character witness has had
sufficient contact and relationship with the principal witness to enable the
character witness to form an opinion for truthfulness. See, e.g., United States v.
Turning Bear, 357 F.3d 730, 733-34 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding daily contact with
child for four to six months sufficient to permit foster parent to give an opinion
as to child's character for truth and veracity).
124 In Semrau, Dr. Laken "emphasized that he was not offering an opinion
about what Dr. Semrau's mental state was at the time that he allegedly
committed the crime or whether Dr. Semrau possessed the requisite mens rea,
[or whether Dr. Semrau was a generally truthful person]. Instead, Dr. Laken
stated that he could only testify that, in his opinion, Dr. Semrau answered the
questions during the fMRI scan truthfully 'overall.'" United States v. Semrau,
No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *7 n.15 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010).
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truthfulness. The only extrinsic evidence of bad character for
truthfulness the rules permit, is certain prior criminal convictions.' 25
The only way the specifics of an fMRI scan could even be
mentioned is if (1) the retained expert had sufficient personal
knowledge of the defendant to form the opinion that he was a
truthful person generally; (2) the cross-examiner inquired into the
basis of that opinion; and (3) the expert then revealed the fMRI
scan and the results that supported his opinion.
These limitations on the type of evidence admissible to
impeach or rehabilitate a witness reflect the general policy goal of
keeping the jury focused on the conduct of the accused on the day
in question and avoiding mini-trials over the credibility of a
witness. Because an fMRI-based opinion on truthfulness is not a
statement about the witness's character for truth and veracity
within the meaning of Rule 608(a), it is not admissible either to
impeach a witness for bad character for truthfulness or to
rehabilitate the witness after a character impeachment. The Rule
608(b) prohibition on extrinsic evidence of specific acts probative
of character of truthfulness excludes the expert testimony about the
fMRI scan itself and the expert's interpretation of it.126
3. Contradiction
Impeachment by contradiction occurs any time a party
introduces any substantive evidence that contradicts or is
inconsistent with the testimony of any other witness in the trial. It
happens in every contested trial. The plaintiff, for example, may
testify that he had the green light when he entered the intersection.
During the defense case-in-chief the defendant may testify that she
had the green light at the time of the accident. When defendant
testifies that she had the green light, she has not only offered

125
See FED.
26

R. EVID. 609.
1 For a consideration of confronting the witness on cross-examination with
the results of an fMRI scan, see infra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
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substantive evidence of the color of the light, but has also
impeached the plaintiff by contradicting his version of events.127
Impeachment by contradiction, however, does not necessarily
mean the impeached witness consciously lied on the witness stand.
The difference between the contradictory versions of events may
be one of simple mistake, different perspective, or memory failure.
The primary witness may even be correct from an historical
perspective and the contradicting witness is relaying the faulty
version. The jury must evaluate the competing versions in light of
other evidence in the case and decide which is the most reliable
and what credit to give the testimony of the various witnesses.
Both witnesses could be sincerely "telling the truth," yet still vary
significantly in their recollection of the facts. Accordingly, merely
offering evidence that contradicts an opponent's witness on the
historical facts does not open the door for the opponent to
"rehabilitate" his witness by offering evidence of good character
for truthfulness. 128 To hold otherwise would bring a parade of good
character witnesses into the court only to be followed by a number
of bad character witnesses. The historical events giving rise to the
litigation could quickly become lost in the clutter if the trial
became centered on the character for truthfulness of, the
contradicted witness. Rehabilitation by offering evidence of good
character for truthfulness would only be appropriate if the
contradiction was connected to a direct attack on the witness's
veracity. 129
By the same token, only if the impeachment by contradiction
carried a specific attack on the veracity of the impeached witness's
trial testimony would an expert opinion on truthfulness be
The common law regulated this method of impeachment by excluding
extrinsic evidence offered solely to impeach a witness on a collateral matter. 1
MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, MODERN STATE AND FEDERAL EVIDENCE: A
COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE TEXT 573 (1989). While this principle was not
specifically codified in the Federal Rules, courts reach the same result through
the application of Rules 401, 402, 403 and 611. MUELLER, ET. AL., supra note
88, § 6.43, at 558.
128
BROUN, supra note 88, at 84.
12
9id.
127
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remotely relevant to rehabilitate the impeached witness. In the
routine situation where impeachment by contradiction with extrinsic
evidence is permitted, it is difficult to see how eliminating all other
possible explanations for the difference in the testimony and
leaving only a conscious and deliberate lie as the reason for the
difference could be presented. Whether the reason for the
difference in testimony was due to mistake, failed memory, poor
perception, or an outright lie, the actual impeaching evidence is the
contradictory testimony of another witness or some other proof of
the contested fact. In other words, impeachment by contradiction
tells the jury the witness "got it wrong," not that the witness lied
about it. Thus, offering fMRI-based opinion to rehabilitate the
impeached witness would not resolve the question of whether a
witness "got it wrong." It would only tell the jury that the
impeached witness believed her own story and does not meet the
impeachment at the point of attack. Supporting evidence to
rehabilitate the impeached witness would need to independently
confirm the facts as she related them. fMRI proponents do not
claim that fMRI can do that.'
4. Inconsistency
Inconsistency, or self-contradiction, occurs when the same
witness tells different versions of the story on different occasions.
Bystander, an eyewitness to the robbery of a convenience store
may tell the police the perpetrator drove away in a dark blue fourdoor sedan. At trial, Bystander may testify under oath that the
perpetrator escaped on foot. The inconsistency between the two
versions creates doubt as to Bystander's reliability as a witness. It
Some researchers have explored whether the brain responds differently to
familiar objects than to unfamiliar ones, thus raising the question whether fMRI
can expose "hidden knowledge." Even less research has gone into this use of
fMRI than has been devoted to identifying the neural correlates of deception.
See, e.g., Matthias Gamer, et al., jMRI-Activation Patterns in the Detection of
Concealed Information Rely on Memory Related Effects, Soc. COGNITIVE &
AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE, 506, 506 (2012) (reporting on results of "guilty
knowledge test" using fMRI but advising against any forensic application);
Greely, supra note 3, at 127-30 (concluding fMRI and EEG-based tests to
expose hidden memory needs more research).
130
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does not mean, however, that he was telling a lie from the witness
stand at trial. Maybe he was mistaken. Maybe his memory failed.
Maybe he thought long and hard about what he had seen and he
remembered things differently after that exercise. Any number of
explanations other than consciously lying could account for the
inconsistency, all of which are properly considered by the jury in
deciding the weight to give his testimony at trial, but none of
which are discernible by fMRI.
Like contradiction, inconsistency generally does not implicate
the witness's character for truthfulness nor does it necessarily
suggest the witness lied in court. It means the witness told different
stories on different days and he is, at best, an unreliable source of
historical information. fMRI-based opinion that the witness was
truthful in the scanner would be relevant to rehabilitate the witness
only if the in-court testimony can be classified as a lie.'"
5. Bias

The fifth method of impeachment is evidence of a witness's
bias. Regulated only by the general rules of relevance and concerns
of unfair prejudice, confusion, and waste of time, evidence that a
witness favors a party, has antipathy toward a party, or has some
self-interest in the matter that may color her testimony is generally
admissible.' 32 The facts tending to show bias may be elicited on
cross-examination of the witness or proved with extrinsic evidence.'33
From the facts establishing bias, the jury can infer the witness is
likely to slant her testimony in a certain direction.
____3

A

gt

cs sarily imply the witness is telling a

deliberate lie, however. Parties to a case routinely testify to their
version of the facts and they, of course, have an interest in the
outcome of the case. It does not follow that both the plaintiff and
131 Inconsistency can, however, support a charge of deliberate deception. See
United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 444 (C.A.A.F. Cir., 1996) (after testifying
in his own behalf, Airman Scheffer was impeached with a prior inconsistent
statement and on closing the prosecutor argued, "He lies. He is a liar. He lies at
every opportunity he gets and he has no credibility.").
132 United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984).
133 MUELLER & KIRKPATRIcK, supranote 98, § 6.76, at 507.
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the defendant in a case are telling deliberate lies from the witness
stand because of their interests in the outcome. The same can be
said of those who have some favorable or unfavorable relationship
with a party. The nature and extent of the relationship may indicate
a bias for or against a party and the resulting testimony may be
delivered through such a filter. But the existence of the filter is not
necessarily evidence of a deliberate lie.
Additionally, bias may be unconscious: witnesses may be
biased and not realize it. Their perception of the events at issue,
their understanding of the situation, and their recounting of the
experience may all be influenced by an unconscious bias. It does
not mean, however, that they are deliberately lying.'34
Rehabilitating a witness after a bias impeachment generally
involves introducing evidence to counter the existence of the bias
itself, minimize its influence on the witness, or show the witness
testified truthfully despite. the bias. Like evidence of bias itself,
evidence to refute bias is regulated only by Federal Rules of
Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 611. If a particular bias impeachment
expressly or impliedly charges that the bias motivated the witness
to deliberately falsify her testimony, the fMRI-based expert
opinion that the witness was truthful when recounting the same
story in the scanner would be relevant to rehabilitate the witness.
The fMRI-based opinion would be evidence that the witness
testified truthfully and her testimony was not a product of her bias.

Neuroscientists have begun to investigate whether fMRI can reveal the
existence of unconscious bias. By comparing the results of a standard racial bias
testing instrument, the Implicit Association Test (IAT), with fMRI results while
subjects viewed photos of unknown men of the same and different race, at least
one researcher has observed higher activation in the amygdala, the part of the
brain associated with emotions, and a correlation with higher scores of racial
bias on the IAT. Greely, supra note 3, at 132-33. The research into this area is
too premature to make any useful predictions. Suffice it say, however, that if
neuroscience could reliably identify hidden biases that influence how we think,
act, decide, and interact, the issue may become whether judges and jurors, as
well as witnesses, should undergo fMRI before participating in a trial. The
implications for our justice system would be staggering. They are also beyond
the scope of this article.
134
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6. DeliberateDeception
As illustrated by the foregoing discussion of the typical means
of impeachment and rehabilitation, fMRI-based opinion that the
witness was truthful during the scan is not admissible to bolster
credibility before impeachment. Nor is the evidence that the
witness was truthful during the scan admissible to rehabilitate the
witness in most impeachment scenarios. There are times, however,
when the impeachment does rise to the level of either expressly or
impliedly attacking the witness's trial testimony as a deliberate lie.
In those situations, fMRI may be relevant to rebut the
impeachment.' To isolate the unique situations that would most
likely trigger the admission of fMRI-based opinion testimony on
truthfulness and to avoid the impression that fMRI evidence is only
admissible if a particular mode of impeachment is employed, this
Article has added the category of Deliberate Deception to the
commonly recognized modes of impeachment.' 36
Branding a witness a liar, whether a party, non-party percipient
witness, or an expert witness, is a serious matter. Trial judges have
the responsibility to control the mode and order of proof to
"protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."' 3 7
Most courts forbid questions on either cross-examination or directexamination asking a witness to characterize the testimony of
another witness as a "lie."' Similarly, courts take a dim view of
lawyers using the "L" word during cross-examination or closing
argument unless the evidence admitted at trial clearly supports that

135

Rule 801(d)(1)(B) recognizes impeachment may raise "an express or

implied charge that the declarant recently fabricated . . . [the in-court testimony]

or acted from a recent improper influence or motive in so testifying." FED. R.
EvID. 801(d)(1)(B).
136 See infra notes 138-65 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
fMRI could be used to impeach a witness with evidence of deliberate deception.
17 FED. R. EvID. 611 (a)(3).
1384 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 611:18 (7th
ed. 2012) (collecting cases).
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conclusion.139 Calling a witness a liar is tantamount to alleging the
witness committed perjury as he testified before the jury.
a. Intrinsic Impeachment: Cross-Examiningthe Witness
First, consider impeachment that levels a charge of deliberate
deception. A typical scenario might be that a government subjected
the "star" witness in a criminal case to fMRI scanning and the
expert determined the witness was being deceptive when he
implicated the defendant in the crime charged.'4 0 The prosecutor
disclosed the result of the fMRI examination to the defense, but
still called the witness in the government's case in chief. 4 ' The
witness's testimony implicated the defendant in the crime charged.
Can the defense counsel cross-examine the witness about the
results of the fMRI scan, or call the expert in rebuttal to give his
opinion that the witness was lying when during the scan he
implicated the defendant in the charged offense?
The impeachment on cross-examination would, necessarily,
take the form of asking whether the witness failed the fMRI test.
Of course, the witness has no way of knowing whether he "failed"
the test unless he was so informed by either the person conducting
the test or the prosecutors who arranged for the test. Accordingly,

The facts of the case and the nature of the evidence determine where the
line is between proper and improper questioning and argument. Compare United
States v. Iacona, 728 F. 3d 694, 701 (7th Cir. 2013) (ruling no error for prosecutor
to repeatedly refer to Defendant as liar; evidence at trial made such a charge fair
argument), with United States v. Woods, 710 F.3d 195, 208 (4th Cir. 2013)
(ruling plain error, but not reversible error, for prosecutor to refer to Defendant
as liar during closing argument). For an entertaining look at the considerations,
and pitfalls, associated with using the "L" word, see James W. McElhaney,
LIAR! Dealingwith Dishonesty in the Courtroom, 80 A.B.A. J. 74 (1994).
0
14 For the sake of discussion, assume the witness voluntarily agreed to undergo
the scan and cooperated fully with the fMRI expert.
141 In Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), the Court held that
impeachment evidence was subject to the disclosure requirements of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). But see Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 5
(1995) (finding failure to disclose polygraph results to defense not a Brady
violation because test results were not "material" and would not have affected
the outcome of the trial).
139
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the witness lacks personal knowledge of the outcome of the test as
required by Federal Rule of Evidence 602.142
If the question seeks to elicit what the witness was told about
the test results, it would be hearsay if offered to prove that the
witness did, in fact, fail the fMRI test.143 If, however, the witness
learned of the results from the prosecutor, or if the examiner was
an agent or employee of the government, the answer could be the
statement of a party opponent and the hearsay rule would not bar
admission.114 If the statement of the examiner, prosecutor, or other
agent of the government informing the witness of the test results
meets the Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) exemption from the
definition of hearsay, the personal knowledge requirement of Rule
602 no longer applies,'4 5 clearing the way for admission of the
"A witness may testify to a matter only if evidence is introduced sufficient
to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.
Evidence to prove personal knowledge may consist of the witness's own
testimony. This rule does not apply to a witness's expert testimony under Rule
703." FED. R. EvID. 602.
143 FED. R. EvID. 801(a)-(c). The question would be eliciting the out of court
statement of the fMRI expert, "The fMRI scan shows you are lying," to prove
that fact.
144 Rule 801(d)(2) exempts from the hearsay definition statements made by
various individuals associated with an opposing party. When these statements
are offered against the party whose agent or employee made or adopted the
statement, the statement is not hearsay. Some Circuits have applied Rule
801(d)(2) to statements made by agents of the government. See, e.g., United
States v. Kattar, 840 F.2d 118, 131 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Morgan, 581
F.2d 933, 937 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Bellamy v. State, 941 A.2d 1107, 1115-16
(Md. 2008) (collecting federal cases). Others have held that no individual could
bind the sovereign by a statement and that Rule 801(d)(2) does not apply to
statements by agents of the government. See, e.g., United States v. Powers, 467
F.2d 1089, 1095 (7th Cir. 1972); MUELLER ET AL, supra note 88, at 910
("[B]etter ... [reasoned cases] indicate that the admissions doctrine may be
invoked against the government.").
145 The exclusion of statements of party opponents from the definition of
hearsay is a function of the adversary system and is not based upon notions of
reliability and trustworthiness like the categorical exceptions. FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2) ("No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in the case of ...
[statements of party opponents]. The freedom which . . . [statements of party
opponents] have enjoyed from technical demands of searching for an assurance
142
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results of the fMRI on cross-examination of the witness who
underwent the procedure.
If the defendant's counsel cannot fit the statement of the results
into Rule 801(d)(2)'s hearsay exemption, she might attempt to
avoid the personal knowledge and hearsay barriers by offering the
evidence for the non-hearsay purpose of showing effect on the
listener (the witness) or the current state of mind of the witness.
The problem with this approach is that learning he failed the fMRI
test does not make it more likely that the story he told in the
scanner and at trial is the product of deliberate deception. The
question is still whether he told the truth at trial and the fact that he
learned that the fMRI examiner thought he was lying does not
make it more likely that the story he told was an actual lie. Thus, if
the fMRI results are not offered for the truth of the matter asserted
they are irrelevant to prove that the in-court testimony was a lie.
One might argue that Rule 608(b) permits cross-examination of
witnesses about specific instances of conduct that are probative of
character for truthfulness and asking about the failed fMRI is
merely applying the plain language of the rule. There are three
problems with that argument. First, Rule 608 is concerned with
character for truthfulness. In the impeachment setting, the prior
acts must be probative of bad character for truthfulness. While
voluntarily submitting to an fMRI exam may be probative of the
witness's subjective belief in the truthfulness of his story and one
might be able to infer from that subjective belief that the witness's
character for truthfulness is good, the evidence here is being
offered to prove the witness lied, not that he told the truth. The fact
that he underwent fMRI scanning is not probative of his bad
characterfor truthfulness.
Second, the specific act of lying while in the scanner is
probative of bad character for truthfulness only if we know and
accept that the result of the examination concluded he was being
of trustworthiness in some against-interest circumstances, and from the
restrictive influence of the opinion rule and the rule requiring firsthand
knowledge, when taken with the apparently prevalent satisfaction with the
results, calls for generous treatment of this avenue to admissibility.").
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deceptive while in the scanner. But any probative value into the
truthfulness of the witness in these circumstances depends on the
accuracy of the exam. As explained above, the fMRI-based
opinion of the expert is not admissible through cross-examining
the witness in order to impeach unless it fits within the Rule
801(d)(2)(A)-(D) exemption for the hearsay rule.' 46 Further
complicating the problem is that the typical fMRI lie detection
examination will consist of at least two scans covering the same
topic. On one scan the subject is asked to respond truthfully and on
the other is asked to respond deceptively.'47 The comparison of the
two scans allows the examiner to see whether the BOLD response
during the "truth" scan is equal to or greater than the BOLD
response observed during the "lie" scan.'4 8 If it is, deception is
indicated. If not, the subject is thought to be telling the truth.
Accordingly, all fMRI examinations require the subject to "lie" at
some point during the scan.'49 Conducting a cross-examination that
suggests the "lie" during the scan is an act probative of character
for truthfulness is, therefore, misleading and could lead to
considerable confusion since the examination itself requires the
subject to lie in order to capture the relative BOLD response
between the brain state of "lying" and the brain state of "truth
telling."
The third problem is that if the witness was asked whether he
"failed" the fMRI and answered by either denying he underwent
scanning or that he passed the test instead of failing it, the
impeaching party would be stuck with that answer. Rule 608(b)
permits cross-examination on prior instances of conduct probative
of bad character for truthfulness. Lying while undergoing an fMRI
exam may well be probative of bad character for truthfulness. But
Rule 608(b) specifically precludes proving the prior act by
extrinsic evidence and, accordingly, prevents calling the fMRI
expert. Reliance upon Rule 608(b) as authority to cross-examine a
146

147

Supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.

148 id.
149 id.
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witness about an fMRI scan creates a conundrum if the crossexaminer does not like the answer and then tries to prove the
specific act by calling the fMRI examiner.
b. Extrinsic Impeachment: Calling theJMRI Expert
To expand upon the current hypothetical, assume the
cross-examiner did not ask the witness about the fMRI test during
cross-examination but, instead, called the fMRI examiner as an
expert and offered the opinion of the expert to directly impeach the
witness's in-court testimony. This form of impeachment does not
implicate any of the five traditional methods of impeachment. It
does not go to the witness's capacity to observe, understand,
remember, or relate. It does not seek to establish the witness's bad
character for truthfulness from which the jury can infer testimony
at trial consistent with that bad character. If the scanner test itself is
a prior statement, it is a consistent one. It does not offer a prior
inconsistent statement; in fact, it does not impeach by offering
contradictory facts that go to the merits of the case. And, it does
not suggest some bias on the part of the witness that may have
influenced his testimony. Rather, the offered evidence is scientific
proof that the facts related by the witness are the result of
conscious and deliberate deception.
There is nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence that says
only the five traditional methods of impeachment are permissible.
Rule 607 allows any party to impeach any witness; "impeach" is
not further defined by the rules."'o In this setting, the rules and
practices that regulate our traditional methods of impeachment are
not dispositive, and the admissibility is determined solely by Rules
401, 402, 611 702-705 and 403.15' The expert opinion has some
tendency to make it more likely that the in-court testimony was
false.152 Rule 402 admits relevant evidence unless it is excluded by

607.
For this discussion assume that Rules 702-705 governing expert testimony
have been satisfied. For a discussion of the application of Rules 702-705 to
fMRI-based expert opinion on witness truthfulness, see infra Parts V.A-V.C.
152 FED. R. EVID.
401.
150 FED. R. EVID.
15
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some other rule, statute, or provision of the Constitution.' Rule
403 is a rule that excludes otherwise relevant evidence if the
probative value of the proposition for which it is offered is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, or causing undue
delay, waste of time, or the needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.'54 This balancing test is tilted decidedly toward
admission, but the court has tremendous discretion in balancing the
relevant factors.' Thus, the only limits on this sort of testimony to
impeach a testifying witness are those governing expert testimony,
the balancing provisions of Rule 403, and the court's power to
control the mode and order of proof under Rule 611.
While this frees the proponent from the labyrinth of textual
rules and the unwritten common law rules that still influence
judges, it does not necessarily mean that the door is wide open to
fMRI-based opinion testimony on witness truthfulness. The
testimony must, of course, clear the significant hurdle of Rule 702.
Then the court must find that countervailing considerations under
Rule 403 do not substantially outweigh the probative value of the
evidence. Perhaps the biggest obstacle here is the practical one: the
party calling the witness must have (1) subjected the witness to an
fMRI exam; (2) the result of the fMRI exam must have indicated
deliberate deception; (3) the exam and the results must have been
disclosed to the opposing party; (4) in spite of the failed exam and
the availability of the fMRI evidence to impeach, the proponent
must have called the witness at trial; and (5) the witness must have
testified at trial consistent with the story he told during the "truth"
portion of the fMRI scan.'5 ' Aligning all of the legal and practical
stars to pave the way for admission of fMRI-based expert opinion
to impeach a witness with extrinsic expert opinion that the witness
failed the fMRI scan is a daunting task, is in large measure

153

FED. R. EvID. 402.

154 FED. R. EVID. 403.

See infra Part VI. Rules of Evidence: Balancing Probative Value Versus
Prejudicial
Effect.
56
1 See supra notes 135-55 and accompanying
text.
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controlled by the trial decisions and tactics of the opposing party,
and will be the rare exception, not the routine.
c. Extrinsic Rehabilitation: Calling the JMRI Expert to Support
Truthfulness
From the foregoing, it is apparent that if the party calling the
witness subjected the witness to an fMRI examination that
indicated deception and was obligated to disclose that fact to the
opposing party, the door to admission of the expert's opinion is
opened, however slightly, if the witness testifies at trial. But what
if the fMRI scan determined the witness was truthful? Assuming
the rules governing expert testimony are satisfied, is the
fMRI-based opinion that the witness was truthful admissible to
rehabilitate the credibility of the witness?
As the prior discussion of impeachment and rehabilitation
explained,' the question of supporting a witness with fMRI-based
opinion on truthfulness only arises after the witness has testified,
or the hearsay declarant's statement has been admitted as an
exception to the hearsay rule, and the witness has been impeached
by means or methods that expressly or impliedly charge the
witness with lying at trial.
As has been shown, not all impeachment carries with it the
charge of deliberate deception. The most likely impeachment
scenarios that carry the charge of lying' are: (1) vigorous cross-

157

See supra notes 55-133 and accompanying text.

Interestingly, the form of impeachment that always infers the witness is
lying in court is an attack on character for truthfulness in the form permitted by
Rule 608 or Rule 609. The theory behind the impeachment is that the witness
has the general propensity to lie and is acting consistent with that propensity
while testifying at trial. The form the evidence must take to accomplish the
impeachment is highly regulated, as is the evidence admissible to rehabilitate.
Insofar as the fMRI examination of the witness is a specific act probative of
truthfulness, Rule 608(b) does not admit extrinsic evidence of such acts to rebut
the inference of in-court deception created by the impeachment. Because the
fMRI-based opinion would necessarily come from the expert who conducted the
scan, the bar on extrinsic evidence excludes it. Furthermore, expert opinion
based on fMRI scanning is not an opinion of the witness's character for
158
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examination that expressly or impliedly attacks the veracity of the
witness's testimony; (2) introduction of contradicting facts that, if
true, expose the witness's contrary version as the product of
deliberate deception as opposed to a difference in perception or
perspective; (3) inconsistencies between the in-court testimony and
prior statements that could only be explained by conscious
deception at trial; and (4) bias or corruption so profound that the
most likely conclusion is that the witness lied.'59
Whether the impeachment actually charges in-court fabrication
so the fMRI-based opinion of truthfulness becomes relevant to
rebut the charge is a matter trusted to the discretion of the trial
judge. If the trial judge does not believe the impeachment included
an express or implied charge of deliberate deception, the proffer of
fMRI-based testimony of witness truthfulness would not meet the
impeachment at the point of attack and would be irrelevant.'6 0
Because the admissibility of fMRI-based expert opinion on
witness truthfulness will turn upon the manner in which a witness
was impeached, control over the admissibility of the opinion lies,
to some degree, within the power of the opponent. As a matter of
trial tactics, if counsel knows opposing counsel has an fMRI expert
waiting in the wings to rehabilitate the witness should impeachment
charge the witness with lying, she may wish to either forego
impeachment or rely upon a method that does not raise the specter
of deliberate fabrication.
The rehabilitation by introducing expert opinion of the fMRI
scan raises the initial question of whether the statements made by
the witness during the scan are admissible as substantive evidence.
If the statements themselves are offered for the truth of the matter
asserted, the statements are hearsay and only admissible as
substantive evidence if they meet an exemption or exception to the
truthfulness as contemplated by Rule 608(a). See supra notes 105-25 and
accompanying text.
159 See supra notes 95-158 and accompanying
text.
160 See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the
requirement that evidence offered to rehabilitate a witness after impeachment
must correspond to the nature of the impeachment itself.
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hearsay rule. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B) exempts from
the definition of hearsay prior consistent statements of a testifying
witness offered to rebut an express or implied charge that the incourt testimony was of recent fabrication or the product of an
improper motive or influence. In Tome v. United States,161 the
Supreme Court held that only statements made before the alleged
motive to fabricate or improper influence arose are admissible
under Rule 801(d)(1)(B).' 6 2 The typical fMRI examination will
usually occur long after any motive to fabricate arose. Otherwise,
there would be no need for the fMRI-based opinion.
161 513

U.S. 150 (1995).
Application of the pre-motive requirement to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) was not
without some controversy. See, e.g., Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric,
PracticalReasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717 (1995);
Andrew E. Taslitz, Interpretive Method and the Federal Rules of Evidence: A
Call for a Politically Realistic Hermeneutics, 32 HARV. J. LEGIs. 329 (1995).
Others have called for amending Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to allow all prior statements
that are relevant for rehabilitation to be admitted for substantive purposes
without regard to when the alleged motive to fabricate arose. Hon. Frank W.
Bullock, Jr., & Steven Gardner, PriorConsistent Statements and the Premotive
Rule, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 509 (1997). This argument has gained considerable
traction and the Supreme Court forwarded to Congress a recommendation to
change to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) to admit prior consistent statements as substantive
evidence without regard to the pre-motive requirement if they are otherwise
relevant to rehabilitate the witness. The amendment to Rule 801(d)(1)(B) will
become effective on Dec. 1, 2014, unless Congress takes contrary action. See
Supreme Court of the United States Order Apr. 25, 2014, amending FRE
801(d)(1)(B) and 803(6)-(8) available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/
courtorders/frevl4_3318.pdf (last visited May 12, 2014). One commentator has
argued that the rule against hearsay stands as the major obstacle to the
admissibility of scientifically valid fMRI-based expert testimony on witness
truthfulness. Jeffrey Bellin, The Significance (if any) for the Federal Criminal
Justice System of Advances in Lie Detector Technology, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 711,
727 (2007) ("The most cogent evidentiary objection to scientifically valid expert
lie detector testimony is that it is hearsay."). The pending amendment to Rule
801(d)(1)(B) eliminates this argument. Some states freely admit prior consistent
statements of testifying witnesses for the non-hearsay purpose of corroboration
of the witness's in-court testimony. See, e.g., State v. Garcell, 363 N.C. 10, 3940, 678 S.E.2d 618, 637 (N.C. 2009) (admitting prior statements of testifying
witnesses given to police during station house interview as "corroborative
evidence").
162
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If the statements of the witness made during the scan are not
offered for their truth value but are only offered as a basis of the
expert's opinion, or for other non-truth purposes, neither the
hearsay rule nor the pre-motive requirement presents a problem.
Experts may rely upon otherwise inadmissible evidence "if experts
in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts
or data in forming an opinion on the subject . .. ."163 Obviously,

fMRI experts on witness truthfulness would all rely upon the MRI
data generated by the witness's statements during the scan. The
actual statements of the witness in answering "yes" or "no" to the
questions about the incident are not what the opinion is based upon
in the first instance. It is the BOLD response those statements
generate that is the basis of the opinion of truthfulness.
Furthermore, in the typical scan the examiner will go through the
questions twice, once instructing the witness to lie and once
instructing the witness to tell the truth. Only if the BOLD response
during the "truth" scan is less than the response during the "lie"
scan does it indicate deception.'6 4 Accordingly, the hearsay rule
and the pre-motive requirement of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) do not
present a serious obstacle to fMRI-based opinions of truthfulness.
To summarize how the rules regulating impeachment and
rehabilitation of witnesses at trial apply to the fMRI-based expert
opinion on truthfulness we can say: (1) fMRI-based expert opinion
testimony that the witness testified truthfully is not admissible
unless and until the witness has testified and been impeached in a

way that constitutes an attack on the veracity of the in-court
testimony; (2) whether the witness has been impeached in a way
that constitutes an attack on the veracity of the in-court testimony
is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge; and (3) whether
a party can impeach a witness through extrinsic evidence that the
witness failed an fMRI examination is not prohibited by the

163 FED. R. EVID. 703.
164

Spence, supra note 46, at 12.
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Federal Rules of Evidence and is a matter left within the discretion
of the trial judge."'
The common theme running through these three principles is
that admissibility of the fMRI-based expert opinion is influenced
greatly by the trial strategy and tactics of the opponent and is
ultimately within the broad discretion of the trial judge. Only time
will tell whether litigants will spend the time and money to obtain
fMRI opinions when their ultimate admissibility depends upon
factors largely beyond their control. What is known, however, is
that the rules applicable to impeachment and rehabilitation of
witnesses will place some real constraints on the admissibility of
fMRI-based evidence of witness truthfulness. In light of the
prevailing judicial attitude that excludes expert testimony of
witness truthfulness,"' coupled with the regulation of impeachment
and rehabilitation, the opportunities to offer fMRI-based testimony
on witness truthfulness are limited.'67
V. RULES OF EVIDENCE: EXPERT OPINION TESTIMONY
To this point we have assumed that the fMR1 expert opinion
satisfied the standards for expert testimony and did not run afoul of
A jurisdiction may have a per se ban on polygraph evidence and if fMRI is
included within the scope of that ban, the judge would not have the discretion to
admit the fMRI evidence. See, e.g., MIL R. EVID. 707 (banning polygraph
evidence). No jurisdiction to date has specifically addressed whether fMRI lie
detection is within the scope of a ban on "polygraph" evidence.
166
See infra notes 287-312 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
prevailing judicial attitude toward admitting expert testimony on witness
truthfulness.
167 Of course, admission at trial to rehabilitate a witness is not the sole use of
fMRI-based expert opinion on truthfulness. As is true with regards to polygraph
evidence, the fact that the witness underwent the examination and was found
truthful by the expert may be useful in negotiating the disposition of the case
with the prosecutor. Furthermore, if opposing counsel is aware of this evidence
he may forego an impeachment that would rise to the level of an attack on
veracity in order to avoid the issue. Both uses have utility. The question is
whether fMRI-based evidence is worth the time and expense when its ultimate
use is so difficult to predict and, in large measure, dependent upon the trial
strategy of the opponent.
165
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Rule 403. When those two standards are coupled with the rules
regulating impeachment and rehabilitation, the likelihood of the
jury hearing from the fMRI expert is reduced further. The next
sections address those limitations.
A. Rule 702: The Relevant and Reliable Standard
Generally, the rules of evidence in both state and federal courts
require witnesses to testify based on their first-hand knowledge of
the historical facts and do not permit, with certain exceptions,
opinion testimony.'" The major exception is when the testimony is
based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge.' 69
Rules 702 through 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence govern
the admissibility of this important category of evidence in federal
trials. Trials in state court are governed by the various state rules of
evidence, which may or may not mirror the standards of the federal
rules. Because the fMRI image only reveals brain activity based on
the BOLD response while the subject is undergoing some
cognitive task, explaining what a given image means with regard
to the subject's truthfulness requires expert opinion testimony.
The Supreme Court set out a two-prong test for admissibility
under Rule 702 in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc.' In Daubert, the Court rejected the Frye v. United States"'
168 FED. R. EVID. 602; FED. R. EVID. 701. Lay witnesses (non-experts) are
permitted to testify in the form of an opinion if the opinion is "(a) rationally
based on the witness's perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the
witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issues; and (c) not based on
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule
702." FED. R. EVID. 701.
169 FED. R. EVID. 701.
170 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Rule 702, as it existed at the time Daubert
was
decided, read, "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." FED. R.
EVID. 702 (1993) (amended 2000). Daubert and its progeny have been the
subject of too many articles and publications to count. For a summary of the
case and its impact on the law of expert testimony, see, e.g., Robert Robinson,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals and the Local Construction of Reliability,
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standard of admitting expert testimony if the relevant scientific
community generally accepted the scientific theory underlying the
testimony and held that Rule 702 requires the trial judge to "ensure
that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not
only relevant, but reliable." 72
The Daubert Court found the relevance standard embodied in
Rule 702's requirement that expert opinion evidence "assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue."17 ' This helpfulness standard requires a valid scientific
connection, or "fit," between the opinion and a disputed issue in
the case.174 Specifically, "Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires
a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a
precondition to admissibility." 7 1
The reliability prong of the Rule 702 standard finds its locus in
the "scientific . . . knowledge" language of the rule.176 The court

19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 39 (2009); David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of
Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 2139 (1999); Judge Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert
Witnesses, 36 Hous. L. REV. 743 (1999); Ruth Saunders, The Circuit Courts'
Application of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 46 DRAKE L. REV.
407 (1997).
'293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Like Daubert,the Frye decision has been the
subject of extensive scholarly commentary. See, e.g., Steven M. Egesdal, The
Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An EmpiricalEvaluation,
74 GEO. L.J. 1769 (1986); John R. Waltz, JudicialDiscretion in the Admission
of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 1097
(1984); Edward J. lmwinkelried, A New Era in The Evolution of Scientific
Evidence-A Primer on Evaluating The Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 261 (1981); Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel
Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 1197 (1980).
172

Daubert,509 U.S. at 589 ("Given the Rules' permissive backdrop and their
inclusions of a specific rule on expert testimony that does not mention 'general
acceptance,' the assertion that the Rules somehow assimilated Frye is
unconvincing.").
Id. at 591.
74
1 Id. at 591-92.
Id.
176 Id. at 590.
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defined "scientific knowledge," as "derived by the scientific
method" and supported by "appropriate validation-i.e., 'good
grounds' . .. ."'" The Court explained, "in a case involving scientific

evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific
validity." 78
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) ("Rule 104(a)") places the
responsibility on the trial judge to determine "whether the reasoning
or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid
and .. . whether the reasoning or methodology can be applied to
the facts in issue.""' The Court suggested five factors for judges to
consider: (1) whether the technique or theory can be, or has been,
tested in some objective sense; (2) whether the technique or theory
has been subject to peer review; (3) the known or potential error
rate of the technique or theory when applied; (4) whether there are
standards or controls that govern the application of the technique
or theory; and (5) whether the technique or theory has been
generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.'so
In response to Daubert, Rule 702 was amended in 2000 to
specifically require expert testimony be based upon sufficient facts
and data, be the product of reliable principles and methods, and
that the expert applied the principles and methods reliably in
id.
'78 Id. at 600, n.9 (emphasis in original).
' ld. at 592-93.
in Id. at 593-94. Some courts, like the magistrate judge and the Sixth Circuit
in Semrau, and commentators combine the "error rate" factor and the existence
of "standards or controls" into the same bullet point and list only four Daubert
factors. Subsequent cases expanded the non-exclusive Daubert factors to
consider, (6) whether the expert's testimony is based on information growing
out of independent research or was developed for the purpose of litigation,
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 43 F.3d 1311, 1317 (9th Cir. 1995);
(7) whether there is "too great an analytical gap between the data and the
opinion proffered," General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997);
(8) whether alternative explanations have been considered and accounted for,
Claar v. Burlington N.R.R., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir. 1994); (9) whether the expert
has applied the same care and attention to his paid litigation consulting that he
applies to his regular professional practice, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526
U.S. 137, 151-53 (1999).
177
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reaching his opinion.'"' As noted by the Advisory Committee, in
proposing the 2000 amendment, "[n]o attempt has been made to
'codify' [the Daubert factors] ....

The standards set forth in the

amendment are broad enough to require consideration of any or all
of the specific Daubertfactors where appropriate."' 8 2 The Advisory
Committee also made clear that the admissibility of expert
testimony is purely a matter for the trial court under Rule 104(a)
and that the proponent of the testimony has the burden of
establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that all of the
admissibility requirements have been satisfied.'"
Like Daubert, the 2000 amendment to Rule 702, did not
impose a checklist of factors that must be applied in each case.
Rather, the rule set out a framework to analyze whether the
proffered testimony is relevant and reliable to address the issues at
trial. The allure of a checklist, however, has proven too much for
some courts to resist. In performing their gatekeeping functions,
many courts cite to Rule 702 and then proceed to analyze the
admissibility of the proffered testimony under the Daubert factors
without considering the analytical framework of Rule 702. The
Daubert factors have, in many instances, become a proxy for the
analysis of the scientific validity of the principles and methods
underlying. an opinion. Some courts, however, have recognized
Rule 702 reads:
Rule 702. Testimony by Expert Witnesses
A witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
experience, training, or education may testify in the form of an opinion
or otherwise if:
(a) the expert's scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to
determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods;
and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to the
facts of the case.
FED. R. EvID. 702.
182 Id. advisory committee's note to 2000 amendment.
83
181

1

Id.
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that the 2000 amendment to Rule 702 superseded the Daubert
decision but the Daubert decision serves as the foundation for the

rule.184
B. Evidence of Lies: JudicialScrutiny offMRI Expert Opinion on
Truthfulness
The most detailed judicial scrutiny of fMRI as a truth verifier
to date, under Rule 702, is the magistrate judge's Amended Report
and Recommendation in United States v. Semrau.'" Dr. Lome
Semrau, a psychologist, was charged with sixty counts of defrauding
Medicare, Medicaid, and other health care benefit programs for
submitting false reimbursement claims for psychiatric services
provided to patients in nursing homes in Tennessee and Mississippi
between 1999 and 2005.186 To convict Dr. Semrau of health care
fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1347, the Government had to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Dr. Semrau: (1) "knowingly devised a
scheme or artifice to defraud a health care benefit program ... ;
(2) executed or attempted to execute this scheme . . . ; and (3) acted
with intent to defraud."' 8 7

United States v. Para, 402 F.3d 752 (7th Cir. 2005).
United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092 (W.D. Tenn.
June 1, 2010). The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, which
excluded the fMRI-based testimony, was adopted by the district judge. Out of a
71 count indictment, the jury found Dr. Semrau guilty of three counts Health
Care Fraud, Aiding and Abetting, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1347. United
States v. Semrau, No. 1:07CR10074-01-MI, 2011 WL 1114441, (W.D. Tenn.
Mar. 24, 2011). On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the trial court's exclusion
of the fMRI testimony and upheld the conviction. United States v. Semrau, 693
F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012). The courts in Wilson v. CorestaffServs., L.P., 28 Misc.
3d 425 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) and State v. Smith, No. 106589C (Cir. Ct.
Montgomery Cty., MD, Oct. 3, 2012) excluded the fMRI testimony under the
"general acceptance" standard for admission of novel expert testimony in New
York and Maryland, respectively, and did not engage in a detailed inquiry into
the scientific reliability of the technology.
186 He was also charged with eleven counts of money laundering, but those
charges were not specifically addressed in the fMRI scanning. United States v.
Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *2 (W. D. Tenn. June 1, 2010).
184

185

' Id. at *2 n.4.

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

160

[VOL. 16: 105

Specifically, the government alleged Dr. Semrau "upcoded" his
bills for reimbursement by instructing his billing clerks to submit
bills for procedure codes that were different than and were
reimbursed at a greater rate than the billing codes for the
procedures and examinations actually performed by the doctors
working for his company.'" He also submitted separate bills for
Abnormal Involuntary Movement Scale ("AIMS") tests that his
psychiatrists performed as part of their regular monitoring of their
patients' condition.'89 The Government charged that Dr. Semrau
knew that AIMS tests were part of the routine monitoring and were
not to be billed separately."
Dr. Semrau contested the Government's claim that he
"knowingly" devised a scheme to defraud, denying that he "acted
with intent to defraud.""' He did not dispute that he submitted bills
with differing codes than those recorded by the treating physicians
in their encounters with the patients. He claimed the procedure
codes were confusing and inconsistent and his billing practices
were reasonable under the circumstances.'9 2 Dr. Semrau claimed
that representatives of the companies processing the Medicare and
Medicaid claims told him that he could submit separate bills for
the AIMS tests. Dr. Semrau's defense was that he did not intend to
defraud the government when he submitted the bills between 1999
and 2005.'"
To bolster the credibility of his denial of the intent to defraud,
Dr. Semrau underwent fMRI scanning conducted by Dr. Steven J.
Laken, Ph.D., founder and president of Cephos Corporation, a
company that provided lie detection and truth verification services
using fMRI.'94
" Id. at *2.
Id.
190 Id. at *2 n.4.
191 Id. at *2.
189

192 id

193

19 4

id

Id. at *4-7; CEPHOS CORP., http://www.cephoscorp.com/about-us/index.
php#about (last visited Sep. 6, 2010). Cephos Corp. discontinued their lie detection
and truth verification services in early 2013. The current version of the
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Dr. Semrau's counsel contacted Dr. Laken in December 2009,
and arranged for Dr. Laken to perform fMRI scanning to determine
whether Dr. Semrau was truthful when he denied having the intent
to defraud the government.19 Dr. Laken worked with the defense
counsel to develop Specific Incident Questions ("SIQ") related to
the charged offenses. 19 6 The SIQs dealt with the basic facts alleged
in the indictment, including whether Dr. Semrau intended to defraud
the government by submitting his claims for reimbursement, and
were phrased to elicit a "yes" or "no" response. 97 For the purposes
of the fMRI, the charges were divided into two major areas.'" The
first area focused on whether Dr. Semrau was telling the truth
when he denied submitting the reimbursement bills with an intent
to defraud. 9 9 The second area focused on whether he knew that
AIMS tests were not to be billed separately.200
On December 30, 2009, Dr. Semrau traveled to Dr. Laken's lab
in Massachusetts. 20 ' After a medical exam and preliminary tests to
determine whether any impediments to scanning existed, Dr.
Laken went over the procedures and the SIQs with Dr. Semrau.202
Prior to the scan, Dr. Semrau practiced answering the SIQs on a
computer to become familiar with them and the response device he

company's website does not mention or refer to the fMRI truth verification
services previously offered by Cephos. In an email exchange with the author,
Dr. Laken expressed frustration with the reluctance of the legal system to accept
what he believed was highly reliable evidence of truthfulness. His company now
devotes its time and resources to forensic DNA services. Personal communication
with Dr. Laken, on file with the author.
1
United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *4 (W.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2010).
196

id.

Id.

I97 id.

1 Id.
'

99

2 00

Id. at *4-5.

Id. at *5-6.
Dr. Laken's company covered all the expenses associated with the fMRI
scanning including Dr. Laken's time and travel to testify at the hearing. United
States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *4 n.12 (W.D. Tenn.
June 1, 2010).
202 Id. at *4-7.
201
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would be using while in the scanner. 203 The first scan dealt with the
intent to defraud issue.204 Dr. Semrau entered the scanner and
responded to the randomized presentation of the SIQs. 205 He was
first instructed to respond truthfully to each question.206 The
questions were presented again and this time he was instructed to
respond falsely.2 07
After the scans on the intent issue, Dr. Semrau told Dr. Laken
he was tired but felt capable of continuing.20 8 Dr. Laken then
scanned him while he responded to the SIQs dealing with the
AIMS testing issue. 209 As before, he was told to respond truthfully
the first time through and falsely the second time. 210 At the
conclusion of the second scan, Dr. Semrau again mentioned he was
tired and that the SIQs seemed complex and confusing, even
though he had practiced them before getting in the scanner.2 11
After all the scans were completed, Dr. Laken processed the
data through his proprietary computer program and evaluated the
resulting images.2 12 By comparing the BOLD responses between
the two scans on the intent issues Dr. Laken concluded that Dr.
Semrau was being truthful during the scan, in which he denied
having the intent to defraud when he submitted the claims for
reimbursement.213
On the scan dealing with the AIMS tests, however, the BOLD
response indicated deception. 214 Dr. Laken surmised that fatigue
and the confusing and complex nature of the AIMS SIQs were

203

Id. at *6.

204

id.

205

id.

206

d

207 id
208

Id.

209

d

210

d.

211

Id.

212

id.

213 Id. at
214

d.

*7.

OCT. 2014]

Evidence of Lies and Rules of Evidence

163

responsible for the deception finding. 215 After revising the SIQs
dealing with the AIMS test, Dr. Laken arranged for Dr. Semrau to
return to Massachusetts to repeat the AIMS test scan.2 16 After
processing the data from the repeat scans, Dr. Laken concluded
that Dr. Semrau was being truthful when he denied knowing that it
was improper to seek reimbursement for AIMS tests as separate
items.2 17
Dr. Semrau's counsel notified the government that Dr. Laken
was prepared to testify that Dr. Semrau was telling the truth when
he denied having the intent to defraud the government and that he
did not know submitting separate bills for AIMS testing was
inappropriate. 21 8 The government moved to exclude Dr. Laken's
testimony under Rules 702 and 403.219 On May 13 and 14, 2010,
the magistrate judge conducted a hearing on the government's
motion. Dr. Laken testified to the reliability of fMRI as a truth
verification technology and offered affidavits of other scientists
and scientific literature to support his theory. 220 The government
called two experts of its own to dispute the reliability issue of
fMRI-based opinion testimony on truthfulness generally, and on
the specific application to Dr. Semrau, offering scientific and legal
literature that questioned the reliability of fMRI as a lie detector.22'
In his report recommending exclusion of Dr. Laken's expert
opinion, the magistrate judge analyzed the testimony and exhibits
presented at the hearing in light of the Daubert factors.222 First, he
2 15 id.
216
217
218

id
id

Id at *1.

219 id.
220 id.

id.
1d. at *9-14. By combining the known or potential error rate and the
existence of protocols or standards into one inquiry, the magistrate judge read
Daubert as suggesting four factors instead of five. Obviously, fMRI as a truth
verifier is based upon scientific knowledge and the magistrate judge first found
that Dr. Laken's was qualified to offer an opinion based on his experience,
education, and training. Id. at *10. Not mentioned in the analysis under Rule 702
was the requirement that the testimony "assist the trier of fact," though
221

222
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considered whether the underlying principles can be and have been
tested.223 He found the underlying theories of fMRI-based lie
detection had been subjected to laboratory testing "at some
level."224 He noted, however, that only three of the laboratory
studies attempted to determine whether fMRI could accurately
detect deception in individuals as opposed to looking at average
BOLD responses across the group of subjects in a given study.225
The first Daubert factor could only be satisfied by Dr. Laken's
limited work in his laboratory, rather than any implementation of
the fMRI technology in the real world.22 6 In fact, Dr. Laken
acknowledged that he did not know how fMRI for lie detection
could be tested in a real-world setting.227
The magistrate judge also found theories supporting fMRI as a
lie detector have been published in peer reviewed scientific
publications, though the studies upon which the articles were based

Magistrate Judge Pham did allude to that requirement in his Rule 403 analysis.
Id. at *16. Furthermore, Magistrate Judge Pham found it unnecessary to address
the "relevance prong" of FED. R. EVID. 702 because he found the opinion
testimony unreliable under the Daubertfactors.
223 Id. at
*9.
224 Id. at *10.
225 Id. at *10 n.16. In the typical fMRI study, all of the subjects are scanned
and the voxel activation pattern is averaged across the group to identify the
regions of the brain where the BOLD response is greatest. Because the final
image is a group average of the scan data across all the subjects, it may not
represent the actual activation pattern in any single individual. See Aguirre,
supra note 40, at 2.
226 United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *10 (W.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2010).
227 Testimony of Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, May 13, 2010,
Vol. II at 191, United States v. Semrau, No. 07CR10074-lJPM (W.D. Tenn.).
The applicability of a laboratory study to outside persons in different settings
involve problems of external validity and ecological validity. These validities
concern how well the laboratory findings translate to people and situations as
they occur in the dynamics of everyday life as opposed to the controlled
environment of the scientific laboratory. See infra notes 478-95 (discussing
external and ecological validity of fMRI studies on detecting deception).
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were conducted only in laboratory settings. 228 He noted several
additional studies analyzing fMRI in the lie detection context have
been published since 2008.229
The lack of known error rates for an fMRI lie detector in a realworld application, especially as applied to a sixty-three year-old
subject, raised additional concerns about the reliability of the
opinion.230 While Dr. Laken testified at the Daubert hearing that
known error rates could be calculated from the fMRI studies upon
which he relied, a government expert disputed the doctor's claim
by pointing to the sample sizes of the existing studies, which were
too small to draw statistically significant error rates.23 1
Furthermore, it was undisputed that there were no known error
rates, or even efforts to discover them, in any setting beyond the
21
In addition, Dr. Semrau's age at the time of the
laboratory using.232
scan was outside the eighteen to fifty-year-old used by Dr. Laken
to establish his error rates.233 The small sample sizes Dr. Laken
relied on,234 coupled with the complete absence of any known error
rates in a real world applications for sixty-three year-old subjects,235
and conclusions in the scientific literature from other researchers
that "[fMRI] is currently not ready to be used in real-world lie
detection"23 seriously impeded Dr. Semrau's efforts to convince
the magistrate judge that Dr. Laken's opinion was reliable.
Similarly, the lack of any established protocols or controls in
the real-world application of fMRI as a lie detector were held as
negative factors against admitting Dr. Laken's testimony.23 7 Dr.
Laken did testify that he used his own protocols and control, but
228 United States v. Sernrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *10 (W. D.
Tenn. June 1, 2010).
229
Id. at *10 n.16.
230
Id. at *11.
231 id.
232 id.
233
Id. at *12 n.17.
234
Id. at *11.
235
Id. at *12 n.17.
2 36
1Id. at *12.
2 37
Id. at *13.
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there were no uniform industry standards applicable to real world
testing.238 "Without such standards," the magistrate judge found, "a
court cannot adequately evaluate the reliability of a particular lie
detection examination."239
The magistrate judge also found that Dr. Laken likely departed
from his own self-developed protocols.240 If the deception finding
on the initial scan regarding AIMS testing was caused by Dr.
Semrau's fatigue, as Dr. Laken testified, it was an indication that
Dr. Laken either did not have a reliable protocol for developing
proper SIQs, or he failed to follow an established reliable
protocol.2 4 ' If the outcome of a scan varies with the form of the
questions, it would seem that scientific reliability would require a
rather clear and precise protocol for question format. None of the
published studies of fMRI scans for truth verification have
indicated any efforts to test what effect, if any, the form of the SIQ
has on the outcome. The magistrate judge was not comfortable
with a procedure that led to a deception finding based on flawed
SIQs and fatigue, and a methodology calling for repeat scans with
revised SIQs until the results supported the client's claim.242 Thus,
the lack of standards and failure to follow protocols seriously
undermined the reliability of Dr. Laken's opinions.
Finally, the magistrate judge evaluated the level of acceptance
of fMRI as a lie detector in the neuroscience community.243 Dr.
Laken admitted at the Dauberthearing that another court excluded
his fMRI opinion regarding truthfulness in a civil case. That court
applied the Frye general acceptance test and found that fMRI as a
lie detector was not generally accepted by the neuroscience
community.244 The magistrate judge, relying upon experts in the
field, found that fMRI. as a means to detect deception is not

238 Id
239id

24 0
241

Id. at *7

id.

242id

Id. at *3 n.7.
244 Wilson v. Corestaff Servs., L.P., 28 Misc. 3d 425
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
243
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generally accepted by the neuroscience community as a scientifically
sound and reliable way to detect lies in a real world setting. 24 5
The magistrate judge concluded that Dr. Laken's testimony
failed the reliability prong of Rule 702 and recommended the
District Court grant the government's motion to exclude the
evidence.2 46 As a result, the magistrate judge did not evaluate the
relevance or "fit" requirement of the Rule.247
The district judge adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation and excluded Dr. Laken's testimony. Dr. Semrau
was ultimately convicted of three counts of healthcare fraud.248 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed his conviction and held the District Court
did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Laken's testimony
under Rule 702 for the reasons set out in the Magistrate Judge's
Report and Recommendation.24 9
Because the Magistrate and District Court did not consider the
"fit" aspect of Rule 702, neither did the Sixth Circuit. The
appellate court noted, however, that jurors without advanced
scientific degrees and training would be "poorly suited" to weigh
the importance of the distinctions between past studies in the field
and the specifics of the exam administered to Dr. Semrau.25 0 The

Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *13.
Id. at *14.
247 The magistrate judge noted that Dr. Laken's opinion spoke to
Dr. Semrau's
"overall" truthfulness and not to the validity of any individual SIQ. Id. at *5
n. 15. The first sixty counts of the indictment all alleged violations of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1347 in submission of claims for reimbursement on specific dates to specific
third party payors. Id. at *2. Specifically, the government alleged Dr. Semrau
submitted reimbursement claims under Code 99312 instead of Code 90862 with
an intent to defraud. Id. One of the SIQs asked, "Did you bill CPT Code 99312
to cheat or defraud Medicare?" Id. at *5. Dr. Laken could not offer an opinion
on whether Dr. Semrau was lying or telling the truth when he said, "No," in
response to that question. Id. at *8.
248 United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 531 (6th
Cir. 2012).
249 Id. at 523.
245

2 46

250 id.
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judge decided that jurors would "more likely ... be confused rather
than assisted by Dr. Laken's testimony.2 51
C. Evidence ofLies. Analyzing Expert Opinion on Truthfulness
The magistrate judge and the Sixth Circuit in Semrau resolved
the admissibility of Dr. Laken's opinion on a rather straightforward
application of the Daubert factors. They were, after all, reviewing
the evidence and argument of counsel in a specific case and were
not engaged in a general academic inquiry as to the reliability of
fMRI. Precisely because the Semrau court did not delve deeper
than the record before it required, some additional evaluation of
fMRI lie detection's relevance and reliability is appropriate.
fMRI as a lie detector or truth verifier is in its infancy. It is
hardly surprising that the first three courts to consider its
admissibility rejected it. As the technology improves and its
application to deception is refined, other lawyers are likely to offer
it into evidence and other courts will have to determine its
admissibility. Thus, a closer look at the current state of the science
and the legal standards for expert testimony will assist researchers,
lawyers, and judges when that day arrives.
While the Daubert factors are a useful proxy for assessing
reliability in many cases, the admissibility question under Rule 702
is broader than just the Daubert factors. The Federal Rules of
Evidence impose six conditions on the admission of expert opinion
testimony: (1) the witness must be qualified expert in the field by
virtue of knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education;
(2) the subject matter of the testimony must deal with scientific,
technical or other specialized knowledge; (3) the testimony must
help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact
in issue; (4) the witness must have had sufficient facts and data
upon which to base an opinion in the specialized field; (5) the
principles and methods relied upon by the expert must be reliable
when applied to the question presented; and (6) the witness must

251

id.
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have applied those reliable principles and methods reliably to the
facts and data needed to answer the question in the case at hand.252
The magistrate judge in Semrau did note that Dr. Laken met
the "qualifications" requirement of Rule 702 and the subject matter
dealt with "scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge." 253 None
of these factors were disputed by the government.2 54 With regard to
the remaining four Rule 702 requirements, and like many other
courts facing similar issues, the magistrate judge cited Rule 702 for
the general proposition that expert testimony must be relevant and
reliable and turned immediately to the Daubert factors.255
252 FED. R. EvID. 701(c); 702. The requirement that the subject matter deal
with scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge is found in the text of
Rule 701(c); the other five requirements are found in the text of Rule 702.
253 United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *10 (W.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2010).
254 Id.
255 See id. Some courts have viewed Daubert as the last word in the
admissibility of expert testimony and have ignored the other two cases in the
Daubert trilogy, Joiner and Kumho Tire, as well as the amendments to Rule 702.
See David Bernstein, The Misbegotten Judicial Resistance to the Daubert
Revolution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 27, 29 (2013) ("These judges ignore the
text of Rule 702, and instead rely on lenient precedents that predate (and conflict
with) not only with the text of amended Rule 702 but also some or all of the
Daubert trilogy,"). Others have suggested that the three-prong inquiry into the
sufficiency of the facts and data, the reliability of the principles and methods,
and the reliable application of those principles and methods to the issue at hand
as set out in Rule 702 (b), (c), and (d) are no more exacting than the Court's
Daubert analysis and should be viewed as a single question. MICHAEL H.
GRAHAM, 5 HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 702.5 (7th ed.) (The following
articulation combining three numbered separate requirements of Rule 702 is
suggested: "[a]s actually applied in the matter at hand to facts, data, or opinions
sufficiently established to exist, are there sufficient assurances of trustworthiness
present that the expert witness' explanative theory produces a correct result to
warrant jury acceptance?"). This may explain why some courts reviewing the
admissibility of expert testimony cite Rule 702 and then proceed immediately to
review the testimony under the Daubert factors, much like the magistrate judge
and the Sixth Circuit did in Semrau. Others have noted that the amendments to
Rule 702 imposed a more exacting inquiry into the basis of the proffered
testimony and consider each of the subsections of Rule 702 as distinct
requirements imposed by the language of the Rule. See, e.g., Rudd v. General
Motors Corp., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1337 (M.D. Ala. 2001) ("[T]he plain
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However, analyzing the admissibility of fMRI-based testimony on
credibility through the analytical framework suggested by the text
of Rule 702 reveals important considerations that were not
specifically addressed in either the Magistrate Judge's Report and
Recommendation or in the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Semrau.
Using this case as the factual context, the following sections apply
the Rule 702 textual framework to fMRI-based expert opinion
testimony on witness truthfulness.
1. The Qualificationsof the Expert Witness
A witness offering expert opinion testimony must have
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to
enable him to apply his area of expertise to the issues before the
court.256 In Semrau, for example, Dr. Laken's qualifications as an
expert in fMRI research were undisputed, and the government
conceded that he was otherwise qualified.257 That may not be true
in every case, and careful litigants should always verify the
qualifications of the experts. The qualifications set forth in the
Rule are in the disjunctive, and the witness need not have gained
his knowledge through higher education; practical experience may,
in an appropriate case, suffice.25 In the realm of neuroscience and
language of the new Rule 702, as well as the advisory committee notes to the
new Rule, makes it clear that this court in now obliged to screen expert
testimony to ensure it stems from, not just a reliable methodology, but also a
sufficient factual basis and reliable application of the methodology to the facts.")
(emphasis in original). This is not to suggest that Rule 702 displace the Daubert
factors. On the contrary, the Court's non-exclusive list of factors to consider in
assessing the reliability of expert testimony are just as useful after the 2000
amendment as they were before the amendment. In sum, Rule 702 is not
satisfied by merely applying the Daubert factors without considering the other
requirements
of the rule.
256
FED. R. EVID. 702(a).
257 United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092,
at *10 (W.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2010).
258 In a case dealing with whether the brakes on a car were defective,
the brake
mechanic at the local garage who dropped out of high school but who has thirty
years' experience fixing brakes and a PhD in automotive engineering may both
qualify as expert witnesses. Equally important, experts from different scientific
or technical disciplines may employ principles and methods from their
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fMRI, however, higher education, as well as training and
experience, will be necessary to qualify a witness to give an
opinion. A trial lawyer overlooks the qualification issue of his or
her own expert, as well as her opponent's experts, at his or her
peril. Following the analytical framework embodied in the text of
Rule 702 ensures this important consideration is not overlooked.
2. The Appropriateness of the Subject Matter
The next issue is whether the subject matter is appropriate for
opinion testimony. The Federal Rules of Evidence distinguish
between opinions offered by lay witnesses and those offered by
experts.25 9 Rule 701 permits opinion testimony of lay witnesses if
(1) the opinion is based on the rational perception of the witness;
(2) admitting the opinion would help the jury understand the
witness's testimony or determine a fact in issue; and (3) the
opinion is not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge within the meaning of Rule 702.260
Rule 702 picks up where Rule 701 leaves off and requires
expert testimony to be based on "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge."26 ' Application of Rule 702's limits on
permissible subject matter to fMRI generally poses no problem
because it is clearly an area of scientific knowledge. While the
substantive law does not require litigants to offer fMRI testimony
in order to establish a charge, claim, or defense, any expert
testimony purporting to apply fMRI technology to an issue in the
case obviously requires scientific knowledge.

respective disciplines to the same issue. See, e.g., Smith v. BMW N. Am., Inc.,
308 F.3d 913, 919 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding an abuse of discretion in excluding
plaintiff s expert forensic pathologist's opinion as to the cause of plaintiff's neck
injury in an automobile crash because the witness was not an expert in
biomechanics, physics, or engineering like the defendant's expert).
259 FED. R. EVID. 701.
26
0

261

d

FED. R. EvID. 702(a).
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3. Help the Trier of Fact
The third condition for admission of expert testimony requires
that the opinion assist the jury in its task of historical
reconstruction of the events giving rise to the litigation.2 62 The text
of Rule 702(a) puts this factor in terms of understanding other
263
evidence or determining a fact in issue. This limitation on the
admissibility of otherwise relevant evidence serves two policy
goals: (1) "promote the trier-of-fact's search for truth by helping it
to understand other evidence or determine the facts in dispute,"
and (2) "preserve the trier of fact's traditional power to decide the
meaning of evidence and the credibility of witnesses." 264 The
Daubert Court considered this as an aspect of relevance or "fit"
between the opinion and the issue in dispute.265
Relevance is a binary concept: the proffered evidence either
has some tendency to make the fact of consequence relevant or
irrelevant.266 The "any tendency" standard of Rule 401 is rather
easily met and some have even argued that the standard is so low
that it is virtually meaningless. 267 fMRI-based expert opinion that a
witness was truthful in the scanner makes it more likely that incourt testimony consistent with the scanner statements is truthful.
While the logical connection between the results of the fMRI scan
and the credibility determination at trial is sufficient to pass the
low bar of general relevancy, Rule 702's helpfulness standard
demands a closer connection between the underlying science, the
opinion, and the issue to be decided. This heightened connection
comes after the opinion passes the basic relevancy test applied to
262Id.
26
3Id.
264 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., VICTOR JAMES
GOLD, & MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, 29 FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:

EVIDENCE § 6262 (2013).
265 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm, Inc., 509
U.S. 579, 591-92 (1993).
266
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 179 n.4 (1997).
267 David Crump, On the Uses of Irrelevant Evidence, 34 Hous.
L. REV. 1, 6
(1997) ("[T]he relevancy 'standard' in Rule 401 is no standard at all, because it
indiscriminately admits every arguable proposition no matter how low its
probative value.").
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all evidence under Rule 401, and before weighing the probative
value of the opinion versus the prejudicial effect under Rule 403.268
The text of the Federal Rules of Evidence supports this
conclusion. Rule 402 declares that evidence meeting the low bar
established by Rule 401 is admissible unless otherwise excluded
by "these rules . . . ."269 Rule 701 excludes opinion testimony based
upon scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge unless it
meets all of the standards imposed by Rule 702, including the
"help the trier of fact" requirement. 270 Rule 702 is one of "these
rules" referred to in Rule 402 that excludes evidence that would
otherwise pass the relevance test of Rule 401.271
Rule 702 requires the proponent of the expert opinion to
affirmatively establish the "fit" between the opinion and the facts
of the case in order for the opinion to meet the "help the trier of
fact" standard.2 72 If the Rule 702 standard was the same as the Rule
401 general relevance standard, the language in Rule 702(a)
requiring expert opinion to help the trier of fact would be
superfluous. All evidence must meet the "any tendency"
requirement of Rule 401, and all relevant evidence helps the jury to
some degree. However, Rule 702(a) uses different language273 to
impose an additional test applicable to expert opinion testimony
that has already cleared the low bar of Rule 401 and places the

See, e.g., Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595 (referring to Rule 403 as another
limitation on expert testimony).
269 FED. R. EVID. 402. ("Relevant evidence is admissible
unless any of the
following provides otherwise: The United States Constitution; a federal statute;
these rules; or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. Irrelevant evidence
is not admissible.").
270 FED. R. EVID. 702(a)
271 By the same token, Rule 403 is also one of "these rules"
that excludes
evidence that clears other admissibility hurdles.
272 FED. R. EVID. 702 Advisory Committee's note (explaining that
under Rule
104(a), "the proponent has the burden of establishing that the pertinent
admissibility requirements are met by a preponderance of the evidence") (citing
Bourjaily v. Unites States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987)).
273 FED. R. EvID. 702(a) (requiring the expert's knowledge to "help the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue").
268
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burden on the proponent to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that the opinion will help the jury.2 74
fMRI opinion testimony on truthfulness easily satisfies the
"any tendency" standard of Rule 401. Since Rule 401 already
requires all admissible evidence to have a tendency to make a fact
of consequence more or less probable, the question becomes: what
does Rule 702's helpfulness standard demand in addition to the
basic requirement of relevancy?2 75 The answer requires consideration
of the second policy goal embodied in the helpfulness requirement
and how courts have treated expert opinion on whether a witness at
trial lied or told the truth.
a. The "Fit"Requirement
In Daubert,the Court addressed this helpfulness aspect of Rule
702 as "whether expert testimony proffered in the case is
sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in
resolving a factual dispute." 276 To meet the helpfulness standard,
the Court said it requires "a valid scientific connection to the
Daubert itself clarified that admissibility of expert opinion was a matter for
the court under Rule 104(a). Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,
591 (1993). In applying Rule 104(a) to questions of admissibility of evidence,
the trial court applies a preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. at 592 n. 10
(citing Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 175-76). This does not mean, however, that Rule
403 is inoperative when dealing with expert testimony. Id. Testimony that
satisfies the admissibility standards of Rule 702 may still run afoul of the Rule
403 balancing test and be excluded on that basis. Id. at 595.
275 Expert testimony is singled out for special treatment in the discovery rules
applicable to both civil and criminal litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26; FED. R.
CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(G). It is not surprising that Rule 702 would impose requirements
on admissibility in addition to those applicable to non-expert testimony. See also
DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW
274

WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE: WHY ALL EXPERT TESTIMONY SHOULD RECEIVE
SERIOUS SCRUTINY § 10.2 (2d ed. 2013) (rejecting a "let it all in" attitude toward

expert testimony and giving four reasons for special scrutiny of expert
testimony: (1) avoid wasting time with un-founded areas of expertise; (2) avoid
expert shopping by the parties; (3) avoid professional witnesses; and (4) juries
lack expertise to fully critique expert opinion).
276
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591 (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d
1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985)).
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pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility." 27 7 The "fit"
between the expert opinion and the issues before the jury requires
more than the basic "any tendency" standard of Rule 401 that
applies to all evidence:
The relevancy, or fit, requirement has two important variations in the
context of expert testimony. The first refers to the more traditional
question of whether the expert's opinion logically relates to some
specific issue in dispute under the substantive law. The second
variation, and the one more particular to expert evidence, is whether the
research basis for the expert's opinion generalizes to a legal issue in
dispute. Both of these are described as matters of fit, but they typically
arise in different ways. The first is primarily a concern of the
substantive law and whether the fact that is the subject of the expert
testimony is an issue in the case. The second primarily concerns the
underlying research basis for the expert opinion and whether it can be
extrapolated to help resolve a disputed fact that is an issue in the
case.

Professors David Faigman, John Monahan, and Christopher
Slobogin explain the "fit" requirement as consisting of both "legal

2 77

Id. at 592.
Faigman, supra note 82, at 93; see also CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER AND
LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 3 FEDERAL EVIDENCE 787-88 (4th ed. 2013) ("Expert
and scientific testimony usually reflects, and brings to bear on the case, theories,
tests, and experience generated in situations unrelated to the events in litigation.
Hence, its utility turns partly on the degree of resemblance between the
transaction in suit and the situations in which the science or expertise was
generated. Expert testimony also extrapolates or draws conclusions resting on
theories, tests, and experience, and its utility turns in part on how closely the
conclusion is connected to the underlying data-whether it is but a short step
from data to conclusion or a long inferential leap. The closer the connection the
better the fit, although this criterion does not demand there be perfect
congruence between proffered testimony and the facts or issues in the case.");
see also In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)
("[T]he [fit] standard is higher than bare relevance."). The relevance prong of
Rule 702's "help the jury" standard also differs from Rule 401 in that the issue
addressed by the proffered expert opinion must be "in dispute." Daubert, 509
U.S. at 591. The existence of a factual dispute is not an aspect of relevance
under Rule 401. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 179 (1997).
278
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fit" and "empirical fit."2 79 Legal fit asks whether the opinion helps
the jury determine a "factual question that the substantive law
requires to be answered."2 80 Empirical fit addresses "whether the
expert testimony proffered in the case is based on research
methods that relate to the factual question in issue."28 ' Considering
fMRI-based expert opinion on witness truthfulness under this
paradigm reveals serious "fit" problems.
i. Legal Fit
Legal fit in this paradigm encompasses simple relevancy.
Credibility is always a "fact of consequence" within the meaning
of Rule 401.282 Furthermore, the opinion of one who professes to
have some special or scientific basis upon which to determine
truthfulness has some tendency, however slight, to make the truth
or falsity of the testimony more or less likely. For example, if one
who professes to have a scientific basis upon which to distinguish
between truth and lies is of the opinion that the witness told the
truth when undergoing that scientific test, it logically follows that
testimony at trial consistent with that given during the test is more
likely to be true. The opinion does not "prove" the witness is
telling the truth, but it has some tendency to make it more likely
that the consistent in-court testimony is truthful.
The legal fit inquiry also considers whether the expert
testimony addresses a disputed issue the substantive law requires
the jury to resolve.283 This goes beyond the mere "any tendency"
David L. Faigman, John Mohahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group to Individual
(G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2014)
280 (manuscript at 23), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2298909.
279

d

281

Id.
282 Cf United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) ("Proof of bias
is almost
always relevant because the jury, as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has
historically been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the
accuracy and truth of a witness' testimony.").
283
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591; see also Faigman, Mohahan & Slobogin, supra
note 279, at 23 ("Legal fit calls upon courts to determine whether the expert
testimony proffered in the case is material to a factual question that the
substantive law requires to be answered.").
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standard of Rule 401 and reaches the second policy of goal of
preserving the jury's role in determining the meaning of evidence
and deciding matters of credibility. The substantive law does not
require the jury to decide whether a given witness was lying or
telling the truth at trial. The jury may, of course, make that
determination in their deliberations, and evidence offered on that
point may satisfy basic relevancy, but the substantive law does not
demand an answer to that question.
Using Semrau as an example, the opinion Dr. Laken was
prepared to give was that Dr. Semrau "believes that he is telling the
truth . . . ."284 His opinion was limited to an "overall" impression of
truthfulness, and he specifically denied being able to tell whether
Dr. Semrau answered any of the SIQs truthfully.2 85 Accepting the
fact that credibility is "of consequence" within the meaning of
Rule 401, Dr. Laken's opinion, based upon his fMRI scan of Dr.
Semrau, had some tendency to make it more likely that Dr.
Semrau's in-court testimony, if consistent with his scanner
statements, was truthful. Arguably, one who is "overall truthful"
during an fMRI scan or who subjectively believes he is telling the
truth is more likely to be telling the truth when testifying consistent
with the scan statements than one who was determined to be
deceptive during a scan or one who does not believe he is telling
the truth. The scan results have some "tendency" to support the
credibility of Dr. Semrau because the jury could infer his
testimony at trial was truthful based upon the opinion of Dr.
Laken.
The substantive law, however, did not require the jury to
decide whether Dr. Semrau was telling the truth or lying at trial.
Dr. Semrau's trial testimony of his intent was probative of his
intent at the time of the charged offenses and, if believed by the
jury, would have exonerated him of those charges. But whether he
was lying on the witness stand was not an element the government
284 Testimony of Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, May 13, 2010,

Vol. 1. at 99, United States v. Semrau, No. 07CR10074-lJPM (W.D. Tenn., June
1,2010).
2 85
Id. at 137-41.
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was required to prove in order to convict. In fact, the law did not
even require him to place his credibility in issue at all.286 He could
have exercised his right not to testify. The trial strategy to take the
stand and place his credibility before the jury was sufficient to
make his credibility relevant in the general sense, but it did not
create a situation where the jury was required to decide whether he
was lying or telling the truth in order to decide the case. One might
infer from the jury's ultimate verdict whether they credited his
testimony, but the substantive law did not require the jury to label
him either a liar or a truth-teller in order to decide the case. Using
Professor Faigman's paradigm, one could say the "legal fit"
required by the helpfulness standard was not met.
In addition to the disconnect between fMRI-based opinion on
witness truthfulness and what the jury must actually decide, there
are broader policy reasons that counsel against professionalizing
the task of determining witness truthfulness. The "help the jury"
standard imposed by Rule 702 is broad enough and flexible enough
to determine whether admitting this sort of testimony will help a
specific jury in a specific case and whether it will help the jury in
the systemic sense.
Federal court decisions both before and after the adoption of
the Federal Rules of Evidence have generally found expert opinion
on whether a witness is telling the truth unhelpful because
credibility decisions are committed exclusively to the jury and the
opinion of an expert merely tells the jury whom to believe. 287 Some
See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., United States v. Hill, 749 F.3d 1250, 1258 (10th Cir. 2014)
(holding that there was plain error to admit expert opinion on witness credibility
because it "(1) 'usurps a critical function of the jury'; (2) 'is not helpful to the
jury, which can make its own determination of credibility'; and (3) when
provided by 'impressively qualified experts on the credibility of other witnesses
is prejudicial and unduly influences the jury' ") (quoting United States v.
Toledo, 985 F.2d 1462, 1470 (10th Cir. 1993)); Marvel Characters, Inc. v.
Kirby, 726 F.3d 119, 135-36 (2d Cir. 2013) (excluding expert historians who
interviewed associates of the parties and constructed a picture of the relationship
between the parties, including credibility); United States v. Lespier, 725 F.3d
437, 448-49 (4th Cir. 2013) (excluding expert testimony that sleep deprivation
286
287
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caused the defendant to give inconsistent statements; jurors could understand
point without aid of expert); United States v. Allen, 716 F.3d 98, 105-06 (4th
Cir. 2013) (finding expert testimony offered solely for the purpose of
undermining the credibility of the codefendant witness is "not the function of an
expert"); Cameron v. City of New York, 598 F.3d 50, 61 (2d Cir. 2010) ("First,
'[a]s a matter of law, the credibility of witnesses is exclusively for the
determination by the jury, and witnesses may not opine as to the credibility of
the testimony of other witnesses at the trial.' ") (quoting United States v.
Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 1995)); Nimely v. City of New York, 414,
F.3d 381, 397-98 (2d Cir. 2005) ("It is a well-recognized principle of our trial
system that 'determining the weight and credibility of [a witness's]
testimony ... belongs to the jury, who are presumed to be fitted for it by their
natural intelligence and their practical knowledge of men and the ways of
men. . . .') (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891);
Wilson v. Muckala, 303 F.3d 1207, 1218 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that it was
not error to exclude expert's opinion on plaintiff's credibility); United States v.
Mathis, 264 F.3d 321, 340 (3d Cir. 2001) (admitting expert testimony when the
expert "made quite clear that he did not intend to tell the jury whether . . . [the
witness] was lying or telling the truth"); Goodwin v. MTD Prod., Inc. 232 F.3d
600, 609 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[A]n expert cannot testify as to credibility issues;
[r]ather, credibility questions are within the province of the trier of fact .... .");
United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251, 1267 (10th Cir. 1999) ("In general,
expert testimony which does nothing but vouch for the credibility of another
witness encroaches upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make
credibility determinations, and therefore does not 'assist the trier of fact as
required by Rule 702.' "); Greenwell v. Boatwright, 184 F.3d 492, 496 (6th Cir.
1999) (finding error, but harmless, for expert to comment on the credibility of
eyewitness's account of accident); United States v. Sanchez-Lima, 161 F.3d
545, 548 (9th Cir. 1998) ("Testimony regarding a witness' credibility is
prohibited unless it is admissible as character evidence."); United States v. Call,
129 F.2d 1402, 1405-06 (10th Cir. 1997) (affirming exclusion of polygraph
evidence to corroborate defendant's testimony under Rule 403 because "it
usurps a critical function of the jury and because it is not helpful to the jury,
which is capable of making its own determination regarding credibility");
United States v. Kime, 99 F.3d 870, 884 (8th Cir. 1996) ("It is the exclusive
province of the jury to determine the believability of a witness. . . . An expert is
not permitted to offer an opinion as to the believability or truthfulness of a
victim's story.") (quoting Bachman v Leapley, 953 F.2d 440, 441 (8th Cir.
1992); United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1528 (11th Cir. 1996) ("Expert
medical testimony concerning the truthfulness or credibility of a witness is
generally inadmissible because it invades the jury's province to make credibility
determinations."); Hoult v. Hoult, 57 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1995) ("It is the function
of the jury alone to evaluate the credibility of a witness . . . . When an expert
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commentators, however, have argued that the adoption of the
witness testifies with respect to the credibility of a victim/witness there is a real
danger that jurors will lend too much credence to the expert's evaluation of the
victim's credibility, at the expense of their own independent judgment of
credibility."); Westcott v. Crinklaw, 68 F.3d 1073, 1076 (8th Cir. 1995) ("Nor
may an expert pass judgment on a witness' truthfulness in the guise of a
professional opinion."), United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785-86 (8th Cir.
1993) ("A doctor also cannot pass judgment on the alleged victim's truthfulness
in the guise of a medical opinion, because it is the jury's function to decide
credibility."); United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 604 (7th Cir. 1991)
("Credibility is not a proper subject for expert testimony; the jury does not need
an expert to tell it whom to believe, and the expert's 'stamp of approval' on a
particular witness may unduly influence the jury."), modified on reh'g, on other
grounds, 957 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. Azure, 801 F.2d 336,
339-41 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding error to admit pediatrician's opinion that victim
of child sexual abuse was telling the truth when she identified defendant as her
abuser), overruled in part on other grounds by United States v. Morales, 108
F.3d 1031 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Price, 722 F.2d 88, 90 (5th Cir.
1983) ("But in some instances, the introduction of ... testimony bolstering the
credibility of witnesses may cause harm that goes beyond the mere wasting of
time. When bolstering testimony suggests to the jury that it may shift to a
witness the responsibility for determining the truth of evidence, its admission
may constitute reversible error."); United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 671
(9th Cir. 1979) ("Under the Federal Rules, opinion testimony on credibility is
limited to character; all other opinions on credibility are for the jurors
themselves to form."); United States v. Libby, 461 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D.D.C. 2006)
("Expert testimony will . . . be precluded if it would usurp the jury's role as the
final arbiter of the facts, such as testimony on witness credibility and state of
mind."); see also STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, MICHAEL M. MARTIN & DANIEL J.
CAPRA, 3 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL § 702.02[15] (10th ed. 2011)

("[I1f the expert does intrude on areas left for the jury-such as the credibility of
a witness-the trial judge should exclude the testimony as unhelpful."). But see
United States v. Williams, 95 F.3d 723, 723 (8th Cir. 1996) (excluding under
Daubert defense evidence that government's key witness failed a polygraph
administered by the FBI without mention of general prohibition of expert
opinion testimony on witness truthfulness); United States v. Piccinonna, 885
F.2d 1529, 1535-37 (1lth Cir. 1989) (en banc) (reversing per se ban on
polygraph evidence and conditioning admissibility of polygraph examiner's
opinion on (1) parties stipulate to the admission; and (2) whether the opinion
satisfies the rules governing impeachment or corroboration of a witness's
testimony); see also United States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding Daubert effectively overruled per se bans on polygraph testimony and
conditioned admissibility on Rules 702 and 403).
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Federal Rules of Evidence paved the way for admission of
opinions on truthfulness if they meet Rule 401 relevancy and Rule
702 reliability standards irrespective of the tradition of leaving
credibility judgments to the jury. 288 Generally, they argue that Rule
702's regulation of expert testimony replaced the traditional
See, e.g., Arthur Best & Jennifer Middleton, Winking at the Jury: "Implicit
Vouching" Versus the Limits on Opinions About Credibility, 55 ARIZ. L. REV.
265 (2013) (arguing that allowing explicit testimony on credibility of child
abuse victim is preferable to current practice of implicitly vouching for
credibility by describing attributes of victim of abuse); Mark Pettit, Jr., FMRI
and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the FederalRules of Evidence, 33 AM. J.
L. & MED. 319, 334 (2007) ("Courts with no doubts about reliability would
accept the science and find ways to deal with the problems of implementation
that such acceptance would present."); Anne Bowen Poulin, Credibility:A Fair
Subject for Expert Testimony, 59 FLA. L. REV. 991, 1004-05 (2007) ("[R]ather
than invoking the maxim that the determination of credibility is the jury's
special province, courts should welcome expert testimony that helps the jury
determine whether a particular witness is being truthful and whether a particular
account of the facts is accurate."); Keckler, supra note 32, at 543 ("The evidence
presented by the expert is about the scan, or perhaps at most the statement, and
not directly about the witness. Consequently, evidence of this sort allows a jury
to make its own assessment of the witness."); Ric Simmons, Conquering the
Province of the Jury: Expert Testimony and the Professionalization of FactFinding, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1013, 1066 (2006) ("Essentially, if we can
determine that there are experts that can provide reliable and useful information
about credibility (and the evidence suggests that we are at or very near that
point), why would we want a lay jury to make these most critical decisions
without any guidance? It is now past time to jettison this tradition altogether and
give the juries all the available tools to carry out the immensely difficult task
that we assign to them."); Edward J. Imwinkelried and James R. McCall, Issues
Once Moot: The Other Evidentiary Objections to the Admission of Exculpatory
Polygraph Examinations, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1045, 1080 (1997)
("[T]estimony about an exculpatory polygraph examination is no more and no
less than scientific evidence of the accused's subjective consciousness of
innocence."); James R. McCall, Misconceptions and Reevaluation-Polygraph
Admissibility After Rock and Daubert, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 363, 422 (predicting
increased admissibility of polygraph evidence of witness truthfulness after
Daubert); Margaret A. Berger, United States v. Scop: The Common-Law
Approach to an Expert's Opinion About a Witness's Credibility Still Does Not
Work, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 559, 586 (1989) ("Opinion testimony on credibility
offered on a theory other than to prove character should ... be admissible
provided it satisfies the relevancy test of Rule 401.").
288
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practice of assigning credibility matters exclusively to the jury.
Empirical studies, they posit, support the fact that juries are not
particularly good at making credibility judgments, and since we
admit a host of other forensic evidence of uncertain reliability,
there is no sound policy reason why an exception should exist
when the subject matter is witness truthfulness. The historical
notion that expert testimony on witness truthfulness "invades the
province of the jury," they argue, should be abandoned in favor of
application of the rules governing the admissibility of all expert
testimony.2 89
But is there something unique about witness truthfulness that
supports the argument that the jury is the lie detector and expert
opinions on witness truthfulness are not helpful to the jury?29 0
Professor Ric Simmons argues that courts should reject the
traditional notion that expert opinion on truthfulness is not helpful
to the jury in favor of the relevant and reliable standard of Rule
702.29 In urging the admissibility of polygraph evidence, he argues
that credibility issues are relevant 29 2 in jury trials and that

289

See, e.g., Simmons, supra note 288, at 1015 ("[T]he province-of-the-jury
prohibition is poorly defined, lacks a legitimate doctrinal basis, and should be
abolished in its entirety, so that every piece of expert testimony is evaluated
under the same standards and admitted or excluded on the reliability standards
of Daubert."); Bellin, supra note 162, at 718-21 (commenting that the argument
that lie detection technology invades the province of the jury is "unlikely to
serve as [a] significant obstacle" to admitting expert opinion on witness
truthfulness based on reliable technology).
290 For a detailed historical account of the legal system's delegation to the jury
issues of witness credibility, especially the problem of resolving conflicting
factual accounts presented by sworn testimony, see Fisher, supra note 69, at
577.
291 Simmons, supra note 288, at 1028-46.
292 Professor Simmons views the jury assistance prong of
Rule 702
coextensive with Rule 401 and does not appear to accept the view that Rule 702
imposes a more exacting standard on expert testimony. Id. at 1050. But see
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1321 n.17 (9th Cir. 1995)
("The Supreme Court recognized that the fit requirement goes primarily to
relevance, but it obviously did not intend the second prong of Rule 702 to be
merely a reiteration of the general relevancy requirement of Rule 402."); In re
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polygraph evidence has reached a reliability threshold on par with
other forensic evidence, so unless there is something unique or
different about the credibility of polygraph evidence, it should also
be admissible.2 93
Whether a given witness is lying as he sits before the jury and
recounts his perception of the historical event is a question
potentially present in any contested jury trial. Gone are the days
where the law avoided such direct conflicts between witnesses,
each sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the
truth.294 But it cannot be denied that resolving such conflicting
testimony is, unquestionably, a core function of the jury. Professor
George Fisher ably demonstrates that over the centuries the law
inexorably moved toward placing that critical determination solely
in the hands of the jury, primarily as a way to support the
legitimacy of the system. 29 5 "The jury's role as the system's lie

Paoli RR Yard PCB Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994) (explaining that
the Rule 702 "standard is higher than bare relevance").
293 Professor Simmons does not consider the polygraph a "lie detector" in a
technical sense. He explains that the interrogation techniques most commonly
employed by polygraph examiners, the "control question" method and the
"guilty knowledge" test, reveal the subject's guilty conscience or his knowledge
of incriminating facts, respectively. Accordingly, he argues that polygraph
examiners are really offering opinions on the subject's state of mind during the
interview and not whether they were lying or telling the truth during the
polygraph examination. Simmons, supra note 288, at 1038-39 ("In this sense,
polygraph examiners are not 'credibility experts' but rather 'state of mind
experts,' because they claim to be able to interpret physiological reactions to
certain stimuli in order to reach conclusions about the mental state or knowledge
possessed by the subject.").
294 See Fisher,supra note 69, at 600.
295 Id. at 705 ("The jury, in contrast [to the oath requirement and competency
limitations], promised a remarkably reliable source of systemic legitimacy. Its
usually private and inarticulate decision making protected it from the sort of
embarrassing public failures that so regularly threatened the oath. There never
has been a mechanism by which the defendant or anyone outside the system
could command the jury to reveal its decision making processes. The jury's
secrecy is an aid to legitimacy, for the privacy of the jury box shrouds the
shortcomings of its methods.").
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detector," he argues, "has only grown and has never, for a
sustained time, diminished."29 6
Credibility, especially witness truthfulness, does occupy a
unique place in the role and function of the jury. It is a serious
thing to label a person a liar. The history of the jury system and the
elaborate rules employed over the centuries to avoid conflicting
accounts from sworn witnesses is evidence that the system itself
was concerned, perhaps overly so, with the problem of competing
oaths and witness truthfulness.297 If, as history demonstrates, the
legitimacy of the jury system and the public's confidence in its
verdicts depend upon the secrecy of the collective deliberations of
the members of the jury, the professionalization of witness
truthfulness offers the jury a tempting way out of struggling
through the difficult task of weighing all the evidence, considering
all the facts, applying reason and common sense to the various
accounts, reconciling discrepancies, and, yes, even deciding
whether a given witness lied on the stand. Instead, they can defer
to the "expert" and be done with it. While their deliberations will
remain secret and their verdicts general, we might reasonably
suspect they did not fulfill their role as a "valuable safeguard to
liberty [and] ... the very palladium of free government."2 98 if
juries are tempted to rely upon professional witnesses and colorful
images produced by powerful computers and modern machines,
they probably will.299 If a group of American citizens sitting on a
296 Id. at 703.
297 Id.
298 THE FEDERALIST No.

83, at 543 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modem Library
College ed., 1964).
299 See McCabe et al., supra note 84, at 572-75 (finding
fMRI lie detection
evidence influenced mock jurors more than polygraph or thermal imaging
evidence of deception, but was no greater than the control group when its
validity was questioned); see also McCabe & Castel, supra note 84, at 350
(finding neuroscientific explanations more persuasive when accompanied by
brain images). But see N. J. Schweitzer et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a
Mens Rea Defense: No Impact, PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y. & L. 357 (2011) (finding

neuroimages had no enhanced influence on mock jurors); Roskies et al., supra
note 84 (reviewing studies and concluding that neuroimages did not unduly
affect mock juror decisions).
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jury debating the fate of a fellow citizen is "the very essence of our
democracy,"300 injecting colorful images of a brain "lighting up"
while purportedly processing a lie, may diminish the jury's
essential role in our system by fostering the notion that machines,
not people, are actually determining the outcome of trials.
The move toward professionalizing witness truthfulness not
only diminishes the jury's traditional role as the fact-finder, but it
exposes the hidden and controversial role of the jury as a political
actor and the issue of jury nullification of the law. Professor Julie
Seaman argues that as machines determine the truth, juries will be
left with the notion that their only choices are to "rubber-stamp the
prosecution's demand for conviction or . .. exercise their non-factfinding functions" specifically, by a verdict nullifying the
applicable law.30 ' This would raise the issue of "whether the jury is
merely a fact-finding machine that should be replaced by a better
fact-finding machine, or whether it has a political, institutional role
worth preserving apart from its ability to judge the credibility of
witnesses and the historical facts."302 Professor Seaman concludes:
[W]ere an accurate lie detector developed, the jury's unique role in
determining witness credibility would be called into question. At that
moment, in many cases, the criminal jury would exist either to rubberstamp the prosecution's version of the historical facts, or instead to
serve distinct, non-fact-finding functions in addition to determining
historical fact. The former vision of the jury would relegate it to an
increasingly trivial role, one at odds with the history, precedent, and
purposes of the right to jury trial embodied in the Constitution. The
latter vision, in contrast, would allow the jury knowledge of its
Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Forewordto ANDREw GUTHRIE FERGUSON, WHY
A CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION, at xvii
(2013).
301 Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L.J. 427, 486 (2008); see also
Arie M. Rubenstein, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modern Jury
Trial, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 959 (2006) (discussing the history and current role of
jury nullification in American jurisprudence); Daryl K. Brown, Jury
Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149 (1997); H.B. 1452,
2013 Leg., 163d Sess. (N.H. 2013) (pending) (requiring the court to give an
instruction to the jury regarding jury nullification or declare a mistrial if the
instruction is not given to the jury).
302 Seaman, supra note 301, at 486.
300
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legislative function, even while risking that it might exercise it in ways
that courts or the public find illegitimate. 303

Despite the promise, and desirability, of more accurate factfinding, expert opinion testimony on truth-telling is a radical
departure from the established American practice. The benefit of
more accurate fact-finding must be weighed against the risk of
delegitimizing the jury as the bulwark between the citizen and the
power of the state and, in civil cases, the unbiased umpire in
private disputes.
In addition to delegitimizing the core function of the jury,
when machines determine truth it risks dehumanizing the
participants of the trial. Witnesses and parties become objects upon
which to apply the mysteries of modem science. Modem science,
of course, often informs juries of the nature of a substance, the
likelihood of a defendant's presence or participation in the crime
based upon DNA analysis, or the cause of death or disease and in
doing so may create doubts about a witness's story. But it creates
those doubts by establishing other relevant facts, not by reaching
into the mind of the witness to determine whether the witness is
lying or telling the truth.
In State v. Lyon,304 a case where the parties stipulated to the
admissibility of polygraph results, the Oregon Supreme Court
ruled that polygraph evidence was inadmissible because the
stipulation did little to enhance the reliability of the polygraph and
that the jury may be unduly persuaded by the scientific evidence.30
In a separate opinion, Justice Linde concurred with the court's
reasoning but raised the more profound question of the system's
unease with machines detecting lies and verifying truth:
The polygraph does not independently establish any past, present, or
future fact. It purports neither to replace nor to supplement the
assertions of the tested person with other evidence on the matter in
question. The polygraph is indifferent to what the assertions are about
and whether they are factually correct. As its popular name suggests,
the lie detector only purports to detect whether a person is uttering a lie.
303 Id. at 488.
304 744 P.2d 231 (Ore. 1987).
3os Id. at 235-36.
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The institution of the trial, above all, assumes the importance of human
judgment in assessing the statements of disputing parties and other
witnesses. The cherished courtroom drama of confrontation, oral
testimony and cross-examination is designed to let a jury pass judgment
on their truthfulness and on the accuracy of their testimony. The central
myth of the trial is that truth can be discovered in no better way, though
it has long been argued that the drama really serves symbolic values
more important than reliable factfinding. One of these implicit values
surely is to see that parties and the witnesses are treated as persons to
be believed or disbelieved by their peers rather than as electrochemical
306
systems to be certified as truthful or mendacious by a machine.

Whether one thinks Justice Linde has carried the values
argument too far to the detriment of accurate fact-finding,"' his
view does require reflection upon whether professionalizing
witness truthfulness helps or hinders the larger role of the jury in
our society and in our system of justice. While perhaps not the
determining factor on whether expert opinion on witness
truthfulness helps the jury, it is a factor.
Credibility issues, whether they concern poor memory, poor
perception, poor character for truthfulness, or consciously lying at
trial, are collateral to the central question in the case: guilt or
innocence, liable or not liable. 08 If expert testimony on whether a
witness told the expert a lie or the truth while in the expert's office
is admissible because it meets the any tendency standard of Rule
401 and is as reliable as other questionable forensic evidence
routinely admitted,30 ' conscientious trial lawyers will present that
306 Id. at 236-37 (Linde, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
307 See, e.g., James. R. McCall, The PersonhoodArgument Against
Polygraph
Evidence, Or "Even if the Polygraph Really Works, Will Courts Admit the
Results? ",49 HASTINGS L.J. 925, 941-43 (1998) (acknowledging the importance
of the issue but arguing that accurate fact-finding is the more important value).
308 See supra note
201.
309 A 2009 report by the National Academy of Sciences
found serious
deficiencies in the reliability of many forms of forensic science routinely
admitted in American courtrooms. Two major concerns were "the extent to
which particular areas of forensic science are based upon reliable scientific
methodology . . ." and "the extent to which ... human interpretation [of test

results] could be tainted by error, the threat of bias, or the absence of sound
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evidence in support of every significant witness in the case. Failure
to do so may be seen as falling beneath the standard expected of a
reasonably competent trial lawyer. Trials will be more expensive,
take more time, and demand more resources than they do now. Of
course, the experts involved will make more money because their
services will be more in demand. That does not mean, however,
that more justice will be done or the system will be better served.3 10
While the commentators may have a point that the Federal
Rules did not explicitly codify the common law "invade the
province of the jury" prohibition on expert opinion on witness
truthfulness, the "help the jury" requirement in Rule 702 is both
broad and specific enough to justify consideration of the impact of
such evidence on the system of justice, generally, and the conduct
of a given trial specifically.3 11
Admittedly, the above concerns are value judgments rather
than objective factors established by empirical data. Some may
argue they are throw backs to an old way of thinking about human
thinking. But they are values deeply rooted in our system of
dispute resolution, both criminal and civil, and should not be
lightly abandoned in a quest for a more accurate lie detector.

operational procedures and robust performance standards" within the discipline.
COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC CMTY. ET AL., STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 9 (2009).

310See D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal
Standards of Certainty Being Left on the Dock?, 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 131 (2000)
(commenting that admitting polygraph evidence "is likely to lead to profound
alterations in the entire litigation system, alterations which cannot be predicted
and which may not be desirable once they are played out," including
diminishing the jury's core function of determining witness credibility).
311 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK & CHARLES H. ROSE

III, EVIDENCE: PRACTICE UNDER THE RULES § 7.6 (4th ed. 2012) ("[W]here the
issue and subject are ones that lay jurors can appreciate and evaluate by
applying common knowledge and good sense, admitting expert testimony seems
the wrong thing to do and may warrant reversal if it is likely to dissuade the jury
from exercising independent judgment or to take over the jury's traditional
function of appraising the credibility of witnesses.").
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The arguments of the commentators that expert opinion on
truthfulness should be admitted have not persuaded the courts.3 12
The long line of authority excluding expert opinion on witness
truthfulness is a significant obstacle for proponents of fMRI-based
lie detection. The underlying reliability of the technology does not
matter if the opinion based on the technology is otherwise not
something that will help the jury in its core function, or worse yet,
actually undermine one of the policy goals behind Rule 702 itself.
To hold otherwise disregards the "fit" requirement of Rule 702,
diminishes the jury's core-function of fact-finding, distorts the jury
system by devoting disproportionate time and resources to the
collateral matter of credibility, downplays the jury's importance in
our system of justice, and runs the risk of dehumanizing the
participants.
ii. EmpiricalFit
In addition to the issues presented by the "legal fit" prong of
the helpfulness standard, the "empirical fit" component presents
even more substantial problems for fMRI-based expert opinion on
See supra note 287 (listing cases decided after the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence excluding expert opinion testimony on whether a witness
testified truthfully). See also Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the
Evaluation of Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 223 (1990)
(concluding that the traditional approach of excluding expert opinion on witness
credibility has merit except in some narrowly defined circumstances and
proposing a new rule of evidence to address those circumstances); DAVID L.
312

FAIGMAN ET AL., 2 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY § 17:9 (2012-2013 ed. 2012) ("Courts nearly uniformly

prohibit experts (or any witness) from offering an opinion regarding the
trustworthiness of a witness' specific allegations."); DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE
NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE

§ 2.4 (2014)

available at Westlaw WIGEVEE (commenting that predictions in earlier
versions of the WIGMORE treatise, as well as WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE treatise,

that expert testimony on witness veracity would become admissible had failed to
materialize and noting that, "[t]he traditional rule-that expert testimony on
whether a witness is telling the truth or has the tendency to do so is not
permitted-remains the law in most jurisdictions"); SALTZBURG, MARTIN &
CAPRA, supra note 287, at §§ 702.02(15), 702.03(24)(b) (collecting cases and
noting that expert testimony on witness credibility should be excluded as not
helpful to the jury).
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truthfulness. Professors Faigman, Mohahan, and Slobogin phrase
the question of empirical fit as "whether particular scientific results
have external validity with respect to the circumstances the law
makes relevant.""' The external validity of a scientific study is the
degree to which the findings can be applied to groups or
individuals who were not participants in the study itself.314
The "empirical fit" requirement resembles the analysis of
probative value under Rule 403."' The better the fit between the
facts of the case and the proffered opinion, the greater the
probative value of the opinion and, as a result, the more it helps the
trier of fact. Including this consideration at this point in the
admissibility determination, however, reveals that the helpfulness
standard of Rule 702 requires more than the low bar of general
relevancy found in Rule 401. Unlike Rule 401, which applies an
"any tendency" standard, and Rule 403, which includes consideration
of counterweights to probative value, the fit requirement of Rule
702 focuses on whether and how much the proffered testimony
will assist the jury in its fact-finding task. The rule does not,
however, establish a threshold that evidence must clear in order to
be found "helpful." Rather, the assessment is left to the discretion
of the trial judge.
Dr. Laken's expert opinion was offered in an effort to
convince the jury that Dr. Semrau was telling the truth when he
testified he did not intend to defraud years earlier when he
submitted his claims for reimbursement.3 16 Dr. Laken, however,
Faigman, Mohahan & Slobogin, supra note 279, at 25.
See infra notes 477-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of external
validity in the context of fMRI lie detection studies.
315 "'The court may exclude relevant evidence
if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time,
or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403. Compare
Calvin William Sharpe, Reliability Under Rule 702: A Specialized Application
of 403, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 289 (2004) with Dale A. Nance, Reliability and
the Admissibility ofExperts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191 (2003).
316 Dr. Laken's opinion was never offered at trial because it was excluded
after a pre-trial hearing. Had it passed the admissibility standards of Rules 702
313

314
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had no opinion on that point and admitted that he could not reach
an opinion on that issue. He could only say his fMRI scan
indicated Dr. Semrau subjectively believed he was telling the truth
when he denied having an intent to defraud. The jury, however,
had to decide whether Dr. Semrau had the intent to defraud in each
of the sixty counts of fraud for which he stood accused. The issue
for the jury was not whether Dr. Semrau was "overall" truthful, but
whether he had the intent to defraud for each claim specified in the
indictment."' There was a gap between the issue the jury had to
decide and the opinion Dr. Laken was prepared to give. Dr. Laken
could not give an opinion on whether the in-court testimony was
truthful; he could only speak to his scan results. While it would not
be illogical for the jury to infer truthfulness at trial from the scan
results, there is still an analytical gap between Dr. Laken's
interpretation of the scan and what the jury must determine. The
inferences from Dr. Laken's opinion to actual truthfulness of trial
testimony denying intent to defraud may satisfy the "any
tendency" standard of Rule 401, but the "help the jury" standard of
Rule 702 requires not just a bare logical connection between the
opinion and the fact to be determined; it requires the court to assess
the strength of that connection."'

and 403, the rules governing impeachment and rehabilitation of witnesses would
have required Dr. Semrau to testify at trial and suffer impeachment that
contained an express or implied charge that his in-court testimony was
deliberately false before the opinion testimony could be presented. See supra
Part IV. Rules of Evidence: Attacking and Supporting Credibility. The Sixth
Circuit's opinion notes that Dr. Semrau testified in his own defense, but does not
discuss any impeachment. Dr. Semrau argued on appeal that Dr. Laken's
opinion should have been admitted because it "'does not confuse the issues' but
rather 'corroborates his testimony."' United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 523
(6th Cir. 2012).
317 Jury Instructions, United States v. Semrau, No. 2:07-CR-10074-JPM,
2011 WL 9258, at *22, *25 (W.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 2010) (copy on file with the
author).
318 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 591-92 (1993)
(holding that expert opinion must be "sufficiently tied to the facts" to help the
jury; "Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a valid scientific connection to
the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.").

192

N.C. J.L. &TECH.

[OL. 16: 105

One might argue that Dr. Laken's opinion as to Dr. Semrau's
subjective belief in his own truthfulness, as evidenced by the
BOLD response to the SIQs during the scan, is circumstantial
evidence of his actual innocent state of mind at the time of each of
the alleged offenses and is, therefore, of some utility to the jury in
deciding the underlying facts of the case. But the same can be said
of the not guilty plea itself and the presumption of innocence that
cloaks a criminal defendant. The fact that a defendant pleads not
guilty and opts for a trial is, arguably, some evidence that he
subjectively believes his own defense. Furthermore, as a matter of
common sense it would seem that one who takes the witness stand,
recites an oath or affirmation to tell the truth, and then recounts his
version of the historical events usually believes he is telling the
truth. Expert opinion of a subjective belief in the truth of his
version of events does not add anything to what the jury already
knows and presumes.3 19 Of course, if evidence is introduced to cast
doubt on the truthfulness of the witness's story, then counter
evidence as to truthfulness would become more germane. But that
evidence, too, would need to be more than the subjective belief of
the witness in order to rebut evidence that the witness consciously
lied during his testimony.
Whether Dr. Semrau actually did not have the intent to defraud
when he submitted bills for reimbursement or whether he
convinced himself of that over the years and after being confronted
with criminal charges is something Dr. Laken and the neuroscience
community cannot answer because they have not studied it.320
Neuroscientists have found that the brain can change, both
structurally and functionally, due to learning, life experiences, and
Faigman, supra note 83, at 93 ("As an initial matter ... the testimony
should concern matters that fall, at least somewhat, outside the ordinary
understanding of the average juror.").
320 A recent study by researchers in China and the United States suggested that
"prepared lies" the subject developed before undergoing scanning were more
difficult to identify in the fMRI context and recommended further research.
319

Xiaoqing Hu, Hao Chen & Genyue Fu, A Repeated Lie Becomes Truth? The
Effect of Intentional Control and Training on Deception, 3 FRONTIERS IN
PSYCHOL. 1, 506 (2012).
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in recovery from injury. The brain is not a static set of stable neural
pathways.32 1 Whether one accused of a criminal offense, or a
percipient witness to any historical event, can "learn" the details of
his story over time so that it becomes "truth".to him is something
the fMRI researchers have not studied. If, for example, Dr. Semrau
convinced himself that his actions in upcoding claims for
reimbursement and billing separately for AIMS tests were
justified, reasonable, and appropriate, would repeating his sincere
belief in his innocence during an fMRI scan produce a BOLD
response consistent with truth? If fMRI researchers do not have an
answer to that question then the opinion of witness truthfulness is
of no help to the jury who must determine past events from incourt testimony. The "empirical fit" between Dr. Laken's opinion
and the issue to be decided was lacking.322
A final empirical misfit between Dr. Laken's opinion in
Semrau and the jury's fact-finding task is the application of fMRI
technology to Dr. Semrau, who was sixty-three years-old, and the
subjects upon which the technology was tested were in the
eighteen to fifty year-old age range. No one knows whether the
thirteen year difference between the top end of the age range and
Dr. Semrau is significant because no one has tested older subjects.
Because the images from the group studies were produced by
averaging the data from the entire group, it is not known where the
BOLD response in the older subjects fell in an absolute sense.
Furthermore, the average age of those tested was around thirty
years-old - a thirty-three year difference in age between the
participants in the underlying studies and Dr. Semrau.323 Whether
the neural correlates of deception are the same in the brain of a
Alvaro Pascual-Leone et al., CharacterizingBrain Cortical Plasticity and
Network Dynamics Across the Age Span in Health and Disease with TMSS-EEG
and TMS-fMRI, 24 BRAIN TOPOGRAPHY 302 (2011); Alvaro Pascual-Leone et
al., The Plastic Human Brain Cortex, 28 ANNUAL REV. OF NEUROSCIENCE 377
(2005).
322 See Faigman, Mohahan & Slobogin, supra note
279, at 25.
323 Testimony of Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. I at 156, Vol.
III at 400, United States v. Semrau, No. 07CRI0074-1JPM (W.D. Tenn. May
13, 2010).
321
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thirty year-old and a sixty-three year-old is unknown because it has
not been studied.324 There is considerable evidence, however, that
the brain changes over time; children's and teenagers' brains are
not as fully developed as an adult brain.32 5 Similarly, as time
marches on, the brains of adults change with advancing age.326
Testimony on witness truthfulness based on fMRI must be derived
from information that fits the demographic of the witness under
scrutiny or it cannot help the jury in making credibility
determinations. At the very least, studies must demonstrate that
such disparities do not make a difference.
Accordingly, the disconnect between the opinion offered and
the issues the jury had to decide in Semrau, as well as the
divergence between the underlying scientific data upon which the
offered opinion was grounded and the actual facts of the case,
supports the conclusion that Dr. Laken's opinion would not have
helped the jury and could have been excluded on that basis
alone.327
But what if the current fMRI technology is better than leaving
the jury to decide credibility in the traditional manner?328 Juries, as
324

1d. Vol. II at 190.
Barry C. Field, B. J. Casey, & Yasmin L. Hurd, Adolescent Competence
and Culpability: Implications ofNeurosciencefor Juvenile Justice Administration,
325

in A PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE, 7-10 (Stephen J. Morse &

Adina L. Roskies eds., 2013) (discussing the differences between adult and
juvenile brain development, and the implication of these differences in the
juvenile justice system).
326
See generally Elizabeth R. Sowell, Paul M. Thompson & Arthur W. Toga,
Mapping Changes in the Human Cortex Throughout the Span of Life, 10
NEUROSCIENTIST 372 (2004) (summarizing the morphological changes of the

human brain spanning childhood through the entirety of adult life).
327 The magistrate judge in Semrau did consider some of these same facts in
his application of the Daubert factors in his reliability analysis, but specifically
noted that due to his conclusion that the proffered testimony was unreliable, "the
court need not address the relevancy prong." United States v. Semrau, No. 0710074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *14 n.19 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010).
328 Professor Frederick Schauer argues that whether science is "good" enough
for the courtroom should be based on legal norms, not scientific ones. See
Schauer, supra note 31, at 1207-09 (arguing that although fMRI results may not
be good enough by science standards for reliability, they are not necessarily any
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the argument goes, are so bad at determining credibility and
assigning proper weight to witness testimony that any help
supplied by the current state of fMRI technology should be
gratefully accepted.3 29 But when the neuroscientists themselves
admit that they cannot tell whether the subject is lying or telling
the truth in response to questions about the specific allegations of
the indictment, can the technology really be that helpful?
When the time gap between the events in question and the date
of the fMRI scan are measured in years instead of weeks and the
neuroscientists have not even asked whether that time gap might be
of some significance in evaluating the neural correlates of
deception, does the technology really add anything to the
credibility question the jury must answer?
If neuroscientists cannot develop a study that will address the
significance of the BOLD response when the subject is being
questioned about a real crime that carries real consequences for the
witness but instead merely assume the neural response would be
the same as an undergraduate who can earn $50 by participating in
a mock crime study, can the resulting opinion really help the jury
decide the important questions placed before them?...
These disconnects between fMRI deception studies and what
juries have to do in a real case are not isolated or unique to the
situation in Semrau. The inability to identify specific lies related to
critical facts in a given case, the unknown impact of a large time

less reliable than other types of evidence admitted in court, and thus possibly
should be admissible). While Professor Schauer makes an interesting argument,
the Supreme Court held that "evidentiary reliability" is based upon "scientific
validity." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993).
329 Schauer, supra note 31, at 1213.
330 Interestingly, neuroscientists may be scratching the surface of the answer
to this very question. See Mohammad Dastjerdi, et al., Numerical Processing in
the Human Parietal Cortex During Experimental and Natural Conditions,
NATURE COMMUNICATIONS 4:2528 (2013) (finding a high degree of correlation
between brain patterns detected through intracranial electrodes when subjects
were engaged in specific math exercises as part of a study and the brain patterns
when subjects were monitored in the non-study setting but were using math or
math-related concepts in normal social interaction).
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gap between the alleged offense and the fMRI scan, and the total
absence of any studies involving real consequences faced by real
people in a real world setting are present in every attempt to use
current fMRI technology to detect deception or verify truth. These
shortcomings not only do not help the jury in determining
credibility, but could affirmatively mislead the jury in that
important task. While the misleading aspect of these shortcomings
would be properly considered in a Rule 403 analysis, Rule 702
imposes an affirmative burden on the proponent to establish that
the opinion will help the jury.
To their credit, the neuroscientists readily admit these
shortcomings are present. They are not trying to hide them or slip
them past unsuspecting judges. In Semrau, Dr. Laken readily
admitted to all of the aforementioned shortcomings."' But the
transparency and good faith of the neuroscience community does
not change the fact that there is a wide gap between what their
studies purport to show and what juries have to do. The
neuroscience lab is a dynamic environment where the search for
"truth" is a never-ending exercise. What science finds today may
be clarified, modified, or even rejected tomorrow. The courtroom,
however, has an end point. A decision in this case about these facts
and this defendant must be made. The finality of jury verdicts
requires a perspective that is different than the scientists'
continuing search for answers. While those unresolved questions
may not overly concern neuroscientists who claim fMRI is able to
detect deception, the "help the jury" standard of Rule 702 makes
them a very real concern to judges, lawyers, and the legal system.
4. Sufficient Facts andData
Rule 702(b) asks whether the qualified expert witness has
sufficient facts and data upon which to apply the principles and
methods of inquiry required by her area of scientific, specialized,

331 Testimony of Dr. Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, May 13, 2010,
Vol. I at 134, 137-38, 156-62, United States v. Semrau, No. 07CR10074-lJPM
(W.D. Tenn.).
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or technical knowledge.332 This is the first broad area of inquiry in
the reliability prong of Rule 702.
This aspect of the inquiry requires an abstract analysis of the
facts and data needed by experts in the field whenever they are
seeking answers to similar questions. The type of information, as
well as the quantity and quality, will depend upon the issues in the
case and the question the expert is attempting to answer. The field
of scientific or technical knowledge may have developed a
baseline set of necessary data needed by any competent expert in
order to formulate an opinion using the tools of the particular
discipline. For novel areas of scientific inquiry, like fMRI for lie
detection, the type and quantity of information necessary may not
be settled. Nevertheless, the trial judge, in performing the
gatekeeping function imposed by Rule 702, must determine
whether the expert has enough information to permit the principles
and methods of the expert's discipline to operate.
There is a case-specific aspect of the sufficiency of the facts
and data requirement, as well. Not only must the expert have
access to the facts and data required by the area of scientific
inquiry generally, but he must also have those that apply to the
specific issue in the case at hand. In the fMRI lie detection context,
the expert needs facts and data about the witness, as well as the
facts and data compiled through the fMRI research dealing with
truthfulness." The fMRI scan of the witness must fit within the
parameters of the research upon which the hypothesis of lie
detection is based.
Witness-specific data would include the details of the proposed
testimony and their relationship to the factual issues to be resolved

332

FED. R. EvID. 702(b).

33 The data generated by the various fMRI lie detection studies is properly
considered under Rule 702(a), the sufficiency of the facts and data underlying
the opinion, as well as under Rule 702(b), the reliability of the principles and
methods used to form the opinion. See Brian Reese, Using JMRI as a Lie
Detector-Are We Lying to Ourselves, 19 ALBANY L. J. SCI. & TECH. 205, 218
(2009) (observing that the underlying fMRI research implicates both FED. R.
EvID. 702(a) and (b)).
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by the jury. This information would then be used to develop the
SIQs the witness will answer in the scanner. An insufficient factual
picture may produce SIQs that are not sufficiently connected to the
issues the jury must decide.
The social and medical history of the witness and his suitability
for MRI scanning is also an important part of the sufficient factual
basis. For example, if the witness has a history of brain
abnormalities, neurological disease, or drug or alcohol addiction,
he may not respond to fMRI scanning in a way that one could draw
meaningful conclusions about his truthfulness.334
5. Reliable Principlesand Methods
The second question in the reliability inquiry under Rule 702 is
whether the principles and methods employed by the expert can
produce a trustworthy result when applied to a sufficient body of
facts and data.335 This is an abstract analysis of the scientific
validity of the principles and methods relied upon by the expert.

334 See id. at 219-26 (identifying pathological liars, the mentally retarded,
environmentally damaged, physically damaged, emotionally damaged and those
with a neurodegenerative disease as inappropriate candidates for fMRI lie
detection).
"s "Reliability" in the context of scientific studies is a measure of how often
and well the applied procedures produce the same results. ROBERT M. LAWLESS
ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 42 (2010). In Daubert, the Court
specifically noted that they were not using "reliability" in its technical sense.
Rather, for evidentiary purposes, "reliability" is synonymous with
trustworthiness. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993).
("We note that scientists typically distinguish between 'validity' (does the
principle support what it purports to show?) and 'reliability' (does application of
the principle produce consistent results?) . .. our reference here is to evidentiary

reliability-that is, trustworthiness. In a case involving scientific evidence,
evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific validity.") (citations omitted,
emphasis in original). Furthermore, "reliability" for Rule 702 purposes is not the
same as "the merits standard of correctness." FED. R. EVID. 702 (2000
amendment advisory committee note), quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 744 (3d Cir. 1994).

OCT. 2014]

Evidence of Lies and Rules of Evidence

199

This is the point in the analytical framework, suggested by the text
of Rule 702, where most of the Daubertfactors come into play.336
Publication in recognized scientific journals of the result of
laboratory studies of fMRI to detect deception is some indication
that the principles and methods are based on the scientific
method.33 7 But merely counting the number of published articles is
a poor proxy of reliability. The substance of those published and
peer-reviewed articles is what is important in the reliability
determination. Furthermore, peer-review does not necessarily
mean reviewed by scientific peers and found worthy. The recent
revelation that an essential finding in an oft-cited psychology paper
was based on flawed mathematics is illustrative.3 The problem of
flawed research getting past peer review seems particularly acute
in open-access journals," but it is also present in the traditional
print journals and in submissions from researchers at prominent
institutions.34 0 The neuroscience community has not been immune

Others have noted that the rote application of Daubert factors is a poor
proxy for determining the reliability and validity of fMRI-based opinion on
witness truthfulness. See, e.g., J. R. H. Law, Cherry-Picking Memories: Why
Neuroimaging-Based Lie Detection Requires a New Framework for the
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under FRE 702 and Daubert, 14 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 1, 37-40 (2010). The Daubert factors, should, however, lead to a more
in depth inquiry and analysis of the scientific principles and methods at issue.
337
Daubert,509 U.S. at 590.
338 See Ivan Oransky, Fredrickson-Losada "positivity ratio" paper partially
336

withdrawn, RETRACTION WATCH (Sep. 19, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://retractionwatch.

wordpress.com/2013/09/19/fredrickson-losada-positivity-ratio-paper-partiallywithdrawn/#more-15724

(reporting that AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST partially

withdrew a paper because the mathematical modeling upon which some of the
conclusions were based was "invalid").
339 John Bohannon, Who's Afraid of Peer Review?, 342 SCIENCE 60 (Oct. 4,
2013)
available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/342/6154/60. full
(reporting that author writing under false name from a non-existent institution
received publication offers from 167 open access journals for a spoof article
containing such obvious flaws that it should have been rejected out of hand).
340
See, e.g., Archive for "Harvard" Category, RETRACTION WATCH, http://
retractionwatch.wordpress.com/category/by-institution/harvard/ (last visited Nov.
5, 2013) (listing several instances of research published in print journals by
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to the problem of questionable work getting past peer review and
into publication.34 '
This is not to suggest that fMRI researchers are not careful,
ethical, and diligent in their research and reporting their findings.
Nor does it suggest that peer review is ineffective. In fact, quite the
opposite may be the case. When journals retract or clarify
previously published papers it is because other scientists, or the
original authors themselves, have noticed and reported flaws that
undermine the conclusions. It does suggest, however, that merely
counting the number of publications on a given topic is a poor
proxy for scientific validity. Some analysis of the contents of those
published and peer-reviewed papers is required, especially when
considering novel scientific principles or the application of
established principles and methods to new problems.
Many of the articles relied upon by Dr. Laken to support the
application of fMRI for lie detection in individuals contained
caveats and reservations about the suitability of the principles for
forensic purposes.342 That, however, did not seem to stop the
magistrate judge from finding the Daubert peer review and
publication query satisfied. 4 3 Paradoxically, the magistrate judge

Harvard affiliated researchers in which retractions or other clarifications were
made after peer review and publication).
341 See Archive for the "Neuroscience Retractions" Category, RETRACTION
WATCH, http://retractionwatch.wordpress.com/category/by-subject/basic-life-sciencesretractions/neuroscience-retractions/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).
342 See, e.g., Spence et al., supra note 44, 1760-61 (noting ecological validity,
experimental design, group to individual inferences, and whether pathological
liars would show similar activation patterns as study volunteers as problems that
research must address); Frank A. Kozel, et al., A Replication Study of the Neural
Correlates of Deception, 118 BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 852, 855 (2004)
(suggesting more work is needed to detect deception within individuals as
opposed to group studies); Langleben et al., supra note 64, at 731 (calling for
further refinement of test paradigm and image analysis to identify an activation
pattern predictive of deception at the individual level); Kozel, et al., supra note
31, at 611-12 (suggesting steps and refinements necessary to detect deception in
individuals).
343 United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074 Ml/P, 2010 WL 6845092, at *10
(W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010). The Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation
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found those same caveats and reservations as evidence the
principles and methods relied upon by Dr. Laken had not gained
sufficient acceptance in the neuroscience community to satisfy the
general acceptance factor under Daubert.3"
Application of the Daubert factors without considering the
larger question of the textual framework of Rule 702 was sufficient
to resolve the question before the magistrate judge in Semrau,345
and the deferential abuse of discretion scope of review on appeal
affirmed the District Court's exclusion of the evidence.3 46 But the
standard of Rule 702(b), that the principles and methods
underlying the opinion be reliable, requires consideration of the
validity of the underlying scientific studies upon which those
principles are based.34 7 While the Daubert factors are considerations
in determining whether a principle or method derived from
research is sound, it is important to place those factors into the
context of scientific validity based upon Rule 702(b).
Scientific research is routinely evaluated by considering its
"reliability" and its "validity." Reliability is a function of
reproducibility. Does the test produce the same or similar results
each time it is applied?34 8 It is a measure of stability, not accuracy.
Validity asks whether the study or test produces accurate and
credible data from which well-reasoned conclusions can be
drawn.349 In the context of fMRI lie detection research, the
scientific validity question requires consideration of: (1) internal
validity, (2) external validity, and (3) ecological validity. 350

to exclude the fMRI-based expert testimony was adopted by the district judge
and affirmed on appeal. United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012).
344 Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092 at *11-13.
345 Id.
34 6
Semrau, 693 F.3d at 520-23.
FED. R. EvID. 702(c).
LAWLESS ET AL., supra note 335, at 42.
349 Id. at 36.
347
348

See Bruce R. DeForge, Research Design Principles, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF RESEARCH DESIGN 1253,1258 (Neil J. Salkind ed. 2010) (describing internal
and external validity); Steve Fuller, Threats to Validity, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
RESEARCH DESIGN 1509, 1511 (Neil J. Salkind ed. 2010) (describing ecological
350
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Evaluating fMRI research from the perspective of scientific
reliability and validity reveals numerous shortcomings not
identified by the court in Semrau.
a. Replication
A sound scientific technique or instrument should produce
similar results each time it is applied. For example, if placing the
same bag of sugar on the same kitchen scale consistently revealed
the bag weighed five pounds, one could say the scale was a
"reliable" instrument for determining weight. That is not the same
as saying the scale was an accurate instrument for determining
weight. Perhaps the scale is off by three pounds and the bag of
sugar actually weighs eight pounds. One could not realize the
inaccuracy of the scale, or the actual weight of the bag of sugar,
unless the bag of sugar was weighed on another scale and got a
different result or placed an object of a known weight on the scale
and saw the weight indicated was off by three pounds. Replication
of tests and experiments is an important feature in gauging the
trustworthiness of the results of those tests and experiments.
fMRI lie detection studies suffer from a lack of replication
within and between laboratories. One of the leading fMRI lie
detection researchers, Dr. Sean A. Spence, reviewed the published
literature through July 2007 and was "unable to identify a single
example of this basic requirement [replication] within the extant
fMRI literature."'
More recently, Elena Rusconi and Timothy Mitchener-Nissen
observed that, "it is very unusual to see a brain imaging experiment
precisely repeated within and between laboratories."35 2 This lack of
replication may be due, in large part, to the tendency for scientific
journals to publish novel studies instead of replications.353 The
validity); see also Francis X. Shen & Owen D. Jones, Brain Scans as Evidence:
Truths, Proofs, Lies, and Lessons, 62 MERCER L. R. 861, 876-78 (2011) (discussing
the impact of ecological and external validity on the admissibility of brain
scans).
351 Spence, supra note
46, at 24.
352 Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen,
supranote 31, at 3.
353
id.
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incentive to publish pushes researchers to develop new test designs
rather than seek to replicate the work of others.354 Spence's analysis
of the literature through July 2007 bears this out: of the sixteen
published peer-reviewed studies he reviewed, he found researchers
used different test designs, different scanner strengths, and
different response modes in various combinations that produced
different areas of brain activation."' As a result, no single study
was ever replicated by another lab or by the original lab." 6 All
were published but replication was lacking.
A meta-analysis of twenty-three fMRI deception studies
published between 2001 and 2011 revealed several brain regions,
primarily in the prefrontal cortex, which were active across the
studies at a rate greater than chance."' Consistent with the findings
of the earlier studies of replication, this analysis also noted
"considerable variability from study to study, as no region was
active in all (or nearly all) studies.""' Like Spence's 2007 study,
the researchers found that differences in study design, variations
among hardware and software, the number of trials each subject
underwent, and the varying number of participants in the studies
precluded a more precise and consistent identification of the sub
regions involved in detection.359 While there was consistency
across the studies of general brain regions of activation in
deception, the meta-analysis was not able to find consistent
activation in sub regions of the prefrontal cortex.3"o
354 Id.
355 Spence, supra note 46, at 14-21.
356
d.
3
Farah,
supra note 51, at 124.
35
8

359

id.

d.
Id. The lack of replication and reproducibility is not limited to lie detection
studies. fMRI, generally, has suffered from a lack of replication. See Tancredi &
Brodie, supra note 31, at 280-82. Differences in hardware, software, and test
designs have produced varying outcomes in studies across labs and even within
the same labs. Id. The Functional Bioinformatics Research Network ("FBIRN")
established by the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") is an effort to address
this problem and establish standards to bolster the reliability of fMRI studies.
FunctionalBIRN, BIOMEDICAL INFORMATICS RESEARCH NETWORK, http://www.
360
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The testing, peer review and publication factors of the Daubert
analysis reveal the shortcomings of the use of fMRI technology for
lie detection if one considers the substance of the published
literature instead of just counting the number of articles and asking
whether the underlying principle can or has been tested. Only by
using the Daubert factors as a starting point for analysis instead of
the end point, will the reliability of the principles and methods
become apparent.
b. Internal Validity
Internal validity "refers to the degree to which the research
design isolates the variable of interest and permits drawing valid
inferences about the relationships between variables from the
resulting data."3 6' An internally valid study reduces the influence
that confounding variables might have on the results.362 In
evaluating internal validity of the fMRI studies on lie detection,
study design (sometimes referred to as methodological or construct
validity) and data collection and analysis (sometimes referred to as
statistical validity) are critical. If the study does not isolate the
neural correlates of deception one cannot draw valid conclusions
about whether the subject was lying or telling the truth during the
test. If the subject does not comply precisely with the test design,
the resulting data cannot lead to valid conclusions. If the
assumptions used to construct the algorithms are manipulated, the
conclusions produced will vary. The underlying principles and
methods of fMRI lie detection must be internally valid in order to
be "reliable principles and methods" under Rule 702(b).

birncommunity.org/collaborators/function-birn/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). The
project links major research labs in a network to share experience and analysis
of fMRI data with the goal of minimizing image variability and increasing
reliability of fMRI studies. Id. The issue of lack of replication and
reproducibility in empirical studies has attracted attention in other areas of
scientific inquiry, as well. The Journal of Social Psychology recently published
a special issue devoted to the problem. 45 Soc. PSYCH. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 137

(2014).
361

LAWLESS, ET AL., supra note 335, at 36.

362 id.
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Considering internal validity in terms of the Daubert factors,
the existence of standards, controls, and protocols, as well as the
error rate associated with a particular principle or method should
lead to an examination of test design, test execution, and data
analysis. Flaws in one or more of these areas raise questions as to
the scientific validity and the evidentiary reliability of the opinion
based upon those principles and methods.
i.

The Problem ofDefining Deception
Any scientific principle or method to detect lies and verify
truth must first isolate the construct of interest (i.e., the neural
correlates of deception).363 This requires the researcher to identify
or define "lying," and then design a test that will isolate the neural
activity associated with that brain state and that brain state only.
The corollary of this first step is to consider the question
philosophers over the ages have struggled with: What is truth?
Considering the following statements by prominent individuals
illustrates that defining a "lie" is not as easy as it sounds:
* "I believe it is peace for our time."364

* "I'm not a crook." 365
* "Read my lips, no new taxes."3 66
* "I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Ms.
Lewinski." 67

Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 31, at 2-3.
Neville Chamberlain, U.K. Prime Minister, Peace For Our Time Speech,
Statement Made at 10 Downing Street, London, After the Munich Conference of
1938 (Sept. 30, 1938), available at http://eudocs.1ib.byu.edu/index.php/Neville
Chamberlain%27s_%22PeaceForOurTime%22_speech.
365 Richard Nixon's Question and Answer Session at the Annual Convention of
the Associated Press Managing Editors Association, held at the Contemporary
Hotel at Walt Disney World in Orlando, Florida (Nov. 17, 1973), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/video/richard-nixon-im-crook- 17736796.
366 George H. W. Bush, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the
Republican National Convention in New Orleans (Aug. 18, 1988), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25955.
363

364
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* "[Saddam Hussein's regime] threatens the peace with

weapons of mass murder."3 68
* "I've never doped." 6
* "I never bet on baseball.""
* "That-is absolutely not true."37 '
* "What [the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Libya]
began as was a spontaneous-not a premeditatedresponse to what had transpired in Cairo. "372
* "If you like the insurance you have, keep it. Nothing in
the proposal forces anyone to change the insurance they

have. Period."3 73
In each instance the fact asserted by the speaker turned out to
be false in some objective sense. However, several questions
remain. Was the speaker lying when making the statement? Or was
the speaker mistaken, naive, in self-denial, ignorant of the true
state of affairs, engaged in wishful thinking, merely "spinning" the
facts to suit his or her own interests, or justified in being less than
forthright because of the greater good achieved if the hearer
accepts the statement as true? Because "lies" are not always easy
to define, and because in the forensic setting they come in
William J. Clinton, Remarks by the President at After School Program
Event (Jan. 26, 1998), available at http://millercenter.org/president/clinton/
speeches/speech-3930.
368 George. W. Bush, President Bush Addresses the Nation (Mar. 19, 2003),
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/
03/20030319-17.html.
369 Larry King Live: Lance Armstrong (CNN television broadcast Aug. 25, 2005),
available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0508/25/1kl.01.html.
367

370 WILLIAM

A. COOK, PETE ROSE: BASEBALL'S ALL-TIME HIT KING, 175

(2004).
371 Nightline: John Edwards Admits Affair (ABC television broadcast Aug. 8,
2008), available at http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/video/john-edwards-part5546322 (denying the allegation that he was the father of Reille Hunter's child).
372 This Week: Susan Rice (ABC television broadcast Sept. 16, 2012),
available at http://abcnews.go.com/ThisWeek/video/susan-rice-week- 17248141.
37 If You Like the Insurance You Have, Keep It, WHITEHOUSE.Gov, http://www.
whitehouse.gov/health-care-meeting/proposal/titlei/keepit (last visited Nov. 7, 2013).
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numerous and sometimes subtle varieties, 3 7 4 constructing a research
design that purports to isolate "lies," identifies their neural
correlates, and then applies that research to a real-life forensic
setting is no small feat, and one that to date has not been
accomplished. When applied to using fMRI as a lie detector, the
question becomes whether the fMRI scan was actually capturing
the BOLD response associated with lying.375 In the vast majority of
underlying studies that support the theory of fMRI-based lie
detection, the subjects were instructed to lie about their
involvement in the simulated theft,376 mock sabotage," or other
staged event.7 The real question, then, is whether the "instructed
lie" is the same as a "real lie?" If not, the underlying principle and
method used to determine whether a real witness is lying, the
BOLD response measured while answering the SIQs, is not a
reliable principle or method.
Adlert Virj suggested that deception is a "deliberate attempt,
without forewarning, to create in another a belief which the

374 Judge Jed Rakoff, Senior United States District Judge for the Southem
District of New York, identified the problem:
The law recognizes many kinds of lies, ranging from 'white lies' and
'puffing' to affirmative misstatements, actionable half-truths, and
material omissions . . . . [T]he differences are crucial in almost any

case: a little white lie is altogether different, in the eyes of the law and
of common sense, from an intentional scheme to defraud. Nothing in
the brain-scan approach to lie detection even attempts to make such
distinctions. And what might a brain scan be predicted to show in the
case of a lie by omission; that is, the person whose statements are
truthful as far as they go but who conceals a material fact that puts an
entirely different perspective on what is being said? In my experience,
these are the most common kinds of lies in court ....
Rakoff, supra note 86, at 44-45.
3 Shen & Jones, supra note 350, at 874-75; see also Anthony Wagner, Can
Neuroscience Identify Lies?, in A JUDGE'S GUIDE TO NEUROSCIENCE: A
CoNCISE INTRODUCTION, 13, 13-23 (2010).

Kozel et al., supra note 31, at 605.
Frank. A. Kozel et al., Functional MRI Detection of Deception After
Committing a Mock Sabotage Crime, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 220, 220 (2009).
378 Phan et al., supra note 62, at 165-66.
376
37
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communicator considers to be untrue."3 79 Three essential
components of this definition of deception are important when
developing neuroimaging studies to identify its neural correlates:
(1) the communicator must deliberately intend to mislead another;
(2) the deception occurs "without forewarning," or without
instruction; and (3) the "ground truth" or objective accuracy of the
facts do not define the "lie." 380 For example, if the communicator
subjectively believes that Fact A is false and deliberately attempts
to create that same belief in the mind of his listener, he has
engaged in deceptive behavior even if Fact A is true. Importantly,
if he subjectively believes Fact A is true and deliberately attempts
to create that same belief in the mind of the listener, he has not
engaged in deceptive behavior even if Fact A is false.
The definition of lying imposes serious obstacles to an
internally valid scientific study. First is the requirement that the
communicator deliberately intend to mislead another. In the typical
fMRI deception studies, subjects are placed in constructed and
controlled environments, told to engage in certain behaviors, e.g.,
"steal" a watch or ring from a drawer, and then try to fool the
researchers with their answers during the fMRI scan. What we do
not know and cannot measure is whether the brain state of
deliberate intent to mislead another is the same in the laboratory as
it is in the real world.
Second is the problem of "forewarning." As the definition
indicates, this is a decision to deceive without being told or
instructed to lie or attempt to deceive. Nancy Kanwisher describes
the typical fMRI deception paradigm as an "instructed falsehood"
which negates this essential element of the definition of deceit."'

379

Aldert Par Anders Granhag & Leif A. Str6mwall, Research on Deception
Detection: Past and Present, in THE DETECTION OF DECEPTION IN FORENSIC
CONTEXTS 5 (Aldert Par Anders Granhag & Leif A. Stromwall, eds., 2004)
(quoting
ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT 6 (2000)).
3 80

id

381

Nancy Kanwisher, The Use of JMRI in Lie Detection: What Has Been

Shown and What Has Not, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT: SCIENTIFIC
AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS, 12 (Emilio Bizzi, et. al. eds., 2009).
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Kanwisher asserts that study subjects are not lying; they are merely
following the researcher's instructions.3 82
In the context of interpersonal communications, whether oneon-one in private conversation or from the witness stand to a jury
of twelve citizens, deception involves several cognitive processes.
Kamila Sip and her colleagues explained the process of deception
as requiring the communicator to continually weigh and analyze
four mutually dependent factors before and during the process of
deception: (1) information management; (2) risk management;
(3) reputation management; and (4) impression management.11
In making the deliberate and voluntary decision to deceive
another, the prevaricator must manage the information and keep
track of both the truth and the untruths, suppress the truth,
construct a lie that is reasonably consistent with the known facts,
as well as monitor the feedback from the hearer to assess how
effective he is in creating a false impression.384 At the same time,
he must manage the risks of deception in terms of gains and losses
and long-term consequences."' Reputation management involves
the need to convince oneself, as well as others, that a greater good
was achieved by engaging in deceptive behavior and the ends
justify the means.386 Impression management requires constant
efforts at building trust in the minds of the listener and closely
monitoring verbal and non-verbal feedback and making
appropriate trust-building adjustments to further the deception.
From a neuroimaging perspective, this process involves
executive-level neural processes that are generally centered in the
pre-frontal cortex, the same general area of the brain identified by

38

2Id.

Kamila Sip et al. Detecting Deception: The Scope and Limits, 12
IN COGNITIVE SCIENCES 48, 49 fig.1 (2008).
383

3 84 id.

38
5Id.
38

6 id.
7id.

38
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most tMRI deception studies as active during deception."'
Importantly, however, the process described by Sip and her
colleagues is one that is followed in deciding whether to deceive,
as well as being active during the deception.389 Since the decision
to deceive is an ongoing one, the cycle identified by Sip arguably
occurs even if the subject decides not to deceive. An internally
valid neuroimaging study to detect deception must isolate the
neural processes that are applicable only to the deceptive behavior
itself and eliminate those correlates that are also present when
deception is not.3"' Studies to date have not accomplished this
important task.39 '
The meta-analysis of twenty-three fMRI deception studies by
Martha Farah and her colleagues found that "a number of
experimental factors are confounded with the lie-versus-truth
manipulation."3 92 For example, they surmised the disparity between
the number of times a subject pressed the "yes" and "no" buttons
as required by the study design may have an influence on the
activation pattern observed and reflect the neural activity
associated with an infrequent versus frequent motor response
rather than deception.393 Similarly, they observed that in many
studies, the brain activation patterns may reflect the cognitive
process of either selecting the object of interest in the study or the
effect of memory rather than the act of deception.3 94
Taken together, the research by Spence,"' Rusconi and
Mitchener-Nissen,3 96 Kanwisher,397 and Farah3 98 all raise the serious

388

Annabelle M. Belcher & Adina L. Roskies, Neuroscience Basics, in A

PRIMER ON CRIMINAL LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 1, 24 (Stephen J. Morse &

Adina L. Roskies eds. 2013).
389 Sip et al., supra note 383, at
49 fig.1.
390 Shen & Jones, supra note 350,
at 874-76.
391 id.

Farah et al., supra note 51, at 124.
Id. at 124-125.
394
Id. at 125.
395 Spence, supra note 46, at 11.
396 Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 31, at 1.
397 Kanwisher, supra note 381, at 7.
392

393

OCT. 2014]

Evidence of Lies and Rules of Evidence

211

question of whether the fMRI deception research to date has really
isolated deception. If not, the principles and methods relied upon to
verify truth or identify deception based upon the BOLD response
in the prefrontal cortex are not reliable. As Professors Francis Shen
and Owen Jones have observed, "Researchers . . . are indeed

measuring something-but they are not necessarily measuring
399

'lying."

ii. The Problem ofReverse Inferences
The inability of study designs to isolate those neural processes
that are active only when deception is present raises the problem of
reverse inferences. Most would agree that while not completely
consistent, the neuroimaging studies of deception all show brain
activation in similar regions.400 This result would lead one to
conclude that when a subject is engaged in deception, certain
general brain regions are active. Researchers then conclude that
when a certain region is active, the subject is lying. Inferring
behavior from brain activation in certain regions is only valid,
however, if activation of that brain region only occurs when that
behavior is present. The regions of the brain identified as active in
fMRI deception studies are regions known to be associated with
higher-level executive functions and are activated in a number of
situations unrelated to deception.40 ' As noted by Elena Rusconi and
Timothy Mitchener-Nissen, "[J]ust because the prefrontal cortex is
activated during deception it does not follow that every time the
prefrontal cortex activates the individual is lying."402

Farah et al., supra note 51, at 123.
399 Shen & Jones, supra note 350, at 875.
400 The active brain regions are usually displayed
on a spatial MRI scan of a
typical brain and are the result of the average regions of activation identified
across the study participants. Because the resulting image of the group study is
an average, no single participate may have displayed precisely the same areas of
brain activation seen on the composite scan. Brown & Murphy, supra note 33, at
1151-52, fig.2.
401 Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 31, at 5.
402 Id.
398
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Martha J. Farah and her colleagues identified this same flaw in
their meta-analysis of fMRI deception studies. They found at least
one study where the activation patterns in the prefrontal cortex
were greater in truth-telling than in deception, precisely the
opposite of the theory upon which fMRI lie detection is based.403
This observation illustrates the misleading results that can occur
when one considers the difficulty of isolating the neural correlates
of deception in the study design and then using reverse inferences
to assume BOLD activation patterns in the prefrontal cortex
indicate deception. Either one of those problems raises serious
reliability concerns, but their combination poses a major obstacle
in using fMRI as a reliable lie detector.
iii. The Problem ofBOLD Assumptions
The underlying theory of fMRI as a lie detector relies upon the
assumption that lying requires more brain energy than truth-telling
and that more brain energy is identified by the BOLD response in
the region of interest.404 Professor Brown and Dr. Murphy
identified three important unanswered questions about the BOLD
response that cast some doubt upon the underlying assumptions of
BOLD fMRI as a reliable lie detector.4 05 They first found evidence
that BOLD response may reflect neural activity related to synaptic
input rather than output, the reverse of the theory upon which
BOLD response to detect deception is based.406 Second, they also
found a study suggesting that astrocytes, a structural but nonneural brain cell, may be involved in the BOLD response in some
yet unknown fashion.40 7 If non-neural brain cells are involved in
the BOLD response it raises questions about whether the BOLD
response is an accurate gauge of neural activity in the first place.
Finally, they noted a third researcher who found increases in neural
Farah et al., supra note 51, at 125, citing J. D. Greene
and J. M. Paxton,
Patterns of Neural Activity Associated with Honest and Dishonest Moral
Decisions, 106 PROC. NATL. ACAD. Sc. 12506 (2009).
404 See supra notes 33-65 and accompanying text.
405 Brown & Murphy, supra note 33, at 1140-41.
406 Id at 1140.
4 07
Id. at 1141.
403
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blood flow in certain regions of the brain in anticipation of neural
firing, but without actual neural firing.408 This finding also runs
counter to the basic theory underlying the BOLD response as a
reliable indicator of deception. Their survey of the relevant
scientific literature led them to conclude:
Each new finding about the BOLD response suggests that our
understanding of its neurological basis and correlation to brain activity
is just scratching the surface. Understanding this phenomenon at the
level of the neuron is critical to understanding if it is capturing little,
some, or most of the brain's actual neuronal activity in response to an
event. In turn, this knowledge is necessary to bridge the gap between a
particular cognition or behavior and the neural mechanism underlying
it.409

iv. The Problem of Subject Compliance and Countermeasures
Even the most carefully designed experiment will produce
invalid results if the design is not followed scrupulously by the
investigators and the participants. In the published studies,
researchers generally took great pains to explain the process to
ensure compliance with the test design. But this rehearsal and
preparation may be a two-edged sword. While it is generally
routine practice for subjects in fMRI detection studies to review
the SIQs prior to the scan to ensure their understanding of the test
requirements and reduce confusion, no one knows where the line
between appropriate study preparation and extensive rehearsing is
and what happens when that line is crossed.410 If the story told in
the scanner is so rehearsed that Sip's and colleagues' cycle of
deception4 11 is on autopilot and the responses to the SIQs require
virtually no mental effort, will neural patterns of deception be
detectable? No one knows the answer to this fundamental question.
In the fMRI setting, movement in the scanner, whether slight or
gross, intentional or unintentional, will introduce signal noise that
will degrade the data and complicate analysis. Theoretically,
engaging in some taxing mental activity, like complex
id

408
409 Id.
410
411

Shen & Jones, supra note 350, at 876.
See supra note 383-87 and accompanying text.
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mathematical calculations, while undergoing fMRI could alter
neural activation patterns and confound the resulting data.412 While
some published fMRI lie detection studies have addressed subject
compliance and even encouraged participants to "beat the test," 413
there has been no comprehensive study of countermeasures. Selfreporting by participants that they altered their breathing during the
scan, visualized themselves in another environment, or delayed
their responses to questions is not a substitute for controlled and
careful studies of how participant non-compliance or deliberate
employment of countermeasures might degrade the data and distort
the results.
A recent study by Giorgio Ganis and his colleagues, however,
has demonstrated the importance of the countermeasure issue. 4 14 In
a version of the concealed information test, twenty-six Harvard
University undergraduates were asked to view a series of six dates
while in the scanner and respond by pressing a button with their
right finger to indicate whether the date had any significance.4 15 Of
the six dates displayed during each scan, four were insignificant to
the study participants.4 16 The other two consisted of the subject's
birthdate and a personally insignificant "target" date to which the
subjects were exposed prior to the scan.4 17 To test the effectiveness
of countermeasures, the participants were scanned three times.418 In
the first scan they were exposed to six dates, only one of which,
the "target" date, was of significance and were asked to indicate
their knowledge of the dates by pressing either the "yes" or "no"
button with their right hand 419 . The only response that should have
elicited a "yes" response was the "target" date.420

Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 31, at 6.
413 Kozel et al., supra note 31, at 612.
414 Ganis et al., supra note 57,
at 312.
4 15
Id. at 313-15.
412

416 id.
417

id

418

id

41

9 id.

420 id.
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In the second scan the goal was to detect whether the
participants had some concealed knowledge of a salient date.42 1
They were instructed to respond truthfully to the irrelevant and
target dates during this scan but to respond deceptively to the
probe date, i.e., their birthdate.42 2 The post-scan analysis was 100%
effective in identifying the "lie" about their birthdate.423
Between the second and the third scan, the group was
instructed in countermeasures to employ during the final scan.424
Specifically, they were told to imperceptibly move their left index
finger, left middle finger, and left big toe before responding to
three of the irrelevant dates in the final scan.4 25 This introduced not
only a delay in response time, but also required a contralateral
motor movement, i.e., movement on the left side of the body in
addition to the movement necessary to press the response device
with the right hand.426 In response to the other three dates in the
sequence, they were told to respond truthfully to the "target" date
and to the other irrelevant date, but to press "no" indicating no
knowledge of their birthdate.42 7 After practicing the countermeasures,
the subjects were scanned.
In the final scan, in which the countermeasures were employed
before responding truthfully to three of the irrelevant dates, the
accuracy rate in detecting the deceptive response to the salience of
their birthdate dropped to only 30% with most of the incorrect
classifications being false negatives.4 28 In other words, introducing
imperceptible movements just prior to responding enabled the
participants to conceal the lie about the salience of their own
birthdate 70% of the time.

421
422

Id. at 314.

d

423Id. at 315.
424Id. at

313.

425
426

id
id.

427

1d. at 313-14.
1d. at 315, 318 fig. 4b.
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The ease at which the countermeasures could be learned and
employed, coupled with the salience of the probe item, the
subject's birthdate, led Ganis and his colleagues to conclude that:
[F]inding no difference between the activation to probes and the
irrelevants in a typical CIT [concealed information test] paradigm does
not imply that participants are honestly reporting ignorance about the
probe; the result could instead be a false negative produced by covert
countermeasures applied by individuals who have actually committed
429
the crime under investigation.

They cautioned against using neuroimaging deception detection
paradigms in an applied setting until the vulnerability of the
technology to countermeasures has been studied more thoroughly. 43 0
Perhaps because the courts have had such a long history with
polygraphy and countermeasures have plagued the reliability of the
polygraph,4 3' courts will most likely require experts to study the
effect of countermeasures and develop means to detect their
employment before admitting opinion testimony on truthfulness
based on fMRI scanning. Leading researchers in fMRI lie detection
technology understand and agree with the courts' concerns: "until
conclusively proven otherwise, brain imaging should be expected
to be no less sensitive to countermeasures than the polygraph." 432
To date, this standard has not been met.
v. The Problem ofData Analysis
Brain scans are data intensive. Managing and analyzing the
data is a complex process dependent upon important choices and

429Id.

at 318.

4 30 id.

431

See, e.g.,

NATIONAL

RESEARCH

COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND

LIE

DETECTION 139 (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2003)
("Perhaps the most serious potential problem with the practical use of the
polygraph is the possibility that examinees-particularly deceptive ones-might
be able to decrease the test's accuracy by engaging in certain behaviors,
countermeasures, designed to produce nondeceptive test results.").
432 Paul R. Wolpe, Kenneth R. Foster & Daniel D. Langleben, Emerging
Neurotechnologiesfor Lie detection: Promises and Perils, 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS
40, 44 (2010).
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tradeoffs along the way.433 Two such choices that influence internal
validity are the threshold at which voxel activation 434 is considered
significant in constructing the fMRI image and the "base rate" of
liars in the population tested. The first is related to the BOLD
theory itself. The second is one of applying statistical principles to
determine the sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, and
negative predictive value of a given test. Both of these factors
should be explored under the "protocols or standards" factor and
the "error rate" factor in a Daubert inquiry.
(1) Threshold of Voxel Activation
As outlined in Part II, the BOLD response is the difference in
cerebral blood flow, cerebral blood volume, and cell metabolism
between the two brain states of interest, truth-telling and lying.435
Because the brain is always active, even when the subject is asleep,
cerebral blood flow, cerebral blood volume, and cell metabolism
are always present, as is every one of the brain's over fifty billion
neurons.43 6 The MRI scanner captures the magnetic resonance of
this constant neural activity over the course of the scan.4 37 If
hemodynamic activity was the only criteria by which to compare
two brain states, the resulting images would show some
hemodynamic activity in all areas of the brain at all times. But the
BOLD response is a relative condition that compares
hemodynamics between two brain states, such as lying and truth
telling.4 38 By setting a threshold level at which to consider the
hemodynamic response significant, the researchers can disregard
433 Jones, et al., supra note 57, at 9 ("It is important to remember that fMRI
images are the result of a process a about a process; [m]ultiple choices and
multiple steps go into determining exactly what data will be collected, how, and
when-as well as into how the data will be analyzed and how it will be
presented.").
434 See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text for an explanation of
"voxels" in fMRI studies. Voxel activation refers to the hemodynamic changes
that occur in the brain during the scan and are captured by the scanner.
435 See supra, Part 11 Evidence of Lies: Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging.
436 See Aguirre, supranote 40, at S9-S l1.
43
7Id. at S10.
438

Id. at S8.
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the "normal" hemodynamics of the brain and focus only on those
areas that have a greater amount of neural activity. Setting the
threshold level is part of the test design and therefore is a choice
made by the researcher.439 There is no pre-determined level agreed
upon by all research labs, and there is no standard set by scientific

consensus. 44 0
If the threshold is set low, far more brain regions will appear
active than if the threshold is set high.44 ' The low setting produces
far more data points to analyze but will necessarily include activity
in regions of the brain that may have nothing to do with the brain
state under consideration. 442 By the same token, if the threshold is
set high in an attempt to narrow the area of interest, some regions
actively engaged in the process may be excluded from the analysis
because the hemodynamic response in those voxels does not reach
the threshold level set by the researcher. 4 43 The fundamental
decision as to the threshold level of voxel activation considered
significant may explain the wide variety of brain regions seen as
active in fMRI deception studies across labs and test paradigms. 44 4
Craig Bennett and his colleagues dramatically illustrated this
aspect of BOLD fMRI by placing a dead fish in an MRI scanner
and exposing it to "a series of photographs depicting human
individuals in social situations . . . [and] ask[ing] ... [the fish] to

determine what emotion the individual in the photo must have been

439 See, e.g., Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 31, at 6 ("The subjectivity
inherent in fMRI analysis algorithms needs to be acknowledged and these
algorithms opened up for scrutiny.").
44
0
("[A]logorithms are not purely objective artifacts; they encapsulate and
reproduce all the subjectivity, bias and assumptions of the programmers, and
some of these may differ each and every time they are applied.").
441 See Aguirre, supra note 40, at S11.
442 id
443
id.
444 See, e.g., Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 31, at 5 ("[A]ssuming
increased oxygenated blood flow in specific brain regions denotes deception,
scientists have not agreed with a degree of precision as to what these specific
regions are.").
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experiencing."" 5 The result: "[s]everal active voxels were discovered
in a cluster located within the salmon's brain cavity."446 Obviously,
a dead salmon could not have any neural activity, much less neural
activity associated with discerning human emotion based upon
pictures of people in various social activities. Nevertheless, the
BOLD fMRI images showed several active voxels in the salmon's
brain.4 47 By processing the data through two different correction
algorithms the false positive result was eliminated.44 8 They
concluded that reliance on standard statistical thresholds for voxel
activation and low minimum voxel cluster sizes are ineffective to
ensure valid conclusions and argued that multiple comparison
correction algorithms should be standard practice in the vast
majority of fMRI studies.44 9 Of course, these correction algorithms
themselves are constructed based on various assumptions and
decisions to apply one particular statistical approach instead of
another, thus bringing choice into the equation once again.450
Running multiple correction algorithms will tend to minimize the
overall effect of a given choice, but the point remains that human
choice, not the purely objective output of a computer, is
influencing the data in a way that will influence the ultimate
interpretation.45'
Unfortunately, most published fMRI studies do not go into all
the detail necessary to identify the specific choices the researchers
made from the study design to the colorful images said to represent
a particular brain state.4 52 This makes it difficult to assess the
validity of the studies that underlie the principles and methods

445 Craig M. Bennett, Abigail A. Baird, Michael B. Miller & George L.
Wolford, Neural Correlates of Interspecies Perspective Taking in the Post-mortem
Atlantic Salmon: An Argumentfor Multiple Comparisons Correction,in OHBM,
June 18-23, 2009, San Francisco, CA, 456 SA-PM.
446 id.
447 Id.
448 Id.

449 id.
450 Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supra note 31, at 6.
451

452

Id
Spence, supra note 46, at 11.
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relied upon by an expert offering an fMRI-based opinion on
whether a witness is lying or telling the truth. If fMRI-based expert
opinion on witness truthfulness was admitted, juries would be
confronted with the range of statistical choices available to
construct an fMRI image, whether those choices are reliable in the
abstract and whether they were reliably applied in the case at trial.
Only after resolving those difficult questions could the jury assess
the credibility of the expert and, finally, evaluate the substance of
the opinion itself and decide whether to believe the witness whose
credibility is in issue. The jury, essentially, becomes a committee
ruling on the propriety of the science behind the fMRI BOLD
theory for lie detection before it can accomplish its task of finding
the facts in the case. Until the science matures and test design and
statistical choices that must be made to process raw data into
images interpretable by the expert become standardized,4 53
fMRI-based lie detection will have problems with internal
validity.454 The jury's task of deciding the facts of the case will be
hindered and not helped by the distraction and confusion necessary
to fully analyze the internal validity of a study on fMRI lie
detection before being able to apply the opinion based on that
study to the witness in question.
(2) The Problem of the "Base Rate" ofLiars
Using fMRI to identify liars or to verify truthfulness is a
binomial task. That is, it places individuals into one of two groups
depending upon whether the brain state of interest, deception, is
present, much like a medical test identifies whether a patient has a
given disease. One measure of the "error rate" of such tests is the
statistical validity of a test results. These results can be expressed
in terms of the test's "sensitivity" and "specificity."4 55 Sensitivity

453 Greely & Illes, supra note 33, at 337.
454See Brown & Murphy, supra note 33, at 1154 ("Unless standardized and

transparent criteria are followed to process the data and construct the activation
map, the procedures employed could be subject to distortion.").
455 For a detailed explanation of calculating sensitivity and specificity in
medical diagnostic and surveillance systems, see generally H. Kelly et al.,
Estimating Sensitivity and Specificity from Positive Predictive Value, Negative
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refers to the ability of the test to correctly identify the individuals
who actually lied.456 Also referred to as the "true positive rate," the
greater the sensitivity the better the test design is at identifying
liars as liars and reducing the false positives (calling a truth teller a

liar). 457
Specificity, or the "true negative rate," on the other hand, refers
to the ability of the test to correctly identify those who did not
display the brain state of interest. In the case of fMRI lie detection,
this means correctly identifying those who actually told the truth.
The greater the specificity the better the test design is at reducing
false negatives (calling a liar a truth teller).458
Calculating the sensitivity and specificity of a lab experiment is
rather straightforward. Sensitivity is determined by dividing the
number of true positives (those the test correctly identified as
telling a lie) by the total of the true positives and false negatives
(those the test incorrectly identified as telling the truth when they
actually lied).459
Specificity is determined by dividing the number of true
negatives (those the test correctly identified as telling the truth) by

Predictive Value, and Prevalence: Application to Surveillance Systems for
Hospital-acquiredInfections, 69 J. HosP. INFECTION 164 (2008). The binominal
nature of fMRI lie detection studies readily permits the application of the wellestablished validity criteria of sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value,
and negative predictive value to the results. See, e.g., Wolpe et al., supra note
432, at 40 (calculating sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive value, and
negative predictive value to analyze the accuracy of an fMRI lie detection
study).
456 Christiana Drake & Richard A. Levine, Sensitivity, specificity and other
diagnosticmeasures with multiple sites per unit, 26 CONTEMP. CLINICAL TRIALS
252, 252 (2005) (explaining the application of sensitivity and specificity
calculations to medical diagnostic tests when attempting to determine whether
the patient has the condition of interest).
457 Wolpe et al., supra note 432, at 41; WALTER SINNoTT-ARMSTRONG,
Neural Lie Detection in Courts, in USING IMAGING TO DETECT DECEIT 36, 37 (E.

Bizzi, et al. eds., 2009).
458

4 59

d
1d. at 42, Table 1.
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the total of the true negatives and the false positives (those the test
incorrectly identified as telling a lie).460
Equally important is a test's "positive predictive value"
("PPV") and "negative predictive value" ("NPV"). The PPV is the
probabilitythat a person who the test identified as having the brain
state at issue actually has that brain state.46' Conversely, the NPV is
the probability that a person who did not exhibit the brain state of
interest actually did not have the brain state of interest.462 In the
context of fMRI lie detection, the PPV expresses the probability
that one who exhibits the neural correlates of deception while
answering salient questions is actually lying, while the NPV is the
likelihood that a person who did not exhibit the neural correlates of
deception was actually telling the truth.463 Going beyond sensitivity
and specificity to determine PPV and NPV evaluates the test
design in terms of probabilities and approaches a more realistic
"error rate" of the test.46 4
PPV is calculated by dividing the number of true positives by
the total number of true positives and false positives. 4 65 The
resulting percentage is the likelihood that one whom the test
identifies as a liar is actually a liar. Knowing the actual number of
subjects who "lied" (the total of true positives and false positives)
is required to calculate the PPV. 466
NPV is calculated by dividing the number of true negatives by
the total number of true negatives and false negatives. The
resulting percentage is the likelihood that one whom the test
identifies as a truth teller is actually a truth teller. Knowing the
actual number of subjects who did not "lie" (the total of true
negatives and false negatives) is required to calculate the NPV.467

460

id.

461

id.

462 Id. at 42.
463

4 64

id.

d

465

I. at 42, Table 1.

466

id

467

id.
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What is readily apparent from this brief discussion of the
statistical methods used to evaluate the accuracy of a laboratory
test is that the researcher must know the "ground truth" for each
participant in the study in order to determine specificity,
sensitivity, PPV, and NPV of the test. While that is not difficult in
the controlled environment of the lab, it is virtually unknowable in
real-world applications. After all, the whole purpose of
administering a lie detector test to an individual, whether in a
criminal investigation or security screening exercise, or in
anticipation of trial testimony is to determine whether an
individual is lying or telling the truth. In those settings, by
definition, we do not know the "truth."
When fMRI lie detection is employed as a screening tool, we
do not know the ratio of truth tellers to liars in the population
screened. Furthermore, when fMRI is employed in a forensic
setting to determine whether an individual witness lied or told the
truth, the sensitivity, specificity, PPV, and NPV depend upon the
test paradigm of the underlying studies. Any difference between
the laboratory studies and the actual forensic application will
influence the "error rate" of the forensic application. The different
factual scenarios, fMRI protocols, and data analysis techniques
used by the various published studies on fMRI lie detection makes
it difficult to calculate an overall error rate for the technology,
generally, and virtually impossible to calculate for an individual
forensic application.468
Daniel Langleben and Jane Moriarity question whether
"overall error rates are a meaningful variable or whether error rates
for each testing scenario need to be evaluated separately."469 They
argue, however, that "the inherent accuracy of lie detection within
an individual subject is a prerequisite for further translational
research [and that] understanding the error rate of a test is not
complete until its positive and negative predictive powers are also
468 Daniel D. Langleben & Jane C. Moriarty, Using Brain Imaging for Lie

Detection: Where Science, Law, and Policy Collide, 19 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L.
222, 229 (2013).
469 Id.
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known."470 Complicating determination of the error rate is the need
to know the "base rate" of liars within the population tested.47 1
In a 2005 study, Paul Wolpe, Kenneth Foster, and Daniel
Langleben illustrated the significance that the "base rate" of liars
within the tested population can have on the predictive value of an
fMRI lie detection scan.47 2 Using Ben-Shakhar's and Elaad's metaanalysis of 123 polygraph studies using the Guilty Knowledge Test
paradigm, in which the sensitivity and specificity ranged between
70% and 85%,47 Wolpe, Foster, and Langleben calculated the PPV
and the probability of a false positive in a hypothetical population
group of criminal suspects with an assumed "base rate" of liars of
50% and a group of Department of Energy employees with an
assumed "base rate" of liars of 0.1%.474 They found when the
prevalence of liars within the tested group was low, "the test will
yield far more false-positive than true-positive results; about one
person in five will be incorrectly identified by the test."4 75 They
also found that even in a population with a "base rate" of liars of
50%, the PPV is "quite low." 4 76 Their study led them to conclude
that "[n]ew technologies may-or may not-improve the situation,
but clearly a very large improvement in the specificity of the test
would be needed for its performance to be acceptable for most
forensic or security purposes."4 77
c. External Validity
External validity is a measure of how well the laboratory
results can be applied to those who did not participate in the study,
whether it is the population at large or to a specific individual.4 78
470 Id.
471 Wolpe et al., supra note
432, at 42.
472 Id.
473 G. Ben-Shakhar & E. Elaad, The Validity ofPsychophysiologicalDetection
of Information with the Guilty Knowledge Test: A Meta-analytic Review, 88 J.
APPLIED PSYCH. 131, 132 (2003).
474

Wolpe et al., supra note 432, at 43.

475Id.
476Id.
477

LLe
478 LAWLESS ET

AL., supra note 335, at 39.
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The typical fMRI lie detection study usually deals with a small
number of participants who are mostly undergraduate students.
They are, generally speaking, young, healthy, eager to participate
and further the cause of science, and without significant social or
medical histories, such as drug or alcohol addiction, that might
confound the results of the study. Ethical concerns require
researchers to make sure the study participants are suitable
candidates for the study and will not be harmed by the study
procedures.4 79
The Problem ofPopulationDifferences
To be externally valid, however, the study results must be
applicable to a wider population or demographic. In the forensic
setting, one takes his subject as he finds him. In other words,
applying fMRI lab research based on young, healthy, and
unmedicated volunteers and comparing it to fMRI results based on
individuals caught up in the criminal justice system ignores the
difference in those two population groups. Mental illnesses,
personality disorders, drug abuse, alcohol addiction, which are all
factors screened for and eliminated in the lab studies, are
encountered routinely in the criminal justice system. Whether any
one or a combination of these factors would influence the outcome
of an fMRI scan is unknown because it has not been studied.4 80
i.

479 See Kozel et al., supra note 31, at 606 ("The subjects were healthy
unmedicated adults ages 18-50 years who were screened with a Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders (SCID-1) . . . a pre-MRI

screening form, a medical history, and a physical exam. They were evaluated
with an Annett Handedness Scale ... and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory
(STAl) ....

A urine sample was obtained for a drug urinalysis and a urine

pregnancy test if a female of child-bearing potential.").
4 80
See, e.g. Kozel, et al., supra note 377, at 228 ("[W]hether fMRI deception
testing would work is unknown for participants who are taking a medication,
who have a significant psychiatric or medical condition, or who are outside the
18-50 year age range[,] [f]uture studies will need to be performed involving
these populations."); Simpson, supra note 31 at 494 ("There has been no testing
of fMRI lie detection paradigms in juveniles, the elderly, or individuals with
Axis I and/or Axis II disorders, such as substance abuse, antisocial personality
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The significant difference between the demographics of the
study participants and those typically seen in the criminal justice
system does not exist in all potential forensic uses. For example, a
"white collar" criminal defendant may exhibit all the
characteristics of the typical study participant. By the same token,
a percipient witness in a criminal or civil case may very well
possess the same characteristics of the typical study population.
The point is that external validity is an important consideration in
every application of fMRI lie detection research and must be
evaluated in each instance. In some situations weak external
validity may render the application of the technology unreliable,
while in other situations the similarity between the study
participants and the individual may be sufficient to satisfy this
important aspect of scientific research.
ii. The Problem of CulturalDifferences
Equally problematic from an external validity standpoint is the
cultural influence of deception. From a psycho-social perspective,
"culture" refers to "features of human groups that typically vary
according to geographic areas and which depend upon social
learning; it includes shared attitudes, practices, and beliefs,
together with languages and religions."481 While some fMRI
studies have noted the ethnicity of the study subjects,4 82 there has
been no systematic consideration of the influence of culture on the
neural correlates of deception. If lying is a social construct and
deception involves intentionally creating a false belief in the mind

disorder, mental retardation, head injury, or dementia. It is unclear whether and
how such diagnoses would affect the reliability of the approach.").
481 Tommaso Bruni, Cross-Cultural Variation and fMRI Lie detection,
TECHNOLOGIES ON THE STAND: LEGAL
NEUROSCIENCE AND ROBOTICS 129 (2012).
482

AND

ETHICAL

QUESTIONS

IN

See, e.g., Tatia M. C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic

Resonance Imaging, 15 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 157, 159 (2002) (identifying

study participants as "native Chinese (Mandarin) speakers from Mainland
China").

OCT. 2014]

Evidence of Lies and Rules of Evidence

227

of another, then the social and cultural milieu in which the
exchange takes place may influence the brain's processing. 483
iii. The Problem of Group to Individual (G2i) Inference
Another important aspect of internal validity is whether BOLD
responses generated by group-averaged studies can be applied to
individuals. 484 Most fMRI lie detection studies have averaged the
degree of activation and location of active voxels of the study's
participants to create a graphical image that displays the average of
the neural correlates for the group.485 Because the study produces
an average of brain activation, some members of the group will
have more areas active; some will have less. Some will show
activation in areas that others do not. Conceivably, a given
participant's brain activation pattern may fall completely outside
the graphical image constructed on the average pattern of
activation across a group.486
Extrapolating the group-averaged data to make definitive
determinations about an individual is problematic, at best.487
Science is concerned with universal conditions in populations;
such an approach increases our understanding of ourselves and the
world in which we live. A trial is concerned about the conduct of
an individual. Does the individual about whom the law is
concerned share precisely the same attributes as the average data
from the subjects of the underlying studies? Unless and until more
studies are done with larger numbers of participants, the attempt to
apply group-averaged data to individuals will raise serious external

Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen, supranote 31, at 6.
For a discussion of the problem of group to individual inference (G2i) in
scientific expert testimony, generally, see generally Faigman, Mohahan &
Slobogin, supra note 279, at 23.
485 Kanwisher, supra note 381, at 7.
483

484

486

d

487 See, e.g., id.; Shen & Jones, supra note 350, at 881 (2011) ("It is an

inferential challenge to move from group-averaged neuroscience data to individual
assessments.").
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validity problems and directly undermine the trustworthiness of an
opinion based on that data.488
d. Ecological Validity
Ecological validity is a measure of the correlation between the
controlled and structured laboratory conditions of the study and
what one would experience in the uncontrolled and unstructured
dynamics of a real-world setting.489 This inquiry looks at the
underlying studies upon which the principles and methods used by
the expert are derived. None of the studies relied upon by
proponents of fMRI lie detection were designed to measure the
neural correlates of deception in a real-world environment. Dr.
Laken, one of the leading proponents of fMRI lie detection and the
scientist who has studied this area more than perhaps anyone else,
acknowledged, "I don't know of a way to do real world scenario
testing."490 Dr. Laken was, however, willing to assume that the
BOLD response observed by researchers in laboratory settings,
using undergraduates who were instructed to lie about their
involvement in a mock crime, would be the same as that of a
criminal defendant facing a prison sentence.49 '
Another ecological validity problem is illustrated quite well by
the Semrau case itself. The fMRI deception studies generally
require the participants to engage in some activity and then "lie"
about their involvement.49 2 Apart from the difference between the
artificial laboratory condition and what might exist in the real
world, the typical test paradigm involves behavior or action on the
part of the participants.49 3 In Semrau, on the other hand, Dr.
Semrau was not asked about whether he engaged in certain

4 88

id.

489 d
490 Testimony of Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, May 13,
2010,
Vol. 11 at 191, United States v. Semrau, No. 07CR10074-1JPM (W.D. Tenn.).
491 Id., May 14, 2010, Vol. IV at 39-40.
492 Spence, supra note 46, at 13.
493 Id. at 14-21, Table 1 (describing studies).
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behavior. 4 94 Rather, he was asked about whether he had a certain
state of mind or intent at a point in his past. 495 No fMRI deception
studies to date have explored whether lying about a past state of
mind as opposed to past behavior would engage the same regions
of the brain to the same extent. Assuming the neural correlates of
deception when the subject lied about engaging in certain
behaviors are the same when the lie involves a past state of mind
instead of conduct or behavior is a question the neuroscientists
have not explored.
6. Reliable Application ofReliable PrinciplesandMethods
The sixth and final requirement imposed by Rule 702 is that
the expert must reliably apply the appropriate reliable principles
and methods to sufficient facts and data in reaching his opinion.
This inquiry will always be case-specific. In the context of fMRIbased lie detection, this involves examining the specifics of the
fMRI scan of the witness in question, the creation of the graphic
images of the BOLD response, and the expert's interpretation of
those images.
Assuming there are standards or protocols that guide the
application of the principles and methods to individual subjects,
the inquiry will be whether the expert followed those standards or
protocols in reaching the opinion offered in the case. Protocols
applicable to individual lie detection have not been published in
the scientific literature, though companies offering commercial
services claim to follow their own proprietary protocols.49 6
The importance of the case-specific analysis of this requirement
of Rule 702 was apparent in Semrau. Dr. Laken's first scan of Dr.
Semrau concerning the AIMS testing issue revealed Dr. Semrau

494 United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *4 (W.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2010).
495
496

id.

See, e.g., No LIE MRI, http://www.noliemri.com/products/Overview.htm
("No Lie MRI is a proprietary product that objectively measures intent, prior
knowledge, and deception using algorithms to automatically analyze functional
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI).") (last visited March 8, 2014).
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was being deceptive.497 Dr. Laken surmised that the deception
result was probably caused by fatigue.498 He then arranged for a
repeat scan which revealed no deception.
D. Frye: The General Acceptance Standard
At the time of this writing, the only other courts to consider
fMRI as a lie detector are the Supreme Court of New York in
Wilson v. Corestaff Services, L.P.,49 a civil action for retaliation
after plaintiff reported sexual harassment by a fellow employee on
the job, and State v. Smith,soo a case where the defendant, a veteran
of the Iraq War, was accused of murdering his roommate. Both
courts rejected the fMRI evidence for failing to meet the "general
acceptance" standard followed by their respective jurisdictions.
In Wilson, plaintiff claimed that the defendant's manager,
Edwin Medina, instructed another Corestaff employee, Ronald
Armstrong, to deny plaintiff a temporary work assignment because
she complained of sexual harassment in an earlier temporary
assignment."o' Armstrong was plaintiffs only witness to the
alleged retaliatory statement made by Medina and Armstrong's
credibility as a witness was central to plaintiffs ability to prove the
retaliatory action by her employer.o 2 Armstrong underwent fMRI
testing by Dr. Laken who concluded that Armstrong was being
truthful when he answered SIQs that Medina made the retaliatory
statement."o3 Plaintiff intended to call Dr. Laken to bolster
Armstrong's testimony as to Medina's instructions not to provide
temporary work assignments to plaintiff because she complained
of sexual harassment.504 The defendant moved to exclude Dr.
497 United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *8 (W.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2010).
498

id

Misc. 3d 425, 900 N.Y.S.2d 639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C (Cir.
Ct. Montgomery Cty., M.D., Oct. 3, 2012).
501 Wilson, 28 Misc. at 426, 900 N.Y.S.2d
at 640.
50 Id.
49928
500

504

id.
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Laken as an expert witness under Frye, the standard for
admissibility of scientific evidence in New York."'5
Expert testimony based on scientific theory is admissible in
New York if the following conditions are met: (1) the scientific
theory, principles, or procedures have gained general acceptance in
the relevant scientific community; (2) the testimony comes from a
qualified expert; and (3) the topic of the expert testimony is
beyond the common knowledge of the average juror.50 The trial
court found that Dr. Laken's testimony went to a collateral matter,
the credibility of Armstrong, which was clearly within the ability
of the jury to determine without the aid of expert testimony.o7
Additionally, the court expressed great reservation and skepticism
about ever admitting expert testimony on the credibility of a
witness:
How complex and confusing would a trial become for the jury if it were
faced with conflicting expert opinions, each with scientific authority to
support it, upon the collateral matter of credibility. The first question
would be the credibility of the experts, and then the credibility of the
witness. The battle of the experts might well be such that the jury
would lose sight of the issues or, at the very least, would tend to regard
the opinion of the expert as determinative of credibility of the witness
rather than to the consider it only as one factor of many to be
considered in concluding wither a witness is telling the truth.os

While the court held that the failure of the proffered testimony
to meet the third prong of the Frye test was sufficient to exclude
Dr. Laken's testimony, the trial judge commented that "even a
cursory review of the scientific literature demonstrates that the
plaintiff is unable to establish that the use of the fMRI test to
determine truthfulness or deceit is accepted as reliable in the
relevant scientific community." 0 ' The court granted the defendant's
motion to exclude Dr. Laken's testimony and denied plaintiffs
sos Id.
506 People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 452, 835
N.Y.S. 2d 523, 375 (N.Y. App.
2007).
507 Wilson, 28 Misc. at 427-29, 900
N.Y.S.2d at 641-42.
508 Id. at 428, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 641-42 (quoting People v. Williams,
6 N.Y.2d
18, 27, 187 N.Y.S.2d 750, 757 159 N.E.2d 549, 554 (N.Y. 1959)).
509 Id. at 429, 900 N.Y.S.2d at 642.
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motion for a full Frye hearing on the general acceptance of fMRI
as a lie detector.1 o
In Smith, the defendant underwent fMRI scanning by No Lie
fMRI, a company that, according to its website, uses technology
that "represents the first and only direct measure of truth
verification and lie detection in human history!""5 1 Smith offered
expert opinion testimony that the BOLD response during Smith's
fMRI indicated he was being truthful when he denied shooting
McQueen.5 12 In an effort to convince the trial court that fMRI lie
detection was generally accepted by the scientific community and
met Maryland's standard for admitting novel scientific testimony,
Smith argued that in twenty-five peer-reviewed scientific journal
articles on fMRI lie detection, none found that "the technology
does not work."5 13 He also argued that in over ten years of research
no published studies refute the validity or reliability of fMRI lie
detection.5 14
The state countered with scientific articles questioning the
reliability of fMRI lie detection and offered the testimony of a
neuroscientist declaring that the neuroscience community did not
yet accept fMRI lie detection."
The court applied the Maryland general acceptance standard 5 16
and found that "it is clear to the Court that the use of fMRI to
detect deception and verify truth in an individual's brain has not
achieved general acceptance in the scientific community."' The
"tepid approval of a few scholars through twenty-five journal

510

Id.

" No LIE FMRI, http://www.noliemri.com/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C at 4
(Montgomery Cty, MD, Oct. 3, 2012).
s13 Id (emphasis in original).
514 Id at 5.
512

515

id

See Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978) (adopting Frye test).
Memorandum Opinion and Order, Maryland v. Smith, No. 106589C at 5-6
(Montgomery City, MD, Oct. 3, 2012).
516
517
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articles does not persuade this Court that such acceptance exists,"
the court reasoned. 1
Wilson and Smith highlight the gap between the neuroscience
community and the proponents of fMRI as a scientifically valid
and reliable lie detector. Even some proponents and researchers of
the new technology acknowledge that more work needs to be
done.5 " Aside from the few published studies of small groups of
volunteers undergoing fMRI scanning under laboratory conditions,
which all acknowledge further research is required, the
professional literature uniformly demonstrates a cautious attitude
within the relevant scientific community.
VI. RULES OF EVIDENCE: BALANCING PROBATIVE VALUE
VERSUS PREJUDICIAL EFFECT

As the discussion of impeachment and rehabilitation indicated,
the trial judge has tremendous discretion when it comes to
admitting evidence to impeach or rehabilitate a witness. Rule
611(a) codifies the inherent authority of the trial judge and
provides textual support for much of the discretionary authority of
the judge. It establishes goals for the conduct of the trial and places
the responsibility for the "effective working of the adversary
system" squarely on the shoulders of the trial judge.520 Rule 611(a)
emphasizes the effective search for truth without wasting time and
without subjecting witness to harassment or undue embarrassment.
While Rule 611(a) establishes desirable objectives for the conduct
of the trial, Rule 403 establishes a test for the admission of
evidence that furthers those objectives.

5'

Id. at 4.

Spence, supra note 46, at 24 ("While brain imaging is
fashionable, and its data susceptible to multiple, aesthetic modes of presentation,
further empirical data are required to justify its future application to the field of
lie detection."); Langleben, supra note 31, at 6 (predicting that demand and
technical feasibility "are likely to produce a clinical fMRI-based lie detector in
the near future").
520 FED. R. EvID. 611(a) (advisory committee's note)
(1972).
519 See, e.g.,
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Rule 403 permits the exclusion of otherwise relevant and
admissible evidence if the probative value5 21 of the evidence for the
point for which it is offered is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the
jury, waste of time, or the needless presentation of cumulative
evidence.52 2 The balancing of probative value versus prejudicial
effect has played a prominent role over the years in consistently
excluding expert testimony of witness credibility generally, and
polygraph evidence specifically.5 23 It is also clear that Rule 403
operates independently of Rule 702 and evidence that meets the
Rule 702 standard may still be excluded by Rule 403.524
With regard to fMRI-based opinion of witness truthfulness, the
Rule 403 equation considers many of the same factors considered
in the "fit" analysis under Rule 702.525 Probative value is higher the
closer the "fit" between the opinion and the issues to be decided by
the jury. But also included in the Rule 403 balancing is the
availability of other evidence probative of the same point,5 26 the
relative importance in the case of the point for which the evidence
is offered,52 7 and the need for the evidence in the context of the
issues in dispute.'
Against the weight of probative value, the trial judge places the
danger of unfair prejudice, the risk of confusing the issues,
"Probative value" is the strength of the logical chain of inferences from the
item of evidence to the fact it is offered to prove.
522 The use of the term "prejudicial effect" includes all of the
countervailing
factors to probative value. This does not imply that evidence that misleads the
jury, confuses the issues, wastes time, or is cumulative is the same as evidence
that unfairly prejudices the opponent by inappropriately appealing to emotion. It
is used merely as label for the side of the scale opposite probative value.
523 See supra note 287 (listing cases excluding expert testimony on
credibility).
524 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993)
(explaining
that Rule 403 applies to expert testimony); United States v. Ramirez-Robles,
386 F.3d 1234, 1246 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that Rule 702 and Rule 403
"address different aspects of evidence and therefore act independently").
525 See supra notes 276-312 and accompanying
text.
526
Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
527 United States v. Herman, 589 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d
Cir. 1978).
528 United States v. Cook, 538 F.2d 1000, 1004 (3d
Cir. 1976).
521
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misleading the jury, causing undue delay or waste of time, and
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.529 Unfair prejudice
usually refers to an improper appeal to decide the case on emotion
rather than the force of the probative evidence, 30 but it also
encompasses the consideration that the jury may give an item of
evidence more weight than it deserves."' Evidence that is
confusing or misleading distracts the jury from the central issues in
the case and/or raises issues to a prominence that they do not
warrant.5 32 Undue delay and waste of time is, as Justice Holmes
famously remarked, a "concession to the shortness of life."' The
amount of time it takes to present the evidence, as well as any
counter-evidence, is a very real and important factor in the context
of our over-burdened justice system. Left unfettered, lawyers will
offer proof of every fact remotely connected to the case through
several different means. Without some tempering effect from the
trial judge, cases would last even longer than they do now.
Rule 403 balancing must be done in the context of the legal and
factual issues in a given case and the nature of the evidence
available to prove the point in question. While Rule 403 balancing
in the abstract does little more than repeat the language of the rule
itself, we know enough about fMRI-based expert opinion on
truthfulness and the contexts in which it would be offered to apply
the Rule's standards to common scenarios.534 Semrau provides a
Evidence that misleads or confuses the jury may also be categorized as
"unhelpful" under Rule 702, further illustrating the overlap between the two
rules.
530 United States v. Pintado-Isiordia, 448 F.3d 1155,
1158 (9th Cir. 2006).
United States v. Looking Cloud, 419 F.3d 781, 785 (8th Cir. 2005).
532 Harless v. Boyle-Midway Div., 594 F.2d 1051,
1058 (5th Cir. 1979).
5
Reeve v. Dennett, 11 N.E. 938, 944 (1887).
534 Professor Teneille Brown and Dr. Emily Murphy, PhD., explored the
reliability and probative value of fMRI-based testimony as evidence of a
criminal defendant's past mental state. They found that the computer-generated
images of the suspect's brain produced by the fMRI scan and the expert
testimony interpreting those images describing the mental state of the criminal
defendant to be unreliable and a hindrance to the fact-finding process: "[The
fMRI evidence] promotes unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues because it
causes jurors to ground their decision making in emotional responses to images
529
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convenient example, but it did not address all the arguments on
either side of the equation.
The government moved to exclude Dr. Laken's testimony
under Rule 702 and, alternatively, under Rule 403, arguing the
probative value was substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice to the government. 3 1
Three factors figured prominently in the magistrate judge's
decision to also exclude the evidence under Rule 403: (1) the
unilateral nature of the exam;13 1 (2) the use of the evidence to
bolster credibility; 3 ' and (3) the gap between the opinion of
"overall" truthfulness and the specific facts alleged in the
indictment."'
A. Probative Value: UnilateralExaminations
In assessing the probative value of Dr. Laken's opinion, the
magistrate judge first noted that Dr. Semrau's fMRI scan was done
without notice to or participation by the government. Dr. Laken
admitted that if the fMRI scans had shown Dr. Semrau was lying,
the results would have never been revealed to the government."'
Drawing upon precedent involving polygraph examinations, the
magistrate judge found the "nothing to lose" aspect of the
unilateral examination diminishes the probative value of the

and distracts jurors from logical errors [in the basis of the opinion], thus causing
them to make decisions founded on improper bases." See Brown & Murphy,
supra note 33, at 1204.
5s United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *14 (W.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2010).
536 id.
537
id.
5
11 Id. at *1 6.
539 Transcript of Proceedings, May 13, 2010, Vol. 11 at 207, United States v.
Semrau, No. 07CR10074-1JPM (W.D. Tenn.) ("If Dr. Semrau failed [the fMRI
test], and my conclusion was the he failed, he didn't pass the test, you [the
government] would never know that. There are no penalties for failing the test
there.").
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proffered expert testimony on the subject's truthfulness.540 The
Sixth Circuit affirmed the magistrate judge's analysis on this point
and affirmed its appropriateness in justifying the exclusion under
Rule 403.541
Whether the unilateral polygraph exam is good precedent for
evaluating the probative value of an fMRI exam raises an
interesting issue. The theory of reduced probative value of a
unilateral polygraph exam is that because there are no adverse
consequences from failing the exam, there is little or no stress on
the witness.5 42 If he fails the exam, no one will know and he will
not suffer any adverse consequences because he failed. Because
polygraph is based on the notion that heart rate, respiration, blood
pressure, and skin conductivity increase with stress and lying
produces stress, the absence of any consequences for lying reduces
or eliminates the underlying stress upon which the test is based.543
fMRI is not grounded on a theory of stress producing an
identifiable BOLD response. In this respect, the reduction of stress
due to the absence of any adverse consequences of failing an fMRI
test does not necessarily undermine the probative value of the
opinion based on the test. In the MRI setting, stress could be a
confounding variable that the algorithms cannot identify and
account for when processing the data from the scan. Stress may
also increase the likelihood of movement of the subject in the
scanner and introduce other artifacts and noise that could degrade
the quality of the data. It stands to reason that a stress-free subject
may be more comfortable in the scanner, more relaxed, better able
to concentrate on the task at hand, and to otherwise cooperate in a
way that minimizes movement and other confounds that may
distort the data. Conceivably, a stress-free subject may be a better

See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 412 F.3d 771, 773-74 (7th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Thomas, 167 F.3d 299, 308-09 (6th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Sherlin, 67 F.3d 1208, 1217 (6th Cir. 1995).
541 United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2012).
540

542

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND LIE DETECTION 13

(2003).
543 id.
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subject for fMRI truth detection and may produce a more reliable
result, not a less reliable one.
While the stress theory of polygraph that spawned the virtual
per se rule of exclusion of unilateral tests may or may not apply to
the fMRI, a unilateral fMRI is of questionable probative value for
other reasons. First, researchers have not studied fMRI in situations
where grave consequences might result from failure of the test. We
simply do not know whether the BOLD response in one who is
facing serious jail time if he is not believed, regardless of whether
the opposing side is made aware of the result, is the same as an
undergraduate psychology student who is paid fifty dollars to
participate in a controlled study. The stress of consequences could
play a role in the BOLD response, or it could not. The stress of
consequences could make the collection and analysis of the MRI
data more complex if anxiety and stress made it more difficult for
the witness to lie still and cooperate fully with the examiner. The
absence of any research on this important question leaves the
expert to assume that the lack of adverse consequences will not
impact the test. This, in turn, makes the testing environment
significantly different from in-court testimony where adverse
consequences abound. Accepting untested assumptions on such a
critical question is the antithesis of the scientific method and
seriously undermines confidence in the test. This, in turn, reduces
the probative value of the test when it moves from the
neuroscience lab to the courtroom.
A second reason why unilateral fMRI exams have little
probative value is that the opposing party is excluded from the
process of developing the SIQs that will serve as the basis for the
test itself. Excluding the opposing party from the development of
SIQs permits the proponent to craft the questions consistent with
his own factual and legal theory of the case. The resulting opinion
of "truthful" is then based upon only those issues fairly
encompassed by the SIQs and may not extend to other important
factual questions-questions the opposing side deem critical to its
theory of the case. The dynamics of adversarial litigation
necessarily include differences over the facts themselves, but
differences over the importance of those facts-and whether facts
unimportant to one side's theory of the case are important to the
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opponent's side-are omnipresent. A unilateral exam excludes
consideration of the opposition's theory or, at best, frames the
opposition theory through the perspective of the proponent.54 4 In
either case, the resulting opinion on truthfulness will not address
the credibility question from a perspective that objectively
considers both sides of the case, thus reducing the probative value
of the opinion on the credibility issue.5 45
B. Probative Value: Specificity of the Opinion
The magistrate judge found the probative value of Dr. Laken's
opinion was lacking because Dr. Laken could not "offer any
opinion as to whether Dr. Semrau was deceptive or truthful as to
any specific SIQ."54 6 An opinion as to "overall" truthfulness
without an ability to determine the truthfulness of responses to
individual SIQs, could not "assist the jury in deciding whether Dr.
Semrau's testimony is credible."54 7

544 In Semrau, the SIQs were actually drafted and submitted to Dr. Laken by
Mr. Houston Gordon, Dr. Semrau's defense counsel:
Q: All right. The specific incident questions that you asked, though,
that were on scan number one revolved around these two CPT
codes, is that correct?
A: That's correct. Those were the questions that were presented.
Q: Where did those questions come from? Can you tell me that?
A: They came from Dr. Houston-they came from attorney Gordon's
office.
Q: All right. So Mr. Gordon actually drafted-to your knowledge
drafted the specific incident questions.
A: Correct.
Testimony of Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, May 13, 2010, Vol. I at
137, United States v. Semrau, No. 07CR10074-lJPM (W.D. Tenn.)
545 An analysis of the SIQs by the opponent after the scan would give the
opponent an opportunity to point out, from the opponent's perspective,
additional SIQs and flaws in the SIQs actually used. The extent and nature of the
opponent's objections to the SlQs used would still be factors to consider in
determining the probative value of the opinion.
546 United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *16 (W.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2010).
5471d. Evaluating the probative value of an item of evidence by analyzing
whether it will assist the jury in his core function of determining credibility
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An opinion that the witness was "overall" truthful during the
scan may have some probative value as to credibility. The jury
might infer that if he was "overall" truthful in the scan he is
"overall" truthful in court, and if he is "overall" truthful in court he
may be "overall" not guilty of the charged offenses. But Rule 403
is concerned with the weight of the probative value and must
balance that against the weight of the countervailing
considerations. If an SIQ addresses a critical fact alleged in the
indictment, the guilt or innocence of the accused may well turn
upon whether the jury finds that fact established. An expert
opinion on truthfulness that admittedly cannot determine whether
the response to that SIQ was true or false simply does not carry
much weight in determining the truthfulness of the accused's incourt testimony. Thus, the probative value of the opinion for the
proposition offered-the truthfulness of the in-court testimony-is
minimal, at best.548
The Sixth Circuit agreed that the inability of Dr. Laken to
"corroborate Dr. Semrau's answers as to the particular offenses for
which he was charged" was an appropriate factor to consider in
assessing the probative value of the evidence.549
C. Probative Value: Reliability
Opinions based upon scientific principles and methods that are
unreliable are inadmissible under Rule 702 irrespective of
balancing under Rule 403."0 While a threshold level of reliability

underscores the overlap between this aspect of Rule 403 and the "help the trier
of fact" element of Rule 702. See supra notes 264-330 and accompanying text.
548 The Sixth Circuit noted that, "Dr. Laken's conclusion
that Dr. Semrau was
'not deceptive' as to the entirety of the alleged criminal conduct is fully
consistent with the jury's determination that he was guilty of only a small part of
that conduct." United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 524 (6th Cir. 2012).
549 id
55o See supra notes 335-499 and accompanying text. One commentator argues
that when fMRI lie detection technology meets FRE 702's reliability standard,
FRE 403 will not be a barrier to admission. Note, Weighing the Admissibility of
fMRI Technology Under FRE 403: For the Law, JMRI Changes Everything-and
Nothing, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 715, 720 (2013).
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is required to meet Rule 702's reliability standard, reliability is a
continuum; barely reliable is not the same as unquestionably
reliable. The probative value side of the Rule 403 balancing test
attempts to place the reliability of a given opinion somewhere
along that continuum. The more reliable the principles and
methods and the more reliably the expert applied those principles
and methods to the question at hand, the greater the probative
value of the opinion.
Though not specifically relied upon by the magistrate judge in
his Rule 403 balancing in Semrau, the Sixth Circuit found that
"questions surrounding the reliability of fMRI lie detection tests in
general and as performed on Dr. Semrau" also supported exclusion
under Rule 403. "' The court did not specifically assign these
concerns to the probative value side of the scale, but it seems
rather obvious that doubtful reliability would weaken probative
value.
The Sixth Circuit's concern over questions about the general
reliability of the principles and methods underlying fMRI as a lie
detector and Dr. Laken's application of those to his scan of Dr.
Semrau, indicates, however, that Dr. Laken's opinion did not move
the probative value side of the Rule 403 scale much at all. As the
research continues and the principles and methods are refined and
improved, the probative value of an opinion that properly applies
those principles and methods should be greater. The Sixth Circuit's
reliance on this factor in assessing probative value is not the final
word. As the questions that concerned the court are answered, the
probative value of an opinion offered in future cases may move the
scales. How far will depend upon the validity of the scientific
research.
D. PrejudicialEffect: Bolstering Credibility
The magistrate judge in Semrau also found that expert opinion
on lie detection results used "solely to bolster a witness's

551

Note, supra note 550, at 720.
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credibility"5 5 2 was highly prejudicial in a case where credibility
was of central importance.' While this was the second of the three
reasons supporting the magistrate judge's Rule 403 exclusion
ruling, it was not among the three reasons given by the Sixth
Circuit in affirming the Rule 403 exclusion. The Sixth Circuit
noted the three reasons the magistrate judge excluded the evidence
under Rule 403: (1) the unilateral nature of the test; (2) the sole use
of the evidence was to bolster credibility in a case where
credibility was a central factor; and (3) the inability of the opinion
to address the truth or falsity of specific allegations.554 In affirming
the exclusion under Rule 403, the Sixth Circuit found no abuse of
discretion in light of "(1) the questions surrounding the reliability
of fMRI lie detection results in general and as performed on Dr.
Semrau, (2) the failure to give the prosecution as opportunity to
participate in the testing, and (3) the test result's inability to
corroborate Dr. Semrau's answers to the particular offenses for
which he was charged."55 5
The appellate court's omission of any discussion of the
prejudicial effect of admitting expert testimony "solely to bolster a
witness's credibility" aligns the Sixth Circuit with those who
would reject the continued viability of that argument.5 If fact, one
could argue that when credibility is of central importance, the
probative value of otherwise reliable expert testimony on
truthfulness is greater. Other courts would disagree."
E. PrejudicialEffect: Unreliability
Instead of considering the bolstering credibility rationale on the
prejudicial effect side of the Rule 403 scale as did the magistrate
judge, the Sixth Circuit noted that "questions surrounding the
United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *14 (W.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2010) (citing Barnier v. Szentmiklosi, 810 F.2d 594, 597 (6th Cir.
1987)).
5 Id.
554 United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 523 (6th Cir. 2012).
555
Id. at 524.
556 See supra note 288.
1
See supra note 287 (collecting cases).
552
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reliability of fMRI lie detection tests in general and as performed
on Dr. Semrau" support exclusion of the evidence under Rule 403.
The court did not specify whether the unreliability diminished
probative value or increased the prejudicial effect. It actually does
both.
Unreliable principles and methods diminish the probative value
of an opinion based on those principles and methods for obvious
reasons. An opinion based upon scientific principles and methods
cannot be any more reliable than the principles and methods
themselves. Both the magistrate judge and the Sixth Circuit found
fMRI-based opinion on witness truthfulness unreliable when
applied to real-world situations involving a sixty-three year-old
witness and involving events that transpired some six to eight years
before the fMRI scan.' Accordingly, its probative value to prove
Dr. Semrau's truthfulness was minimal.
But because the opinion comes from a respected scientist and is
the product of machines that are relied upon for critical medical
diagnostic imaging, the jury could assign the opinion more weight
than the scientific validity warrants. Accompanied by visual
images produced by the MRI scanner and enhanced by computer
algorithms to highlight with bright colors areas of the brain where
the lie is being processed, the danger of misleading the jury on the
appropriate weight the evidence deserves is manifest. The
questionable reliability of the opinion lessens its probative value
while the risk the jury may give it more weight than its validity
warrants increase the prejudicial effect.
F. PrejudicialEffect: Confusing of the Issues
Though not specifically addressed by the magistrate judge in
Semrau, it is readily apparent that the danger of unfair prejudice
and jury confusion may be enhanced because of the perceived
powerful nature of scientific testimony.s" A neuroscientist
prepared to show jurors fMRI scan images graphically illustrating
558 United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *12 n. 17
(W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010); Semrau, 693 F.3d at 522 n.10.
559
See supra note 299.
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the BOLD response in the prefrontal cortex of a trial witness and to
explain that those images represented the brain lying and then to
show them images without the BOLD response present when the
witness was answering truthfully is powerful evidence. This
"scientific proof' that a witness was or was not lying could cause
the average juror to defer the credibility question to the expert.
To overcome the perceived adverse impact to the government's
case should such evidence be admitted, the prosecution would
likely call its own experts to refute the reliability of fMRI
methodology and challenging the validity of the defendant's
expert's opinions. The trial could become a referendum on the
reliability of fMRI as a lie detector, and the jury may be distracted
from the central issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence. In
Semrau, the Daubert hearing itself took two days, dozens of
exhibits, and three well-qualified experts testifying as to the
reliability of fMRI as a truth detector and Dr. Laken's application
of it to Dr. Semrau.sso Had the trial court admitted Dr. Laken's
opinion, the substance of the Daubert hearing would have been
played out before the jury. The jury would then have to weigh the
testimony of the various experts and the exhibits to determine what
weight to give Dr. Laken's opinion and then apply that decision to
weigh the testimony of Dr. Semrau. Ultimately, the jury would get
back to the underlying issue of guilt or innocence, but it would be a
rather long and complicated detour taking significant time and
requiring considerable concentration and attention on matters
collateral to the substantive issues.
VII. RULES OF EVIDENCE: CRIMINAL DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO
OFFER EVIDENCE

Rules of procedure may not arbitrarily deny the criminal
defendant the right to present testimony in his own defense. In
Washington v. Texas,"6 ' the Court ruled that a Texas statute that
precluded co-participants in a crime from testifying for one another
United States v. Semrau, No. 07-10074, 2010 WL 6845092, at *1-4 (W.D.
Tenn. June 1, 2010).
s61 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
560
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violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory
process.5 62
In Chambers v. Mississippi,"' the Court held unconstitutional
state rules of evidence that prevented the defendant from
impeaching his own witness and from introducing hearsay to prove
that another person was responsible for the shooting for which he
was being tried.564 The Court held that in the unique circumstances
of the case, excluding persuasive and trustworthy hearsay that was
critical to the defense violated Chambers' right to a fair trial. The
Court went out of its way, however, to confine the case to its facts
and did not "establish . .. new principles of constitutional law.""'

Similarly, in Rock v. Arkansas,566 the Court found unconstitutional
a per se rule that precluded the defendant from testifying in his
own defense because he had undergone hypnosis to help him
remember the events in question.' The Court held that, "A [state's]
legitimate interest in barring unreliable evidence does not extend to
per se exclusions that may be reliable in an individual case."568
Taken together, Washington, Chambers, and Rock might seem
to offer some hope for the fMRI-based expert opinion on
truthfulness that bolsters the credibility of the defendant. In a case
that turns upon whether the jury believes the defendant's or the
government's version of the facts, one might argue that rules
placing conditions and barriers to bolstering credibility before it
has been attacked and requiring rehabilitation evidence to meet the
impeaching evidence,5 69 might infringe the defendant's right to a

562

Id. at 17.

410 U.S. 284 (1973).
1Id. at 302-03.
565 Id. at
302.
566 483 U.S. 44 (1987).
567
Id. at 62.
6
1 1 Id. at 6 1.
See supra notes 85-166 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
rules governing impeachment and rehabilitation and their application to
fMRI-based expert opinion testimony on witness truthfulness.
563

56 4
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fair trial. That argument became much less persuasive in 1998
when the Court decided United States v. Scheffer.o
The issue in Scheffer was whether Military Rule of Evidence
707,"' which inposed a per se ban on the admission of polygraph

evidence in court-martials, violated the accused's5 72 constitutional
right to present a defense.17 ' Airman Scheffer worked as an informant
for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations ("OSI") on drug
cases.574 As such, he was subject to periodic polygraph examinations
and random urinalysis to ensure he was not using drugs.17 ' After a
drug test, but before the results were known, Scheffer underwent a
polygraph examination administered by an OSI polygrapher."' The
test results indicated "no deception" when Scheffer denied using
drugs. 77 Shortly thereafter, Scheffer went AWOL 7 ' and was arrested
by civilian police during a routine traffic stop approximately two
weeks later.5 79 Meanwhile, the results of the urinalysis revealed the
presence of methamphetamine.' Scheffer was charged "for uttering
bad checks, wrongfully using methamphetamine, failing to go to

523 U.S. 303 (1998).
571 MIL. R. EVID. 707(a) provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of
law, the results of a polygraph examination, the opinion of a polygraph
examiner, or any reference to an offer to take, failure to take, or taking of a
polygraph examination, shall not be admitted into evidence." The Rule was
promulgated by Exec. Order No. 12,767, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,296 (June 27, 1991),
pursuant to the President's authority under UCMJ art. 36 to make rules of
evidence for military courts.
572 In the Military Justice system the criminal defendant is referred to as the
"accused." The trial judge is referred to as the "military judge." The jury is
referred to as the "members of the court."
1 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 305.
57
id.
14
Id.
570

576 Id. at 306.
577 id.

AWOL is the acronym for the military offense of absent without leave,
UCMJ art. 86 (2012); 10 U.S.C. § 886 (2012).
7
1581Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 306.
0

id.

OCT. 2014]

Evidence of Lies and Rules of Evidence

247

his appointed place of duty, absenting himself from his unit for
thirteen days without authority.....

At trial, Scheffer pled not guilty and denied "knowingly"
taking any drugs.58 2 To buttress his claim of "innocent ingestion,"
Scheffer offered the result of the exculpatory polygraph taken
shortly after the urinalysis. 58 3 The military judge, citing Military
Rule of Evidence 707, excluded the polygrapher's opinion
testimony.5 84 Scheffer was convicted and appealed to the Air Force
Court of Criminal Appeals, which affirmed the military judge's
exclusion of the polygraph evidence."'
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces granted review and
reversed, holding that the per se ban of Military Rule of Evidence
707 was unconstitutional in a case where the accused testified at
trial, was impeached with inconsistencies between his trial
testimony and prior statements, and where the prosecutor argued in
closing, "He lies. He is a liar. He lies at every opportunity he gets
and he has no credibility.""' Under these circumstances, the court
found, a per se ban on polygraph evidence deprives the accused of
his Sixth Amendment right to present a full defense.8
The Supreme Court granted Scheffer's petition for a writ of
certiorari and reversed the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces,
holding 8-1511 that the government's interest in ensuring that
reliable evidence is presented in criminal trials was sufficient to
justify the per se of polygraph testimony.589 In light of the lack of a
scientific consensus on the reliability of the polygraph and the
general exclusion of polygraph evidence by state and federal
courts, "excluding polygraph evidence in all military trials [was] a

582

United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 443 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 306.

583

id.

Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 307.
United States v. Scheffer, 41 M.J. 683 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc).
586 United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 444 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
ss. Id. at 445.
588 Justices Thomas, Rehnquist, O'Connor, Kennedy,
Scalia, Ginsburg, Stevens,
Souter, and Breyer were in the majority. Justice Stevens dissented.
584
585

589 Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309.
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rational and proportional means of advancing the legitimate
interest in barring unreliable evidence."s90
Four Justices also found that "[p]reserving the court members'
core function of making credibility determinations in criminal
trials"59 ' and "avoiding litigation over issues other than the guilt or
innocence of the accused"5 9 2 were also legitimate governmental
interests that justified the per se ban on polygraph evidence.
As it applies to fMRI-based expert opinion on witness
truthfulness, note that Scheffer involved a trial where the criminal
defendant testified, was impeached, and was specifically accused
of lying on the witness stand at trial. The polygraph testimony was
offered to rebut the charge of deliberate fabrication of trial
testimony. Because eight justices found that polygraph evidence
was unreliable and that unreliability justified the Commander-inChief's per se ban on all polygraph evidence, Scheffer's Sixth
Amendment argument failed. As noted in Part IV.C of this Article,
this is one of the scenarios in which traditional rules of
impeachment and rehabilitation would countenance extrinsic
evidence to bolster credibility. Should fMRI lie detection
technology reach a level of reliability to satisfy Rule 702,
exclusion of opinion testimony is this situation would, arguably,
violate the Sixth Amendment rights of the defendant. Short of
reaching that level of reliability, or if the offer of fMRI-based
opinion to bolster credibility does not come after the defendant has
testified and been impeached with an express or implied charge of
deliberate in-court fabrication, Scheffer is distinguishable and
would not directly support the constitutional argument to admit the
evidence.
Assuming no significant advances in fMRI lie detection reliability,
courts rejecting Sixth Amendment arguments for admission would
seem to be on solid ground. Of course, should fMRI lie detection
become more reliable, or if polygraph itself demonstrates significant
590

Id. at 312.

"'Id.at 312-13.
592

Id. at 314.

593

Id. at 314-15.
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improvement in reliability, the Sixth Amendment argument would
gain new strength in the circumstances of Scheffer. While Scheffer
stands for the proposition that the Sixth Amendment does not provide
a right to introduce unreliable evidence, it does not determine the
reliability question for all time.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Functional magnetic resonance imaging as a lie detector is,
relatively speaking, in its infancy. Its ultimate acceptance by the
courts as a reliable indicator of credibility will require considerable
advances in the science underlying the theory as well as
considerable changes in attitudes of the judicial system towards the
jury's role in determining credibility issues.
A number of scientific shortcomings must be resolved before
fMRI can satisfy the exacting standards of admissibility in American
trials. First, is the lack of any real world testing of fMRI's
reliability as a lie detector. The studies done to date have all been
laboratory controlled experiments where subjects were paid to lie
about certain recent events while undergoing fMRI scanning. We
do not know and can only assume that the neural correlates of
these "instructed lies" are the same as lies told in the "real world."
While laboratory experiments and tests are instrumental in scientific
advancements, they do not and cannot duplicate the range of
human emotions and responses one experiences when faced with
accusations of wrongdoing in the real world. Unless and until
fMRI proves its reliability as a lie detector in real world
applications, it will remain an interesting area of scientific inquiry
that may well lead to a better understanding of brain function that
will have other benefits to society.
Second, is the inability of the fMRI to distinguish between the
subjective belief of the witness and objective truth. During crossexamination of Dr. Laken at the Daubert hearing in Semrau, the
following exchange took place:
Q: You have not performed any fMRI testing in a situation such as we
have here where an individual has been living with an alleged lie or
a potential lie for a period of six to eight years, correct?
A: So we tested and our conclusions are based on today, what does he
believe today.
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Q: But whether or not the effect of the memory or the fusing of that lie
into the person's brain, whether or not that is possible, you don't
know because you haven't researched it.
A: We don't know. 594

Similarly, during direct examination, Dr. Laken testified that
the fMRI scan showed that "[Dr. Semrau] believes that he is telling
the truth at least."59 5 Whether the witness believes he is telling the
truth is not the question the jury must decide. The jury has to
determine whether the witness is actually telling the truth.
According to Dr. Laken, perhaps the country's foremost proponent
of fMRI as lie detector or truth verifier, the technology is incapable
of making that critical distinction.
Third is the lack of protocols or standards, specifically with
regard to SIQ formulation, scanning procedures, and the computer
processes necessary to convert the raw data to the final image
reflecting the BOLD response. Dr. Laken concluded, without any
research to support it, that the form of the questions during the first
scan on the AIMS testing were in some way responsible for the
initial deception determination. By revising the SIQs and
rescanning, he obtained a truthful result. If the outcome can be so
dramatically altered by reformatting the SIQs it would seem that
appropriately designed studies would identify the critical components
of SIQ formulations and standard protocols developed. Until then
it appears that the person conducting the test can redraft SIQs and
rescan until the desired result is obtained.
Even if fMRI's proponents can establish reliability in real
world applications, there is still the well-recognized and almost
sacred principle that the jury is responsible for determining the
credibility of the witnesses at trial, and they do not need the
assistance of expert opinion in performing that task. The average
juror, as a citizen going through daily life makes credibility
judgments about other people all the time. Sometimes they judge
594 Testimony of Steven Laken, Transcript of Proceedings, Vol. II at 221-22,
United States v. Semrau, No. 07CR10074-1JPM, 2010 WL 6845092 (W.D.
Tenn. May 13, 2010).
595
Id. at 99.
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rightly and sometimes they judge wrongly. Our judicial system
expects those citizens to bring those experiences and that common
sense into the jury box and apply them to the witnesses who testify
at trial. But the American system of justice does not entrust that
duty to a single person."' The jury, as a group of citizens, must
reach a collective judgment on who to believe and what weight to
give the testimony of the witnesses at trial. In the criminal trial, the
jury of twelve citizens597 stands as the bulwark between the power
of the state and the freedom of the defendant. This citizen's check
on the power of the state is deeply entrenched in the American
understanding of democracy and the people's relationship with the
state. Conceding that role to MRI scanners and expert witnesses
with scientific opinions on who is and who is not telling the truth is
a radical departure from our common law heritage and the very
basis of the jury system.
Compounding these problems is the reality that under the
current rules and traditions of impeachment and rehabilitation, the
use of extrinsic evidence in the form of expert opinion testimony
on witness truthfulness is available only in a limited number of
circumstances. Those circumstances are further limited by the fact
that opportunities to offer fMRI-based expert opinion on
truthfulness will depend upon the trial tactics of the opposing
party; something the proponent of the expert testimony cannot
control. Whether commercially viable lie detection will be
available at prices litigants can afford when the opportunity for
actually admitting the evidence at trial is remote is a problem. The
time, effort, and expense of the neuroscience community to study
"real world" application of the technology when its actual use at
trial is rather remote may stifle the research. One company which

Of course, a defendant may waive the right to a jury trial and elect to have
a single individual, the trial judge, decide his fate.
Some jurisdictions try cases with six jurors, but the tradition and usual
5
practice is to empanel twelve.
596
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had offered fMRI lie detection services, Cephos Corporation, has
already abandoned the market."'
While fMRI may hold great promise in neuroscience and
eventually bring new understanding to human behavior, its use as a
lie detector in American courts is stymied by the law of expert
testimony under both the Daubert and Frye standards, the problem
of creating jury confusion over the collateral issue of witness
credibility, the tradition against bolstering witness credibility
before it has been attacked, and the common law tradition of
placing credibility determinations solely within the province of the
jury. Separately, these evidentiary hurdles present significant
challenges to the admissibility of fMRI based expert opinion
testimony of witness truthfulness. Combined, they present a
virtually insurmountable barrier.
The advance of science and the tenaciousness of the
neuroscience community may well solve the reliability issue that
precludes admissibility under Daubert and Frye. Addressing the
other barriers to admissibility will fall within the purview of the
legal community. That debate is ongoing and will continue
unabated.

Cephos Corporation, the company providing the fMRI services in Semrau
and Wilson, left the lie detection market in 2013. Apparently the time, effort, and
expense to develop the technology to a point where it would meet admissibility
standards was not commercially feasible. See supra note 194.
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